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Abstract
The present dissertation consists of six parts: an introduction, four chapters and a 
conclusion. It is intended to recapture the rhetorical norms governing the Confucian and 
Socratic dialogues—their voice of credibility, proto-scientific attitude, tragic 
consciousness, and use of irony—so as to demonstrate how rhetoric enables them to carry 
out their political, philosophical and epistemological pursuits; my research aims at the 
description of similarities and differences between Socrates’s and Confucius’s rhetorical 
methods, which are shaped by their respective historical and cultural contexts.
Specifically, my major objectives are to foreground, in accordance with Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
theory of dialogism, the significance of the “dialogical rhetoric” and dialogic imagination 
of the two cultural giants in their own rhetorical contexts, and also to illuminate how their 
application of dialogue contributes to our understanding of orality and literacy in an era of 
electronic revolution. As a final goal, I attempt to facilitate an intercultural dialogue 
between Confucius and Socrates so as to help set up a bridge of communication between 
the East and West through my delineation of Confucius’s rhetorical vision of harmony 
among human beings and between nature and human society, and also through my 
description of Socrates’s true rhetoric of philosophy that has inspired numerous admirers 
in the East for its persistent efforts to seek truth and knowledge. I am convinced that a 
better understanding of their rhetorical activities will help reconcile some conceptual 
conflicts between Western and Eastern cultural traditions instead of intensifying a possibly 
sharp confrontation that some cultural historians have predicted for the twenty-first 
century.
vii
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Introduction
In the Western world much has been contributed to the exploration of rhetoric 
ever since the word “rhetorike” first appeared in Plato’s Socratic dialogue Gorgias,* 
though Socrates himself is often kept out of the domain of rhetorical criticism. When we 
turn an eye to the comparative rhetoric, it becomes clear that Western historians of 
rhetoric virtually ignored the Eastern rhetorical tradition, the Chinese tradition in 
particular, until the publication of Robert Oliver’s Cultural and Communication in 
Ancient India and China1 in 1971. This work provides a general examination of ancient 
rhetoric in the two cultures. As a student of rhetoric from China, I have been wondering 
about the following questions: Why have Socrates and Confucius, representatives of two 
great civilizations, often been neglected in rhetorical studies? Could these two cultural 
giants be rhetorical dwarfs only when the conception of “rhetoric” is generally understood, 
according to the Aristotelian definition, as “the power of perceiving the available 
persuasives (pisteis)” (Conley, 14)? What do Socratic and Confucian dialogues contribute 
to the history of rhetoric? These questions have served as a starting point for my 
explanation of rhetorical constructs in Socratic and Confucian dialogues.
1
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Through the present dissertation, I hope to recapture the rhetorical norms 
governing the Confucian and Socratic dialogues—their voice of credibility, proto-scientific 
attitude, tragic consciousness, and use of irony—so as to demonstrate how rhetoric enables 
them to carry out their political, philosophical and epistemological pursuits. My research 
aims at the description of similarities and differences between Socrates’s and Confucius’s 
rhetorical methods, which are shaped by their respective historical and cultural contexts. 
Specifically, my major objective is to highlight the significance of the “dialogical rhetoric” 
and dialogic imagination of these two rhetors in rhetorical history, and to illuminate how 
their application of rhetoric contributes to our understanding of orality and literacy in an 
era of electronic revolution. As a final goal, I attempt to facilitate an intercultural dialogue 
between Confucius and Socrates, and hope to set up a bridge of communication between 
the East and West through my delineation of Confucius’s rhetorical vision of harmony 
among human beings and between nature and human society, and also through my 
description of Socrates’s true rhetoric o f philosophy that has inspired numerous admirers 
in the East for its persistent efforts to seek final truth and knowledge. I am convinced 
that a better understanding of their rhetorical activities will help to reconcile some 
conceptual conflicts between Western and Eastern cultural traditions instead of 
intensifying a possibly sharp confrontation that some cultural historians have predicted for 
the twenty-first century.3
My rhetorical study of Confucius and Socrates is based on some historical 
understanding of their life experience, and an exploration of their verbal activities in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
form of dialogue, either with individuals or in a small group. Sima Qian (1457—90? AD.), 
a “Chinese Herodotus,” provides the most comprehensive biography of Confucius,4 who 
was bom of a poor but once-prominent family in Lu state in 551 B.C., and died in 479 
B.C. He was a descendant of the Duke of the state of Song. When he grew up,
Confucius was first put in charge of the granary o f the house of Baron Ji, and then was 
offered a position to take charge of cattle and sheep. At the age of about thirty5 Confucius 
found himself ready for the realization of his political and philosophical ideal of Ren ( \^  , 
human benevolence) and Li (Jf^ , holy ritual system, rites). Being aware of the social 
disorder, especially the wars among the dukes of separated states under the symbolic 
control of King of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770—256 B.C.), Confucius committed 
himself to a teaching career which lasted more than forty years and continued to the end of 
his life. Thus, he became the first educator in Chinese history to open a private school on 
a comparatively large scale. The total number of his students was said to have reached 
about three thousand, and among them there were seventy graduates distinguished for 
their achievement in political, military, business, educational or literary fields (Sima Qian, 
1968). Confucius did not leave any of his writings, though many of the ancient Chinese 
classics were said to be either composed or edited by him.
Confucius’s rhetorical activities, in fact, occupied a major part of his educational 
practice, and what he said was written down by his disciples in a book later entitled Lun 
Yu (The Analects), which indicates that dialogue assumed a dominant role in the process
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of his passing on knowledge. Among more than five hundred sayings in The Analects, 
there are about three hundred dialogues in question and answer form. More than one 
hundred of Confucius’s or his disciples’ sayings may serve as statements on the topics of 
discussion or as direct answers to questions omitted in the text. Due to the basic form of 
dialogue, some scholars feel justified in arguing that “The Analects” is not an appropriate 
translation for the original Chinese term Lun Yu (&<*£? ££■»), and that the most accurate 
rendering should be “discussions and dialogues.”6
Confucius’s rhetorical claims are reflected in his educational practice with an 
emphasis on the relations between learning and thinking, between observing and 
questioning, and in the interaction between rhetors. And his rhetorical activities are often 
reflected in his dialogues that took place during his tours in different states. These 
dialogues are with dukes, literati, scholars, hermits or farmers. They touch upon the 
issues of government administration, rites, benevolence, history and social injustice. The 
dialogues mainly expressed his humanist concern, his perseverance in philosophical 
pursuit, and his attitude toward face-to-face investigation. His rhetorical contact with 
various audiences or interlocutors also revealed his consciousness of the power of orality 
in promoting social reform. These sometimes seemingly contradictory oral events indicate 
a true understanding of the function of face-to-face dialogue in ancient times, when the 
means of transportation and communication put a limit to the exchange of ideas.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The Confucian dialogues have long been observed for their stylistic elements. 
F.S.C. Northrop demonstrates that Confucius “ambles along in an informal conversational 
style with concrete, common-sense examples. There is little of technical terminology, the 
formal definitions, or the logically connected reasoning which characterized practically all 
of the scientific and philosophical treatises of the West” (Northrop, 322). However, it is 
Robert Oliver who first made a brief study of Confucius as a rhetorician. Oliver lists seven 
purposes of Confucius’s Yan ( £  , word) and about fourteen persuasive methods used 
in The Analects. The Confucian concepts of the importance of speech and the manner of 
speech are also explained. Finally, Oliver emphasizes the two indispensable guides to 
effective communication—Ren (benevolence) and Li (rites)— on which Confucian rhetoric 
rests. Oliver’s exploration of Confucian rhetoric, though an initial survey of modest 
scope, offers a comparatively rich source of alternative views to the Euro-American 
rhetorical tradition.
Vernon Jenson, a scholar of East Asian rhetoric, has also called attention to the 
growing importance of Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist teachings in interpersonal 
communication, and outlined a course of rhetorical study in Asian speeches. In the past 
few years, an awakening of interest in Confucian rhetoric has also produced some useful 
studies of The Analects. Among them are A. S. Cua’s “A Possible Rhetoric of Confucius,” 
Donald V. Etz’s “Confucius for the Technical Communicator,” Christoph Harbsmeier’s 
“Confucius Riddens: Humor in The Analects,” and Guo-Ming Chen’s “A Chinese
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Perspective of Communication Competence.” These essays have shed some light on the 
rhetorical aspects of Confucius—interpersonal communication, technical composition, 
persuasiveness, implicit assumption and humor—and they have further broadened the 
rhetorical vision of Confucius’s discourse.
There are some biographical similarities between Socrates and Confucius. The 
accepted date of Socrates’s birth is the year 469 B.C. His execution took place in 399 
B.C., when he was seventy years old. Socrates was bom in a sculptor’s family. His 
poverty, at least in the later part of his life, was certain, which may result from his 
carelessness about seeking money and his passion for and unceasing pursuit of philosophy. 
Socrates left nothing in written form, and knowledge of his life and work is drawn from 
the Socratic works of Xenophon (Apology, Memorabilia, Symposium) and the dialogues 
by Plato, who, like Xenephon, was a young disciple of Socrates in his later years. Other 
sources come from the incomplete Socratic dialogues by Aeschines; some comments by 
Aristotle, who was a student of Plato; and also a comedy, Clouds, produced by 
Aristophanes in 423 B.C., when Socrates was about forty years old. Among all these 
“Socrates,” the Platonic Socrates,7 particularly the Socrates that emerges from the early 
dialogues of Plato, is usually accepted by historians o f rhetoric and philosophers (e.g., 
Guthrie, Vlastos, Kennedy), though with reservations, to be the most accurate portrait of 
Socrates. It is through Plato’s dialogue form that Socrates has become one of the major 
sources of influence on Western civilization for more than two thousand years.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Beginning with the major effort of Schleiermacher in the nineteenth century, 
scholars have tried to determine the authenticity and chronology of the Platonic Socrates's 
dialogues and finally classified these dialogues into three periods:8
1. Early period (in alphabetical order): Apology, Charm ides, Crito, Euthydemus,
Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Hippias Minors, Ion, Laches, Lysis,
Menexemts, Protagoras, Republic I.
2. Transitional period (in alphabetical order): Cratylus, Meno,9 Parmenides, 
Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic II—X, Symposium, Theaetetus.
3. Later period (in alphabetical order): Critias, Laws, Philebus, Politucus,
Sophist, Timaeus.
From the above Socratic dialogues, we are convinced that Socrates shared with the 
leading Sophists of his time an emphasis on the significance of thinking and arguing for 
oneself, and that his verbal activities encouraged argument and dialectic as a way of 
discovering truth. Philosophically, Socratic dialogues helped his interlocutors increase 
their self-knowledge by making them aware of their ignorance. By unceasing attempts to 
reflect on and rearrange their ideas in the progress of oral cross-examination, Socrates 
vigorously led them to arrive at real and final knowledge.
Socrates’s rhetorical efforts are also dramatically reflected in the speech activities 
related to his trial, which eventually led him to suffer a death penalty. At his trial,
Socrates insisted on receiving a reward for the services he had made to the Athenians in 
examining their opinions and clarifying his philosophical claims. At the sacrifice of his life,
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Socrates reached the goal of confronting the Athenians and arousing again through 
dialogue their consciousness of self-knowledge. Thus he left us a portrait as the very 
personification of philosophy itself, and as a last representative of orality during a 
historical period in which Greek civilization was moving from the stage of orality to that 
of writing.
Socratic dialogues have been studied in thousands of books, monographs and 
essays in different languages. However, owing to the anti-“rhetorical” attitude expressed 
in some of his dialogues,10 and also owing to the Aristotelian distinction between 
“Philosophy”and “Rhetoric,” Socrates is seldom studied in accordance with rhetorical 
criticism. To the best o f  my knowledge, only a few scholars like Rossetti (1984, 1989), 
Famess (1987), Seeskin (1989), Carter (1991), Vincenzo (1992), Lewis (1993) and 
Easterbrook (1995) point to the rhetorical maneuvers in the Socratic dialogues. Among 
these critics, Rossetti views the rhetoric of Socrates as “anti-rhetoric rhetoric,” which is 
characterized by its particular conversational practice and preference for allusive 
communication. Vincenzo argues that Rossetti fails to perceive how the true rhetoric of 
Socrates is different from Sophistical rhetoric and argumentative speech, a rhetoric that is 
the language of philosophy itself. In accordance with the perspective of Heidegger,
Famess reviewed Era Brann’s and Thomas West’s interpretation of Socrates’s Apology 
and tried to highlight how Socrates uses his particular rhetorical methods to martyr 
himself so that he could glorify his philosophical self with his final verbal activity. In some
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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more recent studies, Carter emphasized the epideictic rhetoric that functions in Socrates’s 
funeral oration, while Lewis traced the pathological element in Socrates’s defense speech. 
Easterbrook’s study in 1995 analyzed how Kierkegaard employs Socrates as the image of 
the concept of irony and as the historical founder of concepts, and demonstrated the role 
irony and indirection play in the rhetorization of philosophy in Socratic dialogues.
Now let us have a brief review of how the comparative study of Confucian and 
Socratic dialogues has long been a research interest for those who attempt to facilitate 
East-West communication. The Chinese philosopher, Feng Youlan, may be one of the 
first scholars who pointed to a possible comparative study of the form and content of 
Confucian and Socratic doctrines. In a book published in 1938, Feng observed briefly the 
similarities between the teaching activities and research methods of Confucius and those of 
the Greek Sophists, and between the influence of Confucius on Chinese history and that of 
Socrates on Western history (Feng, 76-9). Another well-known Confucian scholar, Lin 
Yutang, also mentioned the Greek rhetorical aspects of ethos and pathos in his study of 
Confucian sayings. Antonio Cua’s exploration has made a breakthrough in the 
comparative study of Confucius and Socrates. Cua presented a general characterization of 
Confucian, Socratic and Zen11 uses o f dialogues for understanding moral experience, and 
his examination focused on the principal features o f role-playing, reasoning and 
argumentation in a speech situation for exploring a source of models. Maurice Cohen’s 
re-interpretation of comparable aspects in Confucian and Socratic conversations explained
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
the reason that the two philosophers remained so attached to intimate discourse—face-to- 
face conversation—for the clarification of the social, political and ethical concepts that 
concerned them most. The preceding comparative works, however, have just expressed a 
general concern for philosophical or ethical issues, and they seldom touched upon the 
theoretical aspects of rhetorical criticism. Moreover, they are often confined to general 
comparisons in the light of Aristotelian classifications when engaged with rhetorical issues.
The rhetorical exploration of Socratic and Confucian dialogue has to face two 
major challenges. First, Socrates’s attitude toward rhetoric often leads his critics to 
consider that his discourse could hardly be constructed with rhetorical strategies 
conventionally characterized by Sophists’ “knack.” Second, the denial of the existence of 
an ancient Chinese rhetoric (Murphy, 100) and the partial description of Confucian 
rhetorical application of argumentation and logical reasoning12 have actually marginalized 
this Eastern cultural giant and active rhetor to the position of a muted thinker who paid 
little attention to the oral aspects of a philosophical activity. These challenges have 
certainly followed their rhetorical standards. The traditional and classical definitions of 
philosophy and rhetoric partially characterize Socrates as a philosopher as opposed to a 
rhetorician. And the Western tradition of rhetorical theory has ruthlessly reduced 
Confucius to the status of an Eastern moralist or educator rather than a rhetor by Western 
standards. Thus, these two historical figures are alienated from their rhetorical context, 
for the continuous research interest in their dialogues or sayings concentrates on their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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philosophical claims rather than rhetorical strategies. Both Socrates and Confucius are
often kept in the position of the “oppressed” in Freire’s sense13 in rhetorical studies. To
have their voices heard and their dialogues mediated calls for a breakthrough in theoretical
interpretation and also a methodological innovation.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of rhetoric, based on his dialogic imagination encourages
a new approach to the study of Socrates’s and Confucius’s dialogues. To begin with,
Bakhtin criticizes the traditional, agonistic sense of rhetoric by defining it as monologic
and polemic, inasmuch as the commonly discussed rhetoric posits a writer or a speaker
directly addressing a reader or an interlocutor, anticipating their responses and exposing
the defects in their opposition in order to “persuade” by every possible means. In
monologic discourse, one assumes dominance and privilege, and deliberately suffocates a
possible dialogue (verbal or non-verbal exchange and heteroglossia—a multitude of voices
that insures the primacy of context over text) by ignoring the existence outside oneself of
another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities. This rhetoric is
attached to authority and ownership. As Bakhtin points out sharply:
In rhetoric there is the unconditionally innocent and the unconditionally guilty: 
there is complete victory and destruction of the opponent. (And) the destruction 
of the opponent also destroys that very dialogic sphere where the word lives.14
This kind of rhetoric, according to Bakhtin, exhibits the monologic quality of the word. It 
produces a vision of a glory that word or speech act could temporarily ensure in its uni­
directional penetration of the other’s discourse while denying the bi-directional function of
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the discourse~to penetrate and to be penetrated. And this is the reason Bakhtin directs 
intense criticism at rhetoric characterized by monologue and polemic verbal activity.
What then is Bakhtin’s understanding of the word? Bakhtin’s basic scenario of 
human communication is based on the assumption of two actual participants talking to 
each other in a particular dialogue at a particular time and a place. However, these two 
participants need not face each other, because utterance and response can be sent to each 
other through a space envisioned by the interpreter or reader who illuminates the “sender” 
and “receiver” (of utterance) relations in communication. In a broad sense, each o f these 
two participants could be “a consciousness” at a moment of history that defines itself 
through a choice it has made out of various “languages” available to it—a particular 
discourse form to clarify its intention in a particular form of communication. These “two 
consciousnesses” or “two voices” (as Bakhtin defines them) are active participants in a 
dialogue that produces utterance and presupposes response. Moreover, this response 
could either be the utterance of the other voice or consciousness or the utterance of 
oneself. This is the understanding of the dialogic property of the word in its synchronic 
sense.15 In its diachronic sense, each of the utterances, spoken or written, is always 
responsive to some earlier utterances or voices by ourselves or someone else. Through 
this dialogue between voices we articulate our role as part of the dissemination of the 
social discourse which enables us to be in a position “to know what comes next.” By 
contrast, the “monologue as speech is addressed to no one, and does not presuppose a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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response,”16 although Bakhtin, unlike Mukarovsky,17 does not regard the role of 
participants as either active or passive, and he insists that in a discourse the two subjects 
constantly influence each other even when one speaker keeps absolutely silent.
Among artistic discourses, Bakhtin privileges novels as an exemplary model of 
discourse which constantly evolves a mode or model, the culture in which it is produced. 
To be accurate, it deals with its form-shaping ideology in terms of a particular type of 
understanding of language that combines dialogue with a new concept, “heteroglossia.” 
Language or a dominant language is thus demonstrated to be composed of countless 
extraliterary languages, each the product of a particular type of experience and each 
providing a new way of understanding the world. We—the users of language (speakers or 
writers) all take part in the countless “languages of heteroglossia,” and meanwhile we also 
experience the struggle of these languages, for each of them claims a privileged 
individualized expression. Such linguistic contention brings out the possibility for dynamic 
interaction in the process of construction as a novel.
Heteroglossia also designates a linguistic stratification (i.e., genres, levels of 
speech, social ideological or professional features) in various spheres and directions, and 
results in an intentional linguistic diversity. Thus the fictional world is presented as 
diverse rather than uniform, contextual rather than textual. In Bakhtin’s classification, the 
novel represents the heteroglossia of an era and various strata of discourses. Traditional 
rhetorical discourse becomes one of these. Bakhtin further divided traditional rhetorical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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texts into two categories in his “Discourse in the Novel” (375). One is the discourse 
outside of novels which functions as “dialogizing background in which the language of the 
world and of the novel is polemically and forensically implicated and marked for the 
absence of heteroglossia.” The other “incorporates heteroglossia into a novel’s 
composition” (375). Apparently Bakhtin insists that the ancient rhetorical discourses by 
Socrates, Cicero, Augustine, Boethius and Petrarch belong to the second category. In 
other words, these discourses are dialogic and open-ended rather than monologic and 
dogmatic. Irony lies in the fact that Bakhtin did develop a negative perception of rhetoric, 
yet simultaneously he acknowledged the significance of rhetorical discourse in his system 
of novelistic theory. His attitude toward this contradiction is to categorize the practice of 
the above rhetoricians into “pre-novelistic forms.” Some rhetorical critics attached 
Bakhtin’s negative attitude to rhetoric to the political-ideological circumstances and 
historical limitation imposed on Bakhtin.18 Other critics argue that Bakhtin’s unfavorable 
view of rhetoric responds not only to Soviet politics but also to a contemporary formalist 
rhetorical theory.19 However, no matter what contributes to Bakhtin’s criticism of 
rhetoric, one thing remains clear: his novelistic theory is closely related to rhetorical 
history, and he never does and does not have to exclude the diversity of linguistic activities 
of human society. More importantly, Bakhtin’s description of the rhetorical practice itself 
does broaden our vision and provide us with the new perspectives which shed light on a 
topic both ancient and contemporary.
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Bakhtin’s arguments for a “dialogic” rhetoric will be most useful if they help us to 
rethink and redescribe Socratic and Confucian dialogues. We are able to see how the type 
of verbal activities popular in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. gained vitality for its 
dialogical form and dialogic imagination. I may further demonstrate how Socratic and 
Confucian dialogues function synchronically as communal activities in small groups or 
with an individual interlocutor as well as an individual activity—a conversation with the 
innerself, and also function diachronically as dialogized heteroglossia in their idiosyncratic 
cultural situation and in our contemporary world. Moreover, the Bakhtinian notion of 
dialogic imagination also encourages the interaction between Socratic dialogue and 
Confucian dialogue, and between Socratic acceptance and Confucian acceptance in our 
time. I hope that this comparative study of dialogues by these ancient thinkers will help 
encourage a mutual understanding between the East and the West in the field of rhetorical 
theory.
My dissertation consists of six parts. Chapter One will deal with a major rhetorical 
aspect of Socratic and Confucian dialogues: the creation of a voice of credibility. It traces 
how Socratic dialogues, Gorgias, Phaedms, Symposium and Cratylus in particular, are 
presented to achieve credibility at two levels: at one level, Socrates in each dialogue is 
anxious to establish his personal integrity, dependability and influence; at the other level, 
these dialogues argue for the superiority of Socrates’s dialectic method. Socratic 
dialogues, Phaedrus in particular, set up a standard for a true rhetoric of discourse: the
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rhetorical methods, the matter-of-fact narration, the logical arrangements and the 
emotional appeal are all employed in his texts to illuminate a psychological approach. 
Confucius’s rhetorical practice in his dialogues is marked by his belief in the ordering of 
Ming ( ,  Names) so as to achieve credibility and reputation in one’s performance of 
verbal communication and political administration. His conception of “ethos” is based on 
virtue, tested by deeds, functioning in accord with Li (rites) and realized in a harmonious 
relationship, the “Way.” This chapter will also demonstrate how Socratic and Confiician 
voices of “ethos” penetrate and are penetrated in their rhetorical and social contexts. 
Chapter Two will explore how the Socratic and Confiician dialogues demonstrate a proto- 
scientific attitude in a particular rhetorical structure, and embodies a combination of oral 
practice and written convention. The Socratic type of face-to-face examination of others’ 
views through question-and-answer sequences will be examined so as to illuminate a 
scientific approach which aims at general definitions or theoretical frameworks, 
methodological innovation, and moral and technical knowledge. On the other hand, 
Confiician rhetorical practice in his teaching career is guided by a theory of “enlightenment 
and inference” which emphasizes the exchange of ideas between participants, values 
different voices in a joint search for the truth—Way, and displays pragmatic spirit that 
contributes to technical communication.
Chapter Three will center on how the voice of tragic consciousness is created in 
Socratic and Confiician dialogues to enhance an analytical as well as an emotional power,
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and to exhibit dialogic relations in their respective rhetorical and social contexts. As a 
practical pessimist, Socrates’s tragic voice will be traced through his continuous effort in 
persuading those whom he can never persuade to accept his opinions, through his 
justificatory self-defense which constructs the danger o f the death-penalty, and through his 
attitude towards life, death, faith and love. Confucius’s voice of tragic sense is expressed 
in his embarrassment at the misunderstanding of his ideals, in his communication with 
Heaven by singing to express his disappointment with the reality of ritual and moral 
collapse, in his silence as a sign of protest against social disorder, and in a life-long bitter 
struggle for social reform rather than seeking hermitage.
Chapter Four will compare the use of irony in Socratic and Confiician dialogues, 
and explore how their irony, as a dynamic rhetorical method, helps to facilitate their 
dialogue with the outside world and with their inner world. My comparative study will 
reveal the similarities between the two forms of irony in three aspects: first, the 
philosophical paradoxes expressed in their disavowal of knowledge versus their claim of 
wisdom /ability in seeking and acquiring knowledge; second, Socrates’s and Confucius’s 
confession of piety and their acceptance of the supernatural versus their reluctance to 
affirm the existence of gods; and third, ironical implications that activate their democratic 
spirit.
The last part, my conclusion, will explore the implications drawn from the 
preceding comparative examination of the norms of rhetorical structure in Socratic and
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Confiician dialogues. Their “dialogical rhetoric” will be defined. Their rhetorical 
contribution to their philosophical mission, communication principles, cultural 
heteroglossia and contemporary information theory will be discussed. In addition, a 
critical study will be made of the elements of the Socratic and Confiician dialogues that are 
still responsive to today’s liberal education and also to the expanding electronic 
revolution. As a final object of my dissertation, the dialogic imagination of Confucius and 
Socrates will be highlighted, for it points to the right way of a cross-cultural conversation, 
helps to encourage East-West contact, and contributes to the communication theory of the 
twenty-first century.
Notes
1. See Edward Schiappa’s “Did Socrates Coin Rhetorike?” Schiappa believes that the 
surviving instances of the word “rhetorike” in Gorgias are novel, and that this new 
word is also in agreement with Plato’s penchant for coining terms with a word ending 
like this.
2. Robert Oliver, past president of the Speech Association of America and the Speech 
Association of the Eastern States, began his twenty years of participation in the 
research of Asian problems in 1942, and he became interested in the cultural 
foundations of Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Mohism, Legalism and Taoism.
His books, particularly Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China, cover 
the field of speech and contributes greatly to the understanding of the roots of Eastern 
rhetorical and communication theory.
3. Guy Alitto lists some viewpoints about the upcoming cultural conflicts between the 
East and the West raised by some Eastern and Western scholars in the 1990s. See his 
Chinese essay “Will the 21st Century World Culture Become Confiician Culture?”
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4. See Chapter 17, v47, “Family History of Confucius.” in Sima Qian’s The Historical 
Records. 1905—47. Although the most comprehensive record, Sima Qian’s 
biography has been criticized for its inconsistencies and arbitrariness in some parts by 
later Confiician scholars like Cui Shu (1740—1816) and Qian Mu (1895—1990). My 
description here is based on some generally accepted historical records. See also Cui 
Shu’s Zhushi kaoxinglu in Cui Dongbiyi shu and Qian Mu’s Xicmqin zhuzi xinian.
5. There is no agreement on the exact year Confucius began his teaching career. I tend 
to accept Confucius’s own claim “at thirty I took my stand,” which suggests that 
Confucius thought he was then well prepared for his career, the teaching career in 
particular.
6. Jay G. Williams, critic of Confucianism, regards the translation “The Analects” as a 
western misinterpretation which ignores the Confiician design of the rhetorical format 
for communication. Williams’ argument is also in agreement with the definition of 
Honshuyiwenzhi by Bangu (62-92 A.D.): “Lunyu {The Analects) consists of 
Confucius’s answers to questions of his disciples and contemporaries, and also his 
conversations with his disciples.” Besides, there was a translation by William Edward 
Soothill entitled The Analects or The Conversations o f Confucius with his Disciples 
and Certain Others.
7. We have to acknowledge that Socrates is both a historical figure and a character 
created by Plato. It is mainly Plato’s figure as represented in the dialogues that we 
now, not the man of history. That is the reason that scholars (e.g., Havelock,
Kennedy, Brickhouse and Smith) discuss Plato or Platonic Socrates rather than 
Socrates, because Socrates is not simply recorded by Plato but drawn by him. It is 
almost the same case with Confucius. We come to know Confucius mainly through the 
dialogues written by his disciples of his time or those of the following generations.
And great efforts have been made in the past two hundred and fifty years to trace the 
historical Confucius but no generally accepted conclusions have been reached on the 
first authors of the Confiician dialogues in The Analects.
8. I generally follow Gregory Vlastos’s classification in his Socratic Studies (135).
9. Vlastos believes that Meno marks the point of transition and that it should be put 
neither in the transitional period nor in the later period. I tend to regard Meno as a 
beginning of the transitional period.
10. Gorgias and Phaedrus in particular.
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11. Zen (iIf ) is a Buddhist sect whose emphasis is upon enlightenment by means of 
direct, and intuitive insights.
12. For instance, even Oliver’s description overemphasized Confucius’s contempt for 
Bian (Jffi , refutation or argumentation) and overlooked the communicative function of 
“silence” in his verbal activities.
13. See Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy o f the Oppressed. With the help of Freire’s pedagogy, 
we are able to see how Socratic and Confucian rhetorical practice is submerged in the 
“culture of silence” among the oppressed, and how their practice functions in a 
dialogical encounter with the practice of the others.
14. See Bakhtin’s “Notes” in “Speech Genres.” Bakhtin. Speech Genres and Other Late
Essays.
15. I have borrowed the concepts of “synchronic” and “diachronic” from Saussure’s 
structural linguistics (1966) within which synchronic linguistics refers to the study o f a 
language at one particular point in time, and diachronic linguistics refers to the study 
of how a language changes over a period of time.
16. See Bakhtin’s Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (117).
17. Mukarovsky believes that monologue is an utterance with a single active participant 
who articulates a point of view “regardless of the presence of other passive 
participants.” See his The Word and Verbal Act: Selected Essays by Jan Mukarovsky.
18. For instance, Halasek believes that Bakhtin’s rhetoric is not ours. It is a rhetoric of 
oppression in his own time. See Halasek, Kay. “Starting the Dialogue: What Can We 
Do About Bakhtin’s Ambivalence Toward Rhetoric?”
19. Detailed discussions have been made in Bialostosky’s “Bakhtin and the Future of 
Rhetorical Criticism: A Response to Halasek and Bemard-Donals,” and also Perlina’s 
“M. Bakhtin in Dialogue with Victor Vinogradov,” expanded as “A Dialogue on the 
Dialogue: The Boxtin-Vinogradov Exchange (1924-65).”
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Chapter One 
A Voice of Credibility in Confucian and Socratic Dialogues
This chapter will first make a brief review of the previous studies of “ethos,” 
“credibility” and “voice” in the rhetorical domain. Then, through an exploration of 
Confucius’s and Socrates’s understanding of the relation between Word and De ( ,
ethics, morality) or Good, I attempt to present a dialogic interpretation of how Confucius 
established a voice of credibility in his representation of a rhetorical or linguistic 
conceptualization of oral practice, and how Socrates contended with other voices in order 
to defend his moral philosophy and true rhetoric. Finally, my comparative analysis intends 
to get their ethical claims and rhetorical visions mutually defined, and to demonstrate the 
dialogic nature of their voices responding to their own situation and to our contemporary 
society.
I. A Brief Review
The concept of credibility, or a speaker/writer’s credibility, derives from the 
traditional rhetorical topic—ethos. Ethos originates from the Greek word “t^fros” and 
means “habit, custom, usage, disposition, character, moral,” which emphasizes a moral 
atmosphere of a person or a community (Kein, 547). Ever since Plato’s Socratic
21
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dialogues (Gorgias and Phaedrus in particular) and Aristotle’s synthesis, there have been 
two different definitions of ethos: one is the Socratic mode of persuasion that relies on the 
ethical or moral grounding of a speaker, and the other is the Aristotelian mode of 
persuasion that is activated by the character of a speaker as it comes across in the course 
of speech. Socrates insists that only an orator who is intrinsically virtuous can instruct 
others in moral values. And this orator must be a philosopher himself in order to convey a 
knowledge of the good to audiences, for Socrates sets it as a major task of a philosopher- 
orator to improve the character of a state. As is proposed in the Gorgias, an orator 
should always put “moral good” in the first place and should not take persuasion as an end 
in itself. This stance of Socrates is further demonstrated in his criticism of the sophistic 
rhetorical claim that oratory aims to produce gratification and pleasure instead of 
knowledge of good and evil.
Aristotle’s definition is based on a more pragmatic and relativistic consideration. 
Rhetoric is viewed as a means that brings about persuasion affecting civil life. The three 
sources that fall within the purview of the art of rhetoric are ethos, “the personal character 
of speaker”; pathos, “putting the audience into a certain frame of mind”; and logos, “the 
proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself’ {On Rhetoric, 24- 
25). When explaining the “ethos” or the “personal character” in speech, Aristotle 
emphasizes that it is speech itself rather than the speaker’s reputation and morality that 
creates credibility among audiences.
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The difference between Socrates’s idealistic view of the speaker’s character and 
Aristotle’s relativist concept of ethos as a role is evidenced in the later different definitions 
of ethos by Cicero and Quintilian (Johnson, 98-114). Cicero’s pragmatic attitude to ethos 
is similar to Aristotle’s, and he defines ethos in the De Oratore (55 B.C.) as a strategic 
role used to win the good will of an audience and to direct their inclinations wherever the 
speaker wishes. Quintilian’s discussion of the speaker’s character in the Institutio 
Oratoria shares the view of Platonic Socrates, and he takes the development of the 
“loftiness of soul” as the goal of oratory. So, his book is produced for the “education of 
the perfect orator.”
In twentieth-century speech and composition studies, there are still some 
rhetorical theorists like Richard Weaver and Wayne Booth who attempt to revive the 
Socratic idealistic view of ethos. In his Language is Sermonic, Weaver has criticized the 
“practical” literary tendency and “flowery” political urgency, and foregrounded “the order 
of values in the ultimate sanction of rhetoric,” and the rhetorician as a preacher who 
“direct(s) our passion toward noble ends and base” (225). The majority of rhetorical 
studies, however, no longer regard ethos as a necessary virtue of rhetoricians. As Nan 
Johnson observes, “In treating the principle of ethos, today’s rhetorical education offers a 
range of alternatives narrower than that typically related to students in early periods.”1 
Current rhetorical studies tend to cover the implications of ethos under the terms of 
“voice,” “tone,” “stance,” “appeal,” “persona” and “credibility,” often within the range of 
stylistics.2
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The term “voice” in rhetoric usually refers to the representation of the speaker or 
the writer in discourse. That contemporary rhetoricians favor a study of “voice” may 
result from two major concerns: first, “voice” covers the concept of “ethos” pertaining to 
a speaker/writer’s character in discourse; second, “voice” encompasses a more extensive 
topic of human subjectivity that is reflected in the issues of presence, control and 
discourse-ownership (Brook, 405-17). Moreover, Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism has 
generated a dialogic reading of “voice” as refined by Don H. Bialostosky: “Voice is never 
something speakers have before they speak but something they create by defining a 
relation to the other voices that have already opened the discussion and to those that wait 
to enter into it”(Bialostosky, 1991, 12). Thus, “voice” is no longer an absolute, static and 
separate notion, but a dynamic, dialogic and open-ended concept.
This brief review of studies of ethos and voice reflects how the concepts have 
maintained a basic concern with the relation between speaker/writer and audience, and 
between ethics and speech in the transition from classical rhetoric to modem rhetoric. My 
attempt to explore a voice of credibility in Socrates’s and Confucius’s dialogue is not only 
for the purpose of adapting my research interest to changing attitudes in the western world 
about ethical dialogue and daily communication, but also for the purpose of responding to 
an increasing awareness in the eastern world of the Confiician concept about the relation 
between De ({%, ethics, morality) and Yan ( f  , speech, language). A comparative 
study of a voice of credibility may help to represent Confucius’s and Socrates’s art of 
persuasion and to locate the similarities and differences between their attitudes about what 
constitutes an oral or written communication. Such a study has to be conducted in
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accordance with Bakhtin’s interpretation of a dialogic imagination, because a speaker’s or 
an author’s voice should not be viewed within a monologic frame. Instead, it should be 
explored in the light of its interaction with the other voices striving for dominance in a 
particular rhetorical situation and in a given historical moment. Besides, a dialogic voice 
addresses its previous topics, and also directs itself to a future self-representation.
Socrates’s and Confucius’s dedication to a voice of credibility is first motivated 
from a dissatisfaction with the moral atmosphere of their time. A major part of 
Confucius’s rhetorical practice points to the moral degradation and political corruption of 
his time, the Eastern Zhou dynasty. Confucius’s sage-king as a model of the ideal ruler is 
always aware of the function of his moral behavior, for he believes that “The virtue of the 
gentleman is like wind, the virtue of the small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over 
the grass and it is sure to bend”(Ch. 12.19). Similarly, Socrates’s ideal ruler of the state, 
the philosopher-king, also believes in the power of morality and strives for the moral 
education of civil society.
In Confucius’s rhetorical activities, he always regards virtue as the origin of 
memorable and moral speech activities. On the other hand, he is critical of the “glibness of 
tongue” that harms virtue and morality of both the rulers and the common people. As a 
practitioner of moral speech and dialogue, Confucius always conducts his verbal activities 
under a super-virtue concept--/,/ ( , rites, propriety). And his dialogues respond to
and are defined by both concrete virtue standards and the ritual system of the period of the 
sage-king, King Wen of the Zhou. As far as Socrates is concerned, his life-long refutation
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of sophistic rhetorical claims is carried out in defense of his concepts of the Good and the 
Virtuous. With Phaedrus, Gorgias, and Symposium, he makes persistent efforts to 
present as credibly as he could the superiority of his dialectical methods over the sophistic 
rhetoric.
In light of the first goal mentioned at the beginning o f this chapter, I will explore 
how Confucius established his voice as a moral philosopher and also a master of language 
in a continuous verbal contact with those who either make an abusive use of speech or an 
under-estimation of the power of the speech act. And I will foreground how Confucius 
sometimes attempts to raise a voice of credibility so as to establish a harmonious relation 
between speaker and virtue, and between human speech and rhetorical situations, which 
makes it possible for his voice to be always responsive to and interactive with other 
elements in such a harmonious order.
As a second goal, I will demonstrate how Socrates displays a dialogic imagination3 
in “contending with” other voices and “exposing the corresponding attempts” of sophists 
“who disguise what they are doing” (Phaedrus, 260-61) in Gorgias, Phaedrus and 
Symposiums so as to create his credibility, integrity, dependability and influence. Besides,
1 will focus on how his processes of definition and classification are employed to get his 
voice defined by that of either his disciples or his opponents in order to plant the seeds of 
love and true rhetoric in the souls of his interlocutors.
Finally, a comparative study will further maintain that both the Confiician voice of 
Xinyan , speech of sincerity) and the Socratic voice o f  true rhetoric rely on the
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moral standards of the speaker, and thus can be mutually defined in an era when orality is 
more favored than literacy for the elements of being participatory, situational and 
aggregative.4 Such a comparison also points to Confucius’s stress on social harmony as 
the goal of verbal activities, and Socrates’s reliance on the argumentation that helps to 
shape moral standards of the speaker as an individual.
EL A Voice of Credibility in Confucius’s Ethics,
Naming, Rites and Word
Before undertaking our study of Confucius’s voice of credibility, it is essential to 
make clear that The Analects resonates with a multitude of voices, those of Confucius, his 
direct disciples, relatives, acquaintances, rulers, and his disciples of succeeding 
generations, although Confucius’s own voice is often heard in major dialogues. Some 
voices, as Jay G. Williams observes, are “singing in many part harmony”(105), some 
contending with each other to realize their representation. This textual reality has thus 
made The Analects exemplary of the Bakhtinian concept of heteroglossia, a way of 
perceiving the world as composed of various voices or languages reflecting particular 
social and discursive forces. Besides, it is also significant to consider that Confucius’s 
philosophical concept, Dao , Way), is built on a comprehensive ethical or moral 
category— De ({£ , ethics, virtue) with benevolence at its core, and with an abstract 
idealized personification Junzi ( jfl , superior man, gentleman) as its highest model.
Now, let us analyze in detail Confucius’s voice of credibility represented in his dialogic 
interpretation of De (morality) and Yan (Word), of his naming theory, and of his ritual 
system.
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Confucius’s rhetorical theory reflects his interpretation of the dialectical relations 
between De and Yan. He believes that “A man of virtue is sure to be the speaker of 
memorable sayings, but the speaker of memorable sayings is not necessarily virtuous”(Ch. 
14.4).5 Confucius’s own “memorable sayings” here first clarify a causal relation between 
the possession of virtue and the capability of a good speech. It is the former that 
determines the latter, and not vice versa. In addition, Confucius foregrounded an active 
process of You ( , to acquire, to possess). The individual as a producer of a voice of
virtue and a good speech is by no means free from his social and rhetorical situations. He 
has to undergo a certain uni-directional process before he is eventually able to establish a 
voice of credibility. That is, he must put personal cultivation of morality in the first place, 
and to be Youdezhe ( % , a possessor of virtues) is characterized by having an inner
voice of virtue that defines an outer voice and empowers its possessor to deliver a 
memorable speech. Therefore, when he confessed that “To fail to cultivate virtue ... is 
what I am worried about” (Ch.7.3), Confucius expressed a deep disappointment with 
those who always placed a political ambition and rhetorical competence before a moral 
knowledge and personal cultivation.
What then are the basic elements that constitute Confucius’s De (-j^-, virtue) in 
his rhetorical theory? Zhong ( ^  , reverence, conscientiousness) and Xin ( f f  , 
trustworthiness, sincerity), according to Confucius, play predominant roles in one’s verbal 
activities. Once his disciple, Zizhang, asked about how to go forward in society without
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obstruction. Confucius said, “If in word you are conscientious and trustworthy and in 
deed single-minded and reverent, then even in the lands of the barbarians you will go 
forward without obstruction. But if you fail to be Zhong ( jjf, , conscientious) and Xin 
('H; , trustworthy) in word or to be single-minded and reverent in deed, then can you be 
sure of going forward without obstruction even in your own neighborhood?” (Ch. 15.6)
In this dialogue, Confucius again attaches moral values to Yan (*|f , Word) in its social 
context by placing a stress on Zhong and Xin. His concept of Zhonff is a prerequisite of 
good and appropriate rhetoric, which can function differently in its dialogical relations 
with different audiences. In the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.), Zhong 
connoted an attitude of both reverence and conscientiousness, and is represented in an 
intellectual’s relations with the ruler, with friends and with Min ( ^  , the people in the 
lower social ranks). Word with the ruler is required to express one’s reverent attitude 
and a sense of responsibility; Word with one’s friends is expected to reveal the speaker’s 
trustworthiness; and Word with the people in the lower ranks should show one’s concern 
for their moral education and help them to acquire the quality of working hard for their 
own benefit. One of Confucius’s purposes of Word is apparently centered on a high sense 
of social responsibility, though the definite connotation of this responsibility is attunable to 
its dialogical relations with a particular audience.
Confucius’s own voice in the dialogue (Ch. 15.6) is also defined and responded to 
by his statements concerning the relation between virtue and speech on other occasions. 
Elsewhere, Confucius insists that only a “superior man” and a “virtuous man” can produce
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a good speech. Once, his disciple, Nangong She, demonstrated the truth in his presence 
that the ancient sages Yu and Ji won the hearts of the people by leading them to tame 
rivers and showing them how to grow crops instead of involving them in bloody wars. On 
hearing Nangong’s speech, Confucius never hesitated in pouring out his praise. “How 
gentlemanly that man is! How he reserves virtue!” Nangong’s “good speech” expresses a 
true understanding of De (virtue) in Confucius’s sense, and displays the intrinsic quality of 
a “superior man.” This anecdote is consistent with Confucius’s standard for “good 
speech” and “virtuous man.” In contrast, the so-called “good speech” of those “Chinese 
sophists” makes no sense, because without virtue there is no genuinely “good speech.” 
Confucius often refers to those high-sounding speeches as Oiaoycm ( * 5 ^  , cunning 
words, artful words). From Oiaoycm he infers that the speaker lacks benevolence and 
ethics. Furthermore, he concludes that “Artful words will ruin one’s virtue” (Ch. 15.27). 
Thus, when Confucius declared that the producer of memorable sayings is not necessarily 
virtuous, his comments elsewhere had already specified that the “memorable sayings” 
mentioned here are nothing but “artful, cunning words” which have no true moral value, 
and are merely empty talks for pleasing listeners or for the self-gratification of the 
speakers only.
Another Confiician concept, Xin (trustworthiness), also serves as a starting point 
for his rhetorical theory. Shuowen Jiezi defines Xin as sincerity (Cheng, ). This helps 
to us to understand the rhetorical claim expressed in the Yijing (Book of Change): 
“Polishing the expressions in order to establish sincerity.”7 This statement also suggests
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how trustworthiness and sincerity are valued in the communication of the early Chinese.
In actuality, Confucius’s Xin, like his concept of Zhong, is interactive with different 
dialogical relations. To begin with, Xin from the people will guarantee the existence of the 
government and state. When discussing the significance of Xin, Confucius stresses that 
“Death has always been with us since the beginning of time, but when there is no trust 
(Xin), the common people will have nothing to stand on” (Ch. 12.7). Confucius intends to 
explain that arms and food are less important than the trust of people in their government 
and state. So, if the governors fail to win the trust of the people with virtuous words and 
deeds, the government and state will exist no more. Thus, Xin on the side of the 
governors will help uphold the moral standards o f the common people. Confucius 
believes that “When those above love trustworthiness, none of the common people will 
dare to be insincere” (Ch. 13.4). In other words, the governors’ Xin will be exemplary in 
effecting the moral education of their people.
Besides, Xin is the foundation of true friendship. Zixia, a disciple of Confucius, 
once argued that a man of learning, in dealing with friends, is trustworthy in what he says 
(Ch. 1.7). Following Confucius, Zixia regards it as a sign of knowledge and of morality to 
be sincere to one’s friends. Finally, Xin, trustworthiness, will enable one to assume high 
responsibility or to be employed in a high position. Confucius declares that if one is 
trustworthy in words, his fellowmen will entrust him with responsibility. Thus, the quality 
of Xin penetrates every aspect of a speaker’s social life, both public and private, self and 
other, appearing in one’s verbal activities and in his moral conduct.
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The seemingly discursive and casual dialogues of The Analects constitute a rather 
comprehensive description of the rhetorical function of Xin in his theory o f De, a 
Confiician concept comparable to the Greek concept of ethos. Then, how can the 
Confiician Xin be established in its rhetorical situations? Confucius chiefly emphasizes 
two dialogic relations of Xin. One is to put Zhong before Xin : “approach your duties with 
reverence and be trustworthy in what you say” (Ch. 1.5). That may imply that Zhong is 
the precondition for Xin. In his verbal encounters, or administrative work, a speaker has 
to express his reverence for the addressee or discussant, and reveal professional ethics in 
his duties, if he intends to have his sincerity felt by others. The other is to understand the 
relation between speech and “sparing of speech” (Ch. 1.6) in order to remain trustworthy 
in what is said, because “the gentleman is ashamed of his word outstripping his deed” (Ch. 
14.27). Confucius insists that practice of morality should always go before words, and 
one’s deeds should match his words. Being “sparing of speech,” as a precaution in 
communication, keeps the speaker vigilant against high-sounding words and empty talk. 
Thus defined, Xin becomes dynamic in its response to Zhong within the domain of 
rhetoric, and in the meantime, Xin sets a moral criterion in Confucius’s theory of 
uniformity between word and deed.
After an analysis of the basic elements that make up Confucius’s concept of De, let 
us observe how his voice of credibility in oral and written language is convincingly 
defended by his theory of “Naming” {&%, , rectification of names), which expresses his 
understanding of the power o f orality over the government administration and moral
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cultivation. The following is a dialogue between Confucius and his disciple, Zilu, on the 
topic of “naming”:
Zilu said, “If the Lord of Wei left the administration of this state to you, what 
would you put first?”
The Master said, “If something has to be put first, it is perhaps, the rectification of 
names.”
Zilu said, “Is that so? What a roundabout way you take! Why bring rectification 
in at all?”
The Master said, “Yu, how boorish you are. Where a gentleman is ignorant, one 
would expect him not to offer any opinion. When names are not correct, what is 
said will not sound reasonable; when what is said does not sound reasonable, 
affairs will not culminate in success; when affairs do not culminate in success, rites 
and music will not flourish; when rites and music do not flourish, punishments will 
not fit the crimes; when punishments do not fit crimes, the common people will not 
know where to put hand and foot. Thus when the gentleman names something, 
the name is sure to be usable in speech, and when he says something, this is sure to 
be practical. The thing about the gentleman is that he is anything but casual where 
speech is concerned.” (Ch. 13.3)
Confucius is the first Chinese scholar who raises such a theory of naming, which
dominates his statesmanship, and moral and legal conceptualization, and also provides a
logical and rhetorical foundation for the verbal activities of a gentleman.
To begin, this theory o f naming has distinguished Confucius’s voice as a political
idealist regarding a question about his proposal for political administration. However, in
view of a multitude of measures (political, economic, military or agricultural) he might
take as a statesman, Confucius’s focus on “naming” dumfounded his disciple, Zilu, who
felt quite disappointed with such an unexpected answer. Zilu’s criticism of Confucius
being pedantic makes it more urgent for him to clarify his concept of “naming.” Certainly,
Confucius did not fail to point out Zilu’s ignorance before expounding his theory of
naming. And this speech proves to be not only the longest but also the most concise
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speech Confucius ever made in his dialogues. The whole speech emphasizes the following 
issues: Confucius first addressed the significance of “naming” in a particular social 
context. As “No Way is prevalent” in Confucius’s time, and the dukes and viscounts are 
struggling to consolidate their own status or territory with an ambition to seize the whole 
empire, the essential “names” Confucius attempted to “rectify” areJun Chen f£ , the 
relation between lord and subject, and between duke and viscount), and Fu Zi ( ,
the relation between father and son).* To establish a generally accepted ethical 
relationship between ruler and subject in the public domain, and between father and son in 
private life is to lay a foundation for sociopolitical order, because power struggles in a 
state and quarrels in a family are major sources of social disorder. Unfortunately, the 
hidden voice behind this theory of naming is often narrowly interpreted. As Hsiao Kung- 
ch’uan explains, “what he called the rectification o f names meant readjusting the powers 
and duties of ruler and minister, superior and inferior, according to the institution of the 
Zhou feudal world’s most flourishing period.”9 And Hansen’s latest reading of 
Confucius’s “naming” has also observed a tradition-oriented aspect: “The social hierarchy 
had the duty to model the correct use of names. That done, the traditional guiding codes 
could correctly guide people in their physical movement” (59). The critical view 
represented by Hsiao and Hansen seems to accept the Confucian theory of naming at its 
face value, and neglects Confucius’s own voice o f “naming” in re-articulating a set of 
“names” for desirable social relations. The implication of Confucius’s “naming,” if 
examined in the rhetorical context o f Confucius’ dialogues, lies within his theory of Dao
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(iJL ’ Way) Ren ( "i— , benevolence). In other words, the authentic voice of 
“naming” is produced by Confucius instead of being generated by the tradition of the 
Zhou. Students of Confucianism tend to examine his dialogues and sayings with a narrow 
interpretation of his self-confession that “I transmit but do not innovate. I am trustful in 
what I say and devoted to antiquity” (Ch. 7.1).10 Actually, in his philosophical 
exploration and in his numerous rhetorical activities, Confucius did refine and “innovate” a 
set o f ethical standards for ruler, subject, father and son with the purpose of maintaining a 
cooperative social structure based on a stable family unity and supported by shared moral 
values. According to his process of reasoning, Confucius’s naming-centered political and 
rhetorical claim becomes the priority o f the state administration and family maintenance, 
which is responsive to the tradition of the Zhou and adaptive to his own social context. In 
this sense, Confucius’s theory of “naming” is highly innovative, for its goals were to build 
an ethical system for society as well as individuals, and meanwhile, to obtain a power for 
his interpretation of the Junzi ( J* , superior man) and Renren ( \~  K . , benevolent 
man).
A rhetorical study of Confucius’s naming theory may, if conducted in a manner 
attentive to the power of orality, also reveal a relation between speech and social 
construction. David Hall and Roger Ames have already observed a dynamic aspect of 
Confucius’s naming process. They write that, “naming and attuning of names is a dynamic 
enterprise in which the existing structure and definition is qualified by the understanding 
that names and their achieved harmonics are always fluid within the parameters o f a
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context, and are in continual need of attunement. The challenge that this fluidity o f names 
and their pattemings represents to a purely logical, referential explanation of Zheng ming 
is reinforced by the performative force of naming” (274). Here, Hall and Ames emphasize 
the performative function of language in rectifying “names” in a changing contextual 
situation and in educating and “performing” people by constructing the meaning o f ethics. 
This interpretation reflects a pragmatic reading that accounts for the illocutional and 
perlocutional effect performed by “naming” as a speech act.
This reading is, however, different from Bakhtinian dialogism in that it does not 
follow the internal dialogue of Confucius as a reflection of and response to the words and 
ideologies of the other. In a pragmatic reading, both the relation between the attunement 
of names and a context, and the relation between naming and its performative force are 
characterized by a uni-directional and monological flow. Even within Confucius’s own 
intertextual context a critic may gather some evidence to question such a monological 
interpretation. Confiician texts themselves can at least demonstrate a “double-voiced” 
interaction—the interaction between the voice of the self and that of the other— in the 
following relations: the necessity of naming and the benefit for the people; the language of 
naming versus the practice of “doing”; the individual activity of naming versus the social 
norms of rites and music; and the benevolence-orientation of naming versus the 
establishment of law and punishment. In the above relations, it is clear that the voice of 
naming in its performance is always responded to and defined by the voices of the other. 
Moreover, this dialogic nature is also reflected in an intertextual context. For instance, as
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recorded in another text, Zuozhuan,u Confucius also recommended the use of names to 
bring benefit to the people, which touches upon the purpose of naming and is consistent 
with his dialogue with Zilu. It seems that the voice for the benefit of the people through 
the language of naming always helps shape his political and philosophical configuration of 
an ideal society. And this explains why “benevolence” (or Love for the people) is forever 
at the center of his system of ethics.
With regard to the voice of language, Confucius’s theory of naming insists that 
what one says should be consistent with his behavior ( 4 3  , doing, deeds), for “The 
gentleman does not allow his word outstripping his deed” (Ch. 14.27). Furthermore, 
Confucius, unlike some western philosophers, believes that doing is never voiceless. It has 
its linguistic function. “A superior man can speak with his deeds while a small man can 
only speak with his tongue.”12 In Confucius’s imagination, a true gentleman may have his 
voice heard not only by his words but also by his deeds, for the voice of a speaker is 
situated in a dialogical relation between words and deeds. The two elements contribute to 
the establishment of a voice of credibility either in one’s internal dialogue with a moral self 
or in one’s external dialogue with the other. Here, Confucius never undercuts the value of 
words. Instead, he alerts his listeners to the fact that words are often defined by deeds.
In addition to the above dialogical relations in the process of naming, we may also 
discern how the social norms o f rites and music define and raise a voice in the Confiician 
texts to enhance a rite-oriented system of naming theory, and how the measures of law 
and punishment are presented as a secondary method to guide the behavior of the people.
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As a last but not the least dialogical relation affecting the theory of naming, Confucius has 
also situated his theory in a context where personal reputation works as a motivation for 
the rectification of names as a social act, for Confucius once emphasized the significance 
of “name” for a gentleman: “The gentleman hates the prospect of arriving at the end o f his 
life without having made a name for himself’ (Ch. 15.20). Having explored all the above 
clear-cut dialogical relations in the Confiician theory o f naming, we may feel justified in 
saying that “naming” is not a monological process. Its dialogic nature has helped to 
strengthen the credibility of the speaker’s voice and the validity of his ethical theory.
A rhetorical study of Confucius’s dialogues has also convinced us that Confucius’s 
voice of credibility is intrinsically guided by the principle of Li , rites, propriety), 
which provides a new path for people to reach their self-cultivation ( ) and to fulfil
the rectification of others ( jE )• Once, Confucius warned his disciples not to “speak 
unless it is in accordance with the rites” (Ch. 12.1), and his constant recourse to L i13 
displays a rich imagination of the rhetorical activities of the speaking individuals in their 
relations with society, tradition, and their surroundings—earth and Heaven in general.
Herbert Fingarette states: “One has to labor long and hard to learn Li. The word 
in its root meaning is close to ‘holy ritual,’ or ‘sacred ceremony.’ Characteristic of 
Confucius’ teaching is the use of the language and imagery of Li as a medium with which 
to talk about the entire body of the moves, or more precisely, of the authentic tradition 
and reasonable conventions of society. Confucius taught that the ability to act according 
to Li and the will to submit to Li are essential to that perfect and peculiarly human virtue
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or power which can be man’s” (6). Fingarette’s statement touches upon the issue of how 
Li is taught as a moral act and a binding power in a perspective of linguistic pragmatics 
and stylistics that stresses the relationship between Confucius and his audience. A dialogic 
reading, however, may help clarify how Confucius’s Li defines, addresses or questions 
particular “languages” characteristic o f different ideologic orientations like those of 
Legalists or Daoists. Confucius says that “Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with 
punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of 
shame. Guide them by virtue, keep them in line with the rites, and they will, besides 
having a sense of shame, reform themselves” (Ch. 2.3). Here, Confucius attempts to 
account for the discrepancy between the Legalists’ political assertions and his own. A 
focus is on which is better in the administration of the state and the education o f the 
people: edicts or ethics, punishment or rites. The different measures do, in effect, result in 
differences in the moral status of the common people. In the former circumstances, they 
are forced to act in accordance with authority for fear of possible punishment, physically 
or financially, and in the long run they grow apathetic to the high moral criteria they are 
expected to meet. But in different circumstances, they gain the power of human dignity 
from their moral education, and develop a strong motivation to personal cultivation. By 
this comparison, Confucius seems to prove that the above contradictory attitudes in 
administration are defined by each other, and responded to with entirely different 
outcomes. The effect of the education of rites and virtue is easily felt, even if it is not 
intended to objectify the assertions of the Legalists.
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The intrinsic relations among Destiny, the rites and rhetorical activities are also 
elaborated in Confucius’s philosophical reasoning, which provides a dialogical interaction 
between social norms and linguistic exploration, and between the self and the other. 
Confucius once said “A man has no way of becoming a gentleman unless he understands 
Destiny ( ojT ); he has no way of taking his stand unless he understands the rites (.f^ ); he 
had no way of judging men unless he understands words ("? )” (Ch. 20.3). The above 
statement draws a picture of how a dialogic process of human understanding extends from 
Destiny to the Rites and then to one’s rhetorical practice, and the other way round, as the 
following:
Gentleman -------------------------------------- Destiny
The Self Personality-------------------------------------- Rites---------- “ The Other
Judgement/understanding-------------------- Word
Figure 1: Dialogic Relations of Destiny, Rites and Word 
This diagram helps explain dialogicaily Confucius’s understanding of a value system and a 
social existence. Being a “gentleman” ( $3 %- ) is the ultimate goal of an individual, which 
is characterized by an understanding of Destiny ( ^  ). To take a stand in society implies 
the configuration of an independent personality which is guided by the Rites, a series of 
accepted social conventions.14 Appropriate judgment of others has to be made through 
rhetorical activities, Word (-^  ), with them. Confucius put Word as a foundation of his 
epistemology, and Rites as the guideline which exerts influence on the main body of the 
society—individuals with independent personality ( ) and moral integrity )
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who are bound to realize Destiny in order to “return to the observance of the rites” of the 
Zhou (Ch. 12.1). Attention should also be paid to the interaction between the self and the 
other, which is actualized in the relations between Gentleman and Destiny, independent 
personality and the rites, and personal judgement and verbal activities. It is important to 
observe that the process of understanding is not monologic or uni-directional, but dialogic 
or bi-directional, because the realization of Destiny, in turn, arouses a passion for learning 
the rites, and the acquisition of the rites guarantees one’s verbal activities in accordance 
with appropriate social norms. Similarly, a gentleman values his stand ( ji. ) in society, 
and pursues a moral judgement of others ( )  through rhetorical contacts, and in turn, 
it is the practice of understanding others, and the cultivation of one’s personality, that 
finally constitute an image of Gentleman. In conclusion, a dialogic reading of Confucius’s 
rhetorical activities pertaining to epistemology highlights the dynamic and interactive 
aspects of his definitions of the Rites, Destiny and Word (rhetorical performance), 
in. Socrates’s Establishment of Good, Names and True Rhetoric 
Compared with Confucius, Socrates’s voice of credibility, as discussed in my 
“Introduction,” is often focused on the establishment of a standard for a true rhetoric of 
discourse. Socrates’s ethical argument is premised on the moral, and inevitably, 
theological inseparability of the speaker from his speech in the dialogue. Like Confucius, 
his argument is often carried out in a rhetorical context of different contending voices, for 
which Bakhtin discovers Socrates’s dialogic spirit in establishing his credibility through a 
verbal contact without imposing his opinions upon others. Keeping in his mind the two
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general goals of his argument: to exhibit his personal integrity and dependability, and to 
illuminate the superiority of his moral philosophy, Socrates makes continuous efforts to 
distinguish his voice from that of his opponents, the Sophists. My analysis of Socrates’s 
voice of credibility will be centered on a dialogic imagination represented in his 
interpretation of the Good, the names, and a true rhetoric, in his reformed rhetorical 
practice, and in his argumentation with the Sophistic rhetoricians.
Let us first examine how such a dialogic imagination works in Socrates’s
delineation of the relation between his ethical standard, the Good, and the nature of his
true rhetoric. To uphold his principle of morality, Socrates has successfully presented
himself to be a real master of ethics exploring a method of creating a personal character so
that his audience is more likely to find his arguments believable. In the Phaedrus,
Socrates maintains that “rhetoric, taken as a whole, is an art of influencing the soul
through words, not only in courts of law and other public gathering” (261b). As far as the
power of persuasion is concerned, Socrates’s efforts may be observed in three aspects:
good intention, virtuous character and rhetorical strategy of dialogue. In the Apology,
Socrates repeatedly claims that his philosophical pursuit and his personal defense are all
carried out for the good of his listeners, the Athenian people. He exclaims:
“Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for 
yours, that you may not sin against God, or lightly reject his boon by condemning 
me. For if you kill me you will not easily find another like me, who, if I may use 
such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by the 
God; and the state is like a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing 
to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has 
given the state and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
arousing and persuading and reproaching you. And as you will not easily find 
another like me, I would advise you to spare me....”
This speech in the Apology displays Socrates’s good intention through his dialogic
imagination. Socrates’s argument focuses on his innocence as a gadfly who acts upon the
God’s will and makes persistent efforts through his dialogue to stir the State to life, but
who repeatedly annoys the State by his persuasion and is eventually forced to defend his
virtuous character and make an apology to get spared. Aware of his vulnerable and
dangerous situation, Socrates remains responsive to and interactive with the divine God
on the one hand and his accusers and the general audience on the other. So, his good
intention has to be read in the consideration of such dynamic relations.
Strategically, the Socratic defense of his intention largely relies on a transference
between the self and the other, the subject and the object, the defense and the accusation,
and the present and the absent. To realize such a transference, he tries to bring into his
apology a whole set of various “languages” in Bakhtin’s sense, and put them into
communication with one another. The Athenian audience are at the very beginning invited
to take part in the reasoning in order to get their voice heard. Their language of
dissatisfaction with Socrates’s verbal activity is fully represented when they are supposed
to risk themselves by condemning and executing a man with a divine mission, although
they make judgements as the jurors, the other. Should they make such a decision as to
punish Socrates, the Athenians themselves would be the victims of their wrong decision.
Socrates’s timely warning helps transfer his role as an object of the accusation to that as a
subject of the real judgement. Consequently, he is in the position to predict that the
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Athenians’ neglect of the presence and the language of God would put themselves beyond 
God’s protection and blessing. The defense is further directed to a would-be replacement 
of “this”-- Socrates— with “that”— another philosopher, which is destined to be a failure, 
because by their sin against God’s will, God would not give the State another man of 
wisdom to express His language and to bring enlightenment to the Athenian people in 
illusions. And the speaker seems to argue that “this” man is the “only one,” and that he 
can be addressed and argued with, but he is not replaceable. Metaphorically, Socrates’s 
good intention is also expressed in his figurative speech comparing the whole State to a 
noble steed that “has to be stirred to life” by words, by true rhetoric. By this simile, 
Socrates employs a new language to highlight the dialogic function of rhetoric in 
influencing souls with the will of God. Through such a display of diverse “languages,” 
Socrates creates a dialogue among the morally specific ways of “conceptualizing the world 
in words” (Bakhtin, 1986, 150) and represents them as they co-exist with, or address one 
another in the situation of a boisterous trial.
In her discussion about ethos and aims of rhetoric in the Phaednts, Nan Johnson 
argues that Socrates’s statement suggests a “reformed rhetorical practice”15 which points 
to an ethical orientation of “words,” the spoken discourse. The traditional criticism of the 
Phaedrus, however, just emphasizes that the dialogue is “an example of dialectic in the 
highest sense”(Helmbold and Robinowitz, xii-xvii), which provides the scientific method 
of discovering first the true nature of things and expressing them correctly in the oral form 
so as to find a unity between “the soul” and rhetoric. This analysis clarifies a static
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relation between the soul and rhetoric, but it neglects a dialogic nature in the Phaedrus 
that facilitates such a relation. Actually, rhetoric, in Socrates’s sense, should participate in 
the Good by teaching the public what is beautiful and excellent through knowledge of 
Ideas. As Socrates elaborates his rhetorical practice, “if we are to adopt this method, it 
must be on condition that we regard ourselves as rivals in the attempt to distinguish truth 
from falsehood” (Gorgias, 458). In order to establish a voice of credibility, Socrates not 
only regards his interlocutors as rivals, but also regards himself as an assumed rival of his 
own argument in a philosophical exploration of the rhetorical function in instructing “the 
souls” of the audience. After Phaedrus read the speech by Lysias, Socrates was 
immediately inspired to deliver a speech of his own, which aroused Phaedrus’s admiration 
for its complete rhetorical form and credible composition: a preoemium, narration, proof, 
and epilogue. In discussing Socrates’s first speech, Kennedy believes that “Plato is at 
pains to demonstrate Socrates’ rhetorical ability” (Kennedy, 1960, 78). It seems, on the 
contrary, that Socrates’s first speech is to oppose a rhetorically good one to a bad one, or 
in Bakhtin’s term, to “address” a speech that is much inferior even in the aspect of 
rhetorical studies, because the co-existence of the two speeches provides dialogic 
circumstances for his interlocutors or audience to make a contrastive analysis themselves. 
Certainly, Socrates is quite aware of the immoral basis for his first speech, and that is why 
that speech is regarded as a rival to his second speech which demonstrates the nature of 
the soul and his reverence for the god of Love. Using a dialogic imagination, Socrates is 
able to hear his voice being responded to by a divine voice “which forbade me to go away
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until I made atonement for an impiety to heaven” (242). He is keen on the otherness in his 
own voice too, because he does experience a “heteroglossia” both in and out of his 
discourse. Socrates explains in a friendly way that Phaedrus is responsible for his first 
speech, the one Phaedrus “forced me to deliver” (242). By such an explanation, his first 
speech has become a deviated voice of his own. After he shifts the moral responsibility to 
Phaedrus, Socrates is determined to purify his soul for such a sin “with a fresh and 
drinkable discourse.”
So far we have no difficulty understanding Socrates’s smooth transference from his 
“otherness” in his first speech to a true “self’ in his second speech, which is, contrary to 
his first one, built on sincerity and solemnity, and aims at truth and divinity. My dialogic 
reading is intended to explore whether there is any oratorical significance in Socrates’s 
first speech. Traditional reading branded the first speech to be a merely rhetorical 
challenge to sophistic rhetoric. This interpretation still holds water in terms of the 
rhetorical context in which the speech is generated. But, this observation may sound 
somewhat reductive and superficial if we turn an eye to the dialogic relations between 
Lysias’s speech and Socrates’s first speech, and between his first and second. Socrates’s 
first speech may be used to establish the rhetorical inferiority of the sophistic “knack,” but 
it also serves as an object of Socrates’s self-criticism and spiritual purification. It is clear 
that the juxtaposition of his two speeches helps to make a distinction between lover and 
non-lover, morality and immorality, truth and falsehood in an oratorical practice, and we 
are thus invited to imagine an endless journey of a philosopher-orator whose life goal is to
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influence the public with the knowledge of love and science through a proper use of 
rhetoric. More importantly, by presenting his first speech, Socrates succeeds in displaying 
a “reformed” spirit and in revolutionizing the sophistic rhetorical practice which attempts a 
“destruction of the opponent” only. By so doing, Socrates is enabled to establish the 
“very dialogic sphere where the word lives” (Bakhtin, 1986, 150), that is, to create a 
dialogue between different rhetorical claims. He himself never acts to destroy the 
sophistic rhetoric, though he believes it is detrimental to moral purification. The oratorical 
significance of Socrates’s first speech also lies in his understanding o f the persuasive 
power of the sophistic rhetoric and his capability of such a skill, which can be proved by 
his excitement with Phaedrus’s “wonderful and sublime” attitude towards his first speech. 
So, the first speech seems to suggest that the Socratic true rhetoric is not a closed system, 
and it is open to sophistic achievements and never attempts to gain its credibility by 
destroying its opponents.
Another point worth noting in Socrates’s transfer from his first speech to his 
second speech is his response to “an ancient rite of purification” “for those who have 
sinned by lying about gods or heroes” (243), which sets up the relations between speech 
and rite,16 and between his discourse and those by Homer and Steisechorus, and as a 
result, facilitates his transfer to the second speech. Socrates attempts to stress that 
oratorical practice should proceed in accordance with truth, morality and reverence for the 
god of Love, that otherwise an orator could be punished for his abusive use of discourse. 
This realization naturally helps Socrates to obtain confidence and credibility, for his 
second speech is delivered in honor of “a generous, decent love” (243).
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With enthusiasm surprisingly similar to that of Confucius, Socrates also touches 
upon the topic of naming theory in his dialogue, Cratylus, in order to demonstrate that the 
dialecticians have the real knowledge needed to assign names to things well. Socrates 
agrees with Hermogenes that convention and agreement are the only determinants of 
internal correctness of naming. But, he differs from both Hermogenes and Cratylus in 
thinking that there is a further question of external correctness of naming. Socrates 
implies that there is one question about what a name for a given item is, and another 
question of whether or not the convention that assigns a name to the item is correct itself. 
This interpretation puts the process o f naming in a position that it is defined and 
determined by both the internal and external elements of a given item—the named. 
Furthermore, such an interpretation reinforces Socrates’s rhetorical claim that names must 
correspond to the reality or the natures, because Socrates states that “a name is an 
instrument of teaching and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the 
threads of the web”(388c). Here, Socrates, like Confucius, also points to the significance 
of naming in dividing up the reality as a whole in order to develop both an individualized 
recognition and a general understanding of the world. For instance, people learn to 
recognize “sun” and “moon,” and they may also come to an understanding of “heaven.”
In social domains, naming plays far more complicated functions. When discussing the 
etymology of Hermogenes’s name, Socrates asserts that, despite the original meaning of 
the name (“of the race of Hermes”), Hermogenes “is no true son of Hermes,” because he 
is “always looking after a fortune and never in luck” (384b-c). Hidden in this joking
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tone,17 we may also distinguish Socrates’s voice of a philosophical connotation, for he 
may imply that a human name, apart from its nature as the result o f  a conventional 
conduct, suggests a diversity o f implications, historical, mythical, metaphorical or moral, 
which go far beyond the intention of the namegiver and the identification of the named, 
and inevitably put “this name” in a position interactive with endless interpretations.
As a great part of “the knowledge of the good” (384b), naming, according to 
Socrates, exerts a tremendous influence on the teaching process and moral education. The 
instruments of teaching, in fact, are not the names per se (43 5d). It is the process of 
testing the names by questioning and answering that provides applicable instruments for 
teaching and educating people. Therefore, a critical question that faces us is what is the 
appropriate relations among the namegiver (legislator), the teacher (user of names) and 
the dialecticians (director of the legislator). Some critics argue that Socrates actually 
suggests that teacher, namegiver and dialectician should be the same person in three 
different roles, that is, the philosopher-king.18 Such an argument could be meaningful only 
when we are convinced that Socrates really denies the roles of a teacher and a namegiver 
in his configuration of naming. This is, however, not the case with the Cratylus. What we 
can discern in the dialogue is Socrates’s intention to establish a dialogic relation among 
namegiver, teacher and dialectician, namely, to make the naming process a dynamic one in 
which each of the three assumes his own role, and names are defined, and redefined, 
taught, tested and corrected so as to be consistent with reality. This might be the 
credibility Socrates attempts to achieve for his naming theory through the Cratylus.
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Another rhetorical intention that may be observed in the Cratylus is Socrates’s 
unclaimed superiority of the oratorical power in naming over the written language. The 
Socratic dialogue works hard to explore in what way it is right for Homer’s text to call the 
bird chalcis rather than cymindis, to call the river Xanthus rather than Scamander, and to 
call Hector’s son Astyanex rather than Scamandrius (392-3). The conclusion is clearly 
that it is easy to understand the correctness of the names in the Homeric texts, but it is 
hard to explain why one name is better than the other. As Socrates hints, one reached the 
true understanding of the names in Homer when he imagined that he had found some 
indication of the opinions of Homer about the correctness of names. Instead of criticizing 
the vagueness in the Homeric written representations of names, Socrates points to the 
right way to interpret the truth of naming through one’s oral exploration and dialogic 
imagination of how one name gains more interpretative strength than another in its 
reflection of reality, its interaction with the namegivers, and its exposure to the scrutiny of 
the dialecticians. In an iconoclastic manner, Socrates seems to encourage his interlocutors 
not to rely on the written word for its potentiality to destroy one’s ability of thinking, but 
to resort to the oral method, the dialogue in particular, to develop the knowledge of 
names. With such a rhetorical persuasion, Socrates further defends his rational 
understanding of the naming theory.
Compared with Confucius, Socrates devotes far more argument to justifying the 
superiority of his moral philosophy and true rhetoric in his direct encounters with sophistic
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rhetoricians. Apart from the Phaedrus, his dialogues, Gorgias and Symposium, are also 
conducted to meet the rhetorical challenge of the sophists. From the perspective o f 
morality, Socrates in the Gorgias places his philosophical exploration with the True, the 
Good and the Just, and the sophistic rhetoric with the false, the evil and the unjust. In 
light of epistemology, Socrates aligns philosophy with health and knowledge, and rhetoric 
with disease and ignorance. Some contemporary critics (e.g., Vickers, 110, 127) have 
thus pointed out the exaggerated dichotomies in these dialogues and argued that Socrates 
himself does have recourse to each o f these rhetorical methods (e.g., appeals to the 
audience, arousing emotions, etc.).19 The scrutiny of either the dichotomies or the blend 
of the methods, however, does not account for Socrates’s success in creating his own 
voice of credibility in a dialogue with his opponents. It is his dialogic imagination that 
enables Socrates to push forward his argumentation with Gorgias, Polus and Callicles on 
the issues of rhetoric, real power and real statesmanship. Ever since Socrates starts his 
(also Chaerephon’s) question and answer process with Gorgias, he makes efforts to set 
their argumentation in a context in which their voices are interactive with each other, and 
also with the voices of those absent from their dialogue. The initial topic they concentrate 
on is “What is the profession of Gorgias?” Gorgias’s pupil, Pollus’s explanation seems to 
contradict the professional criterion by which people call themselves physician, painter, 
etc. When Gorgias states that his profession is rhetorician and that rhetoric is the art of 
how to produce persuasion, Socrates once again places his debate in a social situation 
where an arithmetician or a teacher o f law courts is also recognized as a producer of
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persuasion. This definition from the standpoint of social reality challenges the validity of 
Gorgias’s profession. It is in the moment that Gorgias is induced to make the admission 
that an ignorant man with the skill of rhetoric may be more persuasive than a doctor on 
the subject of health that Socrates raises the question of whether rhetoricians really know 
the distinction between justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness, good and evil when he is 
engaged with persuasion. By such a step-by-step questioning and analytical process, 
Socrates successfully gets Gorgias’s voice defined by various other contending voices so 
as to prove that rhetoric is not an art of persuasion, but a knack of flattery. And 
meanwhile, Socrates seizes whatever opportunities present to remind the audience of the 
addressivity of Gorgias’s statement to his former statement, and to reveal the incredibility 
of sophistic rhetorical claims. One such prominent instance is to place Gorgias’s 
statement that an “orator might make use of rhetoric for unjust purposes” in comparison 
with his previous claim that “rhetoric could never be anything unjust” (461). Socrates’s 
listing of such an inconsistency is not simple, and he intends to claim that Gorgias’s 
lengthy monological speech based on the theory of probability and relativity, though 
sounding convincing, does not always address the question; and it is a dialogic imagination 
generated from his dialectical method that points to the conclusion that Gorgias’s rhetoric 
is not conducive to the good life, and useful rhetoric must aim at its demonstration of 
injustice and its protection of the innocent (481).
The aspect of the later part of the Gorgias that has received the attention of critics 
is Socrates’s frustration in developing his critical studies of Gorgias’s brand of rhetoric20
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before he shifts to a different topic. This third part (481-527), however, suggests that the 
issue of the relation between rhetoric and the good life always lies at the center of the 
dialogue, although Socrates is fully aware of Callicles’s hostility and non-cooperation. 
Certainly, Socrates’s realization that he can hardly persuade Callicles to accept his 
argument does not prevent him from his further exploration of the topics o f happiness, 
pleasure, good and evil, rhetoricians and politicians, because he does not deem it a victory 
to “compel” anybody to an agreement. Instead, he keeps the voices of his and his 
opponents complementary, and he enjoys having a listener21 and having his argument 
responded to, approvingly or critically. His encouragement of questions from his 
interlocutors, and his patience with their counter-argument seem to indicate that he never 
deems it “un”harmonious and discordant for him to face any philosophical or rhetorical 
challenge, and that argumentation becomes a dynamic part of his dialogue and exploration. 
This attitude reflects Socrates’s understanding of a true dialogue—to question and to be 
questioned so as to develop a knowledge of the absolute truth, and reach an agreement 
between the mortal souls and the divine god. Very few readers can deny that it is his 
continuous dialogue itself that enables Socrates to force from his interlocutors the 
irresistible conclusions. The credibility of Socrates’s argument also comes from his 
delineation of the evil statesmen who mirror “those who call themselves sophists.” When 
Socrates creates a dialogue between these two groups of professionals, the audience are 
brought to see how the politicians who brought destruction to the state complained about 
the harsh treatment they finally face, and how the sophists who “pretend to teach virtue
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finally accuse their pupils of misdeeds” while “defrauding them o f wages or showing no 
gratitude for the benefits they have received” (521). Furthermore, Socrates makes use of 
the dialogic nature of the practice of sophists and orators, and illuminates how these 
professionals “closely approximate one another” and corrupt the state. These pungent 
comparisons are used to draw a clear picture of the dark side of the contemporary 
Athenian political and rhetorical situation and to launch a severe attack on the pragmatism 
and sophistry still popular in the state.
While emphasizing the dialogic nature of Socrates’s verbal activities, Bakhtin 
presents Socrates as the hero of a new genre, which helps modern readers to distinguish 
his true rhetoric of Love and Good, tragedy and comedy in the dialogues like the 
Symposium. Bakhtin believes that Socrates “is an outstanding example of heroization in 
novelistic prose (so very different from epic heroization) ...Socratic laughter...and Socratic 
degradation...bring the world closer and familiarize it in order to investigate it fearlessly 
and freely...” {Dialogic Imagination, 11-13). The Symposium may well serve as such a 
process of “heroization” for Socrates to gain the right to the definition of moral and 
rhetorical concepts in a “heteroglossia” of voices struggling to provide their own 
interpretations. The dialogue proceeds in the situation of a drunken banquet. The comic 
circumstances, and the reverence for Socrates from those present encourage free speeches 
on the topic of love and the casual exchange of disparate viewpoints. Our reading may 
prove how the speeches bring to the audience or the reader an encyclopedic knowledge of 
the issue of Love.22 Phaedrus’s beginning speech generates “a self-image”23 as an object
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
of love, and the second speech by Pausanias may be deemed as a “declaration of 
independence” for the pederasts to whom he belongs. Eryximachus gives an account for 
his conclusion that the god of Love is actually a physician like himself. Then,
Aristophanes, in the light of an explanation of mythical origin, interprets Love as the 
desire for copulation and harmony with its primordial other half originally separated by 
Zeus. From these self-centered speeches, we are convinced that the speakers do not make 
utterances on the basis of philosophical reasoning but merely out of their rich imagination 
and in their own interests. With those melodramatic voices resonating in the party, 
Socrates feels obliged to make known his philosophical understanding of Love as the 
desire for Good, for what an individual lacks (198b—201c). What I intend to illuminate is 
not the content of the Socratic argument, but his dialogic imagination in manipulating such 
a complicated topic as Love, and in making his voice theologically and philosophically 
responsive to his otherness and to the half-somber rhetorical context. The basic structure 
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Figure 2: The Dialogic Structure of Symposium
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Diotima, a female priest and prophet, is a myth-making image in the center o f Socrates’s 
communication. She is also the source from which Socrates claims to get instruction.
This half-goddess, half-human authority is, however, a figure without historical basis.24 It 
is reasonable for us to infer that Diotima’s statement constitutes a divine voice that is both 
dialogic with Socrates’s innerself and alienated from his own voice. By introducing a 
female prophet into the discussion, Socrates may reflect that his understanding is 
consistent with the mythical account of the origin of Love as presented by Aristophanes. 
Though his speech addresses all the participants at the banquet, it is through his direct 
dialogue with Agathon that Socrates is able to expound to the rest at the level o f morality 
that Love is intended for the beauty of souls and happiness o f the individuals, and at the 
level of philosophy, to reveal how Love in the form of beautiful interior is defined by the 
ugly exterior, and how “the Love of wisdom” is defined by “the wisdom of Love.” 
Furthermore, in the light of his moral philosophy, Socrates’s contribution also responds 
negatively to the preceding speakers on the topic of Love, and his dialogic relations 
penetrate the object of Socratic Love,25 Alcibiades, because Alcibiades’s encomium of 
Socrates advocates that Love may be pursued in the real world, but cannot be experienced 
and appreciated in the spiritual domain. Alcibiades, presented as an epitome of a 
passionate lover, is observed as a sharp contrast to Socrates, a philosopher o f reason.26 
But, these two extremes, in terms of Love, are still complementary when Love is 
understood to be both the origin of the human longing for a physical pleasure, and the 
motivation for spiritual exploration of truth and knowledge.
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Socrates’s dialogue also points to the rhetoric of Gorgias and its influence on the 
speakers in the banquet. By drawing a distinction between flattery and praise, the 
beautiful encomiums of Love and the truth about Love, the imitation of Gorgias’s rhetoric 
and the dialectical exchange, Socrates is able to defend a philosophical attitude toward 
Love. The last but the most significant point is that the Symposium functions as a 
convincing refutation against the charges of creating new gods and corrupting youth. His 
philosophical exploration of Love is contradictory to the preceding speeches that do create 
new gods, and his moral emphasis on Love is also opposed to the pleasure-seeking 
tendency of the rest of speakers present. Indeed, Socrates is a lonely philosopher among 
those participants who exhibit a pragmatic attitude. And it is his dialogic imagination that 
keeps him awake in the gathering of those drunken with wine. This is why we in the 
audience can often trace his voice of credibility among a heteroglossia of voices struggling 
to represent themselves. And this also reminds us of the same role Confucius often 
assumes in his dialogues to defend his moral philosophy.
IV. Fa/i/True Rhetoric versus DelGood: Dialogue 
between Confucius and Socrates
In the above discussion, I have described the basic understanding of Confucius and 
Socrates about the relation between Word and De or Good, and provided a dialogic 
reading of a voice of credibility in their dialogues. Now, my comparative study is 
intended to get their ethical claims and rhetorical visions mutually defined so as to
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emphasize the dialogic nature of their voices interactive with their own context and also 
ours.
Both Confucius and Socrates have developed a rather systematic understanding of 
the self-representation in one’s verbal activities. They emphasize the close relation 
between the speaker’s self-representation and his discourse. For Confucius, a speaker 
must be a possessor of De (virtue) before he engages himself in a speech or a dialogue, 
because speaking ability is basically an instrument with which the gentleman (or exemplary 
man) educates or influences the “small man” (or common man) in the way the wind blows 
over the grass (Ch. 12.19). On the other hand, Word is not only a carrier but also a 
reflection of virtue, and that is why Confucius stated that “he has no way of judging men 
unless he understands words” (Ch. 20.3). Thus, Confucius emphasized the dialogic nature 
of virtue and Word. The former may lead to the latter, and the latter, in turn, defines and 
cultivates the former. For Socrates, word or speech ensures a process, a dialectical 
exchange for the speaker to tell the truth and discover the truth, which compels the 
speaker to encounter and contend with different voices in order to have his own voice 
heard. So, word itself is highly valued in Socrates’s doctrine,27 for his philosophical life 
would be put to an end once he was denied the right to word.
In their idiosyncratic interpretation of virtue and word, the two great thinkers 
contributed to different configurations of rhetorical activities for their moral philosophy. 
Confucius provided, though not intentionally, a comparatively more systematic description 
to define the oral practice of a “gentleman.” Within this system, a speaker has to take 
care of the various relations of his word with the “rectification of names,” performance of
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action, rites and music, with legal enforcement, and also with the compliance of the 
common people. Apart from his focus on verbal activity as a means of social construction, 
the Confiician rhetorical theory also insists on oral practice as a process of self-cultivation. 
Accordingly, Confucius’s standard of Yan (word) is a verbal activity under the principle 
of De (virtue) that consists of two essential elements: Zhong (reverence, 
conscientiousness) and Xin (trustworthiness, sincerity). However, these moral standards 
are not monological and uni-directional. They are dialogical and bi-directional in the sense 
that the word with virtue, according to Confucius, reflects both the speaker’s spiritual 
purification and his intention for the moral education o f the common people. Word as a 
rhetorical performance is elaborated by the value system of the speaker himself and 
responded to by its audience. In sum, Confucius’s concept of word deals with the 
individualized spiritual cultivation and the socialized moral elevation, for Confucius’s 
rhetorical vision is for the realization of a harmony among the people, and between human 
beings and their social environment (e.g., the state administration, cultural tradition, and 
the natural world).
Corresponding to Confucius’s concept, Socrates, in the Western world, also 
produced a rather systematic theoretical description of his “true rhetoric.” Since Socrates 
established his conception upon the understanding that true rhetoric is employed to 
express and discover truth {Phaedrus), to redefine “names” so as to teach people 
{Cratylus), or to awaken the souls of the audience {Symposium) while purifying the soul 
of the speaker himself {Phaedrus), he located the self in the context of dialogue—a
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dialogical exchange— while presenting before us an internal harmony28 among word 
(rhetoric), character, truth and divinity, which can be illustrated in the following diagram:
,CQharacte£) Qnterlocutoj)
CWord^) Internal Harmony—Self Curator) External harmony—Other (^JrutK)
TrutlT) --------------Cj5ivinity^) ^ ^ - ( ^ b iv in i^ )
Figure 3: Word, Character, Divinity and Truth 
In Socrates’s ethical dialogues, the speaker’s character is always embodied in his good 
intention, and good will is always expressed in his word that is employed to discover and 
describe truth. Such truth is in accord with the divine or spiritual voice that communicates 
with the speaker, and kindles his inspiration on his further exploration. This harmony in 
the inner world of the self is simultaneously defined by an external harmony of the 
speaker’s dialogical activities with his interlocutors. Once he could persuade his 
interlocutors to participate in his question and answer exchange toward the final goal of 
the absolute truth, Socrates would always enjoy some harmonious relations with the 
other—his interlocutors and then the absolute truth. Though it is often the case that 
Socrates is heatedly refuted, for instance in the Gorgias or the Symposium, he seldom 
feels hesitant in his continuous efforts for a divine cause. On many occasions, he seems 
gratified with two rhetorical visions he has already achieved: one is to make effective his 
dialectical method, as in his dialogue, the Gorgias, by exposing the fallacy of the argument
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of his opponents and demonstrating the superiority of his philosophy, and the other, as my 
discussion of his Apology indicates, is to make clear to the public how their souls can be 
awakened in such a process of verbal and spiritual confrontation so as to get nearer to the 
god of Love, and the god of truth. In this sense, Socrates is often commended for his 
epistemological optimism in his belief that Man can finally reach the truth so long as he is 
conscious of his ignorance and responsive to the divine voice of the god.
In general, Confucius’s rhetorical vision aims at an internal harmony between Yan 
(word) and De (virtue, morality) within the self, which is extended to a harmony among 
people, between human beings and society, and between human society and the natural 




Zhong Famil' Success in life
Junzi Friend Dao (Wa
Xin Virtuous rule
o f  the stabeaven
Shu
Figure 4: Confucius’s Ethical Claims for Yan (Word, rhetoric)
Within this framework, we may discover how Confucius internalized his ethical claims in 
his rhetorical theory. The Gentleman {Junzi) is both the exemplar of virtue (De), and the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62
producer of Word (Yan) in the form of a speech or a dialogue. The virtuous Word mainly 
consists of two elements: Zhong (reverence, conscientiousness) and Xin (trustworthiness, 
sincerity). These ethical elements enable the gentleman to develop harmonious rhetorical 
relations with rulers, family members, friends, and to carry out moral education among the 
common people. The rhetorical activity o f the gentleman, however, is always 
contextualized in terms of its relations with Time, Place, and Heaven, because Confucius 
insists that the gentleman has to decide whom to communicate with,29 when to speak,30 
and on what occasion or at what place to make his utterance.31 More significantly, the 
gentleman has his own way talking to Heaven.32 The purpose of rhetoric, for Confucius, 
is first of all self-oriented, for oral ability generates a favorable self-image and may 
contribute to one’s success in life. As his disciple, Zigong, points out, “One word from a 
gentleman reveals his wisdom or ignorance” (Ch. 19.25). So, speech can not be too 
careful. The second purpose o f rhetorical activity is to produce Word that upholds the 
rule of virtue (Ch. 9.24), because “The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star 
which commands the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place” (Ch. 2.1). 
Undoubtedly, order and harmony are found in this imagined structure of the state 
administration. Once the rhetorical activities reach such a stage of the successful self­
representation and benevolent administration, the supreme ideal of Confucius, Dao (Way), 
will be realized both in the self and the other. Worthy of discussion is the “golden thread,” 
Shu , reciprocity),33 that connects the whole structure of Confucius’s rhetorical 
claims. By Shu, Confucius implies that in rhetorical activities or ethical education, the
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gentleman should, on the one hand, learn to discipline or overcome the self in its relation 
with the other,34 and on the other, address or treat others as you would treat yourself, 
namely, never impose on others what you yourself do not desire.35 The Confiician theory 
of reciprocity helps to activate his dialogic imagination for a gentleman to carry on with 
his verbal activities to achieve both internal and external harmony.
Although both Confucius and Socrates might attempt to establish a voice of an 
authoritative Zheren!man of wisdom through their dialogues, they seemed to realize 
eventually, after many setbacks and frustrations, that the strong passion to dominate an 
otherwise cooperative verbal exchange could undermine the “ethos” or De of the 
participants. Accordingly, they developed their own strategies in their ethical dialogues. 
Confucius’s attitude toward a successful dialogue among friends and students is to 
encourage “everyone present to speak out his mind” (Ch. 11.26). He is reluctant to 
impose his opinions upon others, for he believes that “The three armies can be deprived of 
their commanding officers, but even a common man cannot be deprived of his 
purpose”(Ch. 9.26 ). In other words, Confucius insists that it is essential to develop a 
mutual understanding when people are engaged in a conversation or a discussion, because 
the rhetorical activity itself is a process of learning for all the participants. For Socrates, 
the purpose of a dialogue is “to reach an agreement which must be recognized as valid by 
everyone” (Jaeger, v2, 63). True to his word, consensus in Socrates’s dialogue also 
becomes instrumental to the maintenance of a constant contact between discussants. 
Though the Socratic dialogues could sound highly argumentative, the argumentation itself
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usually proceeds in a situation where agreement on certain ideas is often reached.
Socrates seldom takes his debates as a conflict of antagonistic utterances. Instead, he 
believes that a dialectical exchange can submit the opinions of his interlocutors to the 
scrutiny of his critique. That is why Socrates often starts from some practical statements 
and minuscule propositions in order to introduce gradually his interlocutors to general 
concepts of his moral philosophy. The consequence Socrates has to face is often the 
general opposition to and final disagreement with his moral claims as a whole. But, who 
can deny that Socrates does arrive at a certain consensus with his interlocutors, which 
often enables him to complete his argument and to get his voice of morality heard?
The intercultural dialogue between Confucius and Socrates also suggests that both 
thinkers value the dialogic relations between the concepts of harmony and argumentation. 
Setting social harmony as the goal of his verbal activities, Confucius never overlooks the 
function of argumentation, especially on the occasions he attempts to get his own 
propositions across. His argumentation with his disciples (e.g., Ch. 6.1, 17.7, 17.21) and 
interlocutors (e.g., Ch. 12.18, 12.19) indicates that he does not avoid the clash with the 
other participants in a dialogue,36 because a speaker should not echo others (Ch. 13.23), 
and argumentation can lead him to uphold the principles of De. What Confucius criticizes 
is not the employment of argumentation, but the “glibness of tongue” that undermines the 
principle of De (ethics, virtue). Actually, Confucius’s idea of De is sometimes defended 
in a course of argument. By contrast, to Socrates, harmonious relations in oral activities 
have to be guaranteed for the speaker to carry out his argumentation which eventually
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leads to the truth. Therefore, argumentation marks Socrates’s peculiar way of shaping a 
dialogical display. The difference between Confucius and Socrates lies in the fact that, in 
order to raise a voice of sincerity and credibility, Confucius takes social harmony as the 
goal of his rhetoric, and of his argumentation while Socrates takes harmony as an 
instrument to push forward his argumentation. This difference, however, never prevents 
us modem readers from experiencing the power of credibility in their dialogues.
Notes
1. Nan Johnson is certainly right to point out that the pragmatic attitude has led to the 
tendency of putting ethical concern outside of the sphere of pedagogy. She has, 
however, failed to observe that the issue of professional ethics is gaining significance
in technical and professional communication. See Johnson’s “Ethos and Aims of 
Rhetoric.”
2. The textbooks of composition or speech published in the past two decaded reveal such 
a tendency. Representative texts include Frank D’Angelo’s Process and Thought in 
Composition. 20-21, and John Lannon’s Technical Writing. 62-87. Worth 
mentioning is Roger D. Cherry’s effort to overcome the conceptual terminological 
confusion between “ethos” and “persona”. See his “Ethos Versus Persona.”
3. According to the theory of dialogism, the author, text, the characters, and the reading 
of them by an audience together produces a situation in which meaning is pursued by
all participants-- to achieve meaning (rather than monologically produce it) requires a 
shared dialogic awareness or dialogic imagination. Given this situation, when I speak 
of Socrates’s dialogic imagination I mean Socrates, as a speaker, is aware of his 
addressing other voices in and out of his dialogues so as to get his own concept 
defined or responded to.
4. I borrowed the term “aggregative” from Walter Ong to emphasize the aspect of 
Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogues of being occasionally cumbersome, redundant and 
seemingly unorganized. See Ong’s Interfaces o f the Word. 188-212.
5. D.C. Lau’s translation here becomes arbitrary when he renders “ $  ”( literally 
meaning “the producer of good speech”) into “the author of memorable sayings,” 
because he emphasizes the written language. Yang Buojun explains that Confucius’s
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Ycm ) refers to Yanyu , language, speech) or Shuo , speak) (Lunyu
Yizhu, 246). Here is my interpretation for Confucius’s saying: A virtuous person is 
bound to deliver a good speech, but those who can make a good speech are not 
necessarily virtuous. Another recent translation is made by Xing Lu: A good person 
should speak well; but those who speak well are not necessarily good persons.
6. Xu Shen’s (58-121 A.D.) Shuowen Jiezi defines Zhong as reverence and the loyalty of 
trying one’s best.
7. My own translation from “Xiuci li qi cheng” ( ^  ). Yijing (The Book of 
Change) is a book written in the Zhou dynasty. According to The Historical Records, 
Confucius made such a thorough study of Yijing that the book written on the bamboo 
slips was worn out in several places. Yijing was also used by Confucius as one of the 
textbooks in his school. However, even today, we still have difficulty in finding 
correspondence between Confucius’s rhetorical claims and Yijing.
8. Confucius’s concept of “naming” is further defined in his dialogue with Duke Jing: 
Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about effecting sociopolitical order, and Confucius 
replied, “The ruler ought to be ruler, the subject subject and father father, and son 
son” (Ch. 12.11).
9. Hsiao’s interpretation suggests that Confucius’s political views were rational but 
extremely conservative. See Hsiao, Kung-chuan’s A History o f Chinese Political 
Thought. 519. Makeham also insists that the standard interpretation of “naming” is 
that “the names of various social, political, and ethical institutions were rectified so as 
to accord or conform with certain immutable standards inherited from tradition.” See 
John Makeham’s Name and Actuality in Early Chinese Thought. 44.
10. Some Confiician scholars insist that this self-description o f Confucius just serves as 
evidence of his modesty. See Zhu Xi’s Lunyu Jizhu (<< i#} *§• !$  -;i >> ). Other 
scholars, like Yang Buojun, believe that Confucius’s word Zuo ( f^  ) here has the 
connotation of “innovate without possessing true knowledge.” I follow Yang’s 
interpretation. See Yang’s interpretation in his Chinese edition of 'The Analects 
(1983). 66.
11. See Zuozhuan in Chunqiu. Confucius’s comment in Zuozhuan is translated into 
English as “Names are used to generate credibility, credibility is used to protect the 
ritual vessels, ritual vessels are used to embody ritual action, ritual actions are used to 
enact significance, significance is used to produce benefit, and benefit is used to bring 
peace to the people.”
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12. My own translation. See Kongzi Jiayu (The School Sayings of Confucius). Section 5. 
46.
13. Li (rites) is mentioned more than seventy times in The Analects.
14. Feng Youlan insists that in the ConfUcian doctrine “Rites” refers to the social system, 
and is the art of man. Feng’s definition emphasizes the otherness of “Rites”. See 
Kongzi yanjou lunwenji.
15. Nan Johnson argues that in the Phaedrus ideal truth and absolute goodness are 
central issues which are intended for reformed oratorical practice, and rhetoric, in fact, 
functions as the instruction of ideal truth. See Nan Johnson’s “Ethos and Aims of 
Rhetoric.”
16. This is comparable to Confucius’s understanding of the relation between Word and Li 
(Rites).
17. Some critics tend to take this joking and dramatic tone at its face value. See James A. 
Arieti’s Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama. 64.
18. Timothy M. S. Baxter makes such an inference with the textual evidence that 
Socrates never assumes that there is only one namegiver who is responsible for names.
See his The Cratylus: Plato's Critique o f Naming. 46.
19. Robert Brooke has summarized how Socrates uses each o f the following four 
rhetorical methods excluded from dialectics: appeal to the crowd; arousing emotions; 
ridicule and flattery. And Brooke concludes that Socrates is not playing fair for he 
demands his opponents to play by the rules within a system o f dialectics while he himself 
relies on a mix of methods, both dialectic and rhetorical. See Robert Brooke’s “Trust, 
Ethos, Transference.”
20. Thomas M. Conley states that Socrates carries the dialogue to a description of the 
judgement of souls when he finds that his methods of interrogation does not work 
with Callicles. See Conley’s Rhetoric in the European Tradition. 9.
21. In the Phaedrus Socrates is also so anxious to make sure that Phaedrus remain a 
faithful listener to his second speech about Love.
22. Randall Craig depicts the basic structure o f the speeches in the Symposium, which fall 
into two complementary groups: one defines Love pragmatically, and the other defines 
Love artistically or philosophically. See Craig’s “Plato’s Symposium And The 
Tragicomic Novel.”
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23. In her comment on Phaedrus’s speech, R. Burger writes, “In his identification of the 
response of the beloved as the sign o f the power o f Eros, Phaedrus in fact betrays the 
projection of his own self-image as passive beloved.” See Burger’s The Phaedo: A 
Platonic Labyrinth. 11.
24. KJ. Dover argues that if Diotima is a historical figure who postponed a plague she 
should be mentioned by other writers too. See the Symposium (trans. K.J. Dover).
137.
25. I suppose that Socrates reveals a heterosexual orientation, though in a number of 
dialogues he is often presented as a homosexual seducer.
26. M. Nussbaum has observed in the Symposium a love “overweening of reason” on the 
side of Socrates and a love “overweening of the body” on the side of Alcibiades in her 
article “Speech of Alcibidaes: A Reading of Plato’s Symposium.”
27. Natural spoken word, according to Socrates, different from writing, is human and 
strengthens memory. And it is active, espousive, and it can be used to defend oneself 
in a form of give-and-take between responses. See Walter Ong’s summary in Orality 
and Literacy. 79.
28. James S. Baumlin offered an insightful description of the inner harmony among 
language, character and truth in Platonic fashion, and Baumlin’s discovery starts me 
on the further exploration of the dialogic nature o f such a harmony in its rhetorical 
context. See Baumlin’s “Introduction: Positioning Ethos in Historical and 
Contemporary Theory .” Ethos, New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory.
29. Confucius taught his disciples that “To fail to speak to a man who is capable of 
benefitting is to let a man go to waste. To speak to a man who is incapable of 
benefitting is to let one’s word go to waste” (Ch. 15.8). Here, Confucius 
emphasizes the right persons to talk with.
30. Zilu praises Confucius by saying that “Master knows when to talk, and his listeners 
never feel tired of what he says” (Ch. 14.13).
31. Chapter 10 of The Analects vividly records how Confucius had dialogues on different 
occasions. For instance, “In the local community, Confucius was submissive and 
seemed to be inarticulate. In the ancestral temple and at court, though fluent, he did
not speak lightly” (Ch. 10.1).
32. Confucius’s communication with the Heaven will be discussed in Chapter Four in 
detail.
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33. Phillip Ivanhoe has presented the interpretations of the “golden thread” by four 
representative scholars. See his “Reweaving the ‘one thread’ of the Analects
34. Confucius once expressed his political ideal as “To return to the observance of the 
rites through overcoming the self constitutes benevolence” (Ch. 12.1).
35. Confucius expressed this idea two times in the dialogues with his disciples (Ch. 12.1, 
15.24). My understanding of this assertion is that the gentleman ( J* ) can 
guarantee a harmonious relation with others in communication only if he always keeps
in mind the common interests shared by (him)self and others. Therefore, we are 
justified in saying that Confucius highly values the aspect of dialogic imagination of 
the speaker.
36. J. Vernon Jensen observed in Asian rhetoric a tendency of “the avoidance of clash of 
opinions in order to preserve harmony.” However, this conclusion is not always 
applicable to Confucius’s rhetorical practice. See Jensen’s “Teaching East Rhetoric.”
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Chapter Two 
A Proto-scientific Attitude in Confucius’s 
and Socrates’s Dialogues
A review of Confiician and Socratic studies concerning their scientific attitude and 
method has started me thinking of some questions from rhetorical theory. Does either 
Confucius or Socrates propound a proto-scientific attitude? What are the basic 
characteristics of their representations of science in the dialogue form? What does a 
dialogue between Confucius and Socrates contribute to today’s rhetoric of science and 
communication theory? With these issues, Chapter Two will demonstrate how the 
Confucian and Socratic dialogues reflect a proto-scientific attitude and scientific methods 
in their particular rhetorical structure, embody a combination of oral practice and written 
convention, and might contribute to our contemporary theory of technical communication. 
The chapter consists of a general survey of scientific thinking in rhetorical studies, a 
detailed analysis of the scientific elements in Confucius’s and Socrates’s texts, and a 
comparative analysis of their attitude toward scientific/philosophical inquiry through 
rhetorical activities.
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According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989), the word “science” originally 
referred generally to the state or fact of knowing, and its adjective form “scientific” 
originates in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (71b), indicating a theoretical property o f 
being able to “produce knowledge.” Today, in a more strict sense, “science” usually refers 
to the intellectual and practical activity encompassing those branches of systematic study 
that apply an objective method to the phenomena of the physical universe, that is, the 
“natural” sciences. Modem discussions of the exploration of scientific knowledge and 
methods in the West, however, often start from the Socratic tradition. Early in the 1950s, 
the American scholar, James B. Conant, president of Harvard University, made the 
following comments on the spirit of scientific inquiry:
For the burst of new ardor in disciplined intellectual inquiry we must turn to a few 
minds steeped in the Socratic tradition, and to those early scholars who first 
recaptured the culture of Greece and Rome by primitive methods of archaeology. In 
the first period of the Renaissance, the love of dispassionate search for the truth was 
carried forward by those who were connected with man and his works rather than 
with inanimate or animate nature. During the Middle Ages, interest in attempts to use 
the human reason critically and without prejudice, to probe deeply without fear and 
favour, was kept alive by those who wrote about human problems. In the early days 
of the Revival of learning, it was the humanist’s exploration of antiquity that came 
nearest to exemplifying our modem ideas of impartial inquiry. (23-24)
Conant’s understanding of the humanistic scientific inquiry and method emphasizes its
love for truth, critical reasoning, and impartiality, and provides us with a useful basis for a
rhetorical analysis of Socrates and Confucius. With the help of Conant’s theoretical study,
the Chinese scholar, Hu Shi,1 in the 1960s argued for the scientific aspects of Chinese
philosophy that originated with the Confucian tradition. In response to the challenge that
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Eastern science “has never progressed for long beyond the initial natural history stage of 
development to which concepts by intuition restrict one” (Northrop, 223), Hu vigorously 
argues for the Confucian tradition, the Chinese “Socratic tradition,” which has encouraged 
philosophical inquiry and molded the orthodoxy of Chinese intellectual life for twenty-five 
centuries (Hu, 203-4).
Both Conant’s and Hu’s claims, however, only centred on the humanistic aspects 
of the scientific attitude and method of ancient philosophers. Contemporary scholars like 
John Ziman, Thomas Kuhn, Stephen Toulmin and Charles Bazerman have developed a 
much broader understanding of the philosophy and rhetoric of science and have suggested 
its particular relevance for rhetorical study.
Based on his study of the Western heritage, including the Socratic dialogues, 
Ziman emphasizes that science is a collective human enterprise and is founded on social 
consensus (31-32, 96, 101). Kuhn’s model of the history of science hinges on its 
periodically successful achievement of paradigmatic consensus within a scientific 
community, and his theory, though separating mature science from philosophy and other 
social sciences, acknowledges the Socratic tradition in knowledge-making. Toulmin has 
further observed that the knowledge of science has to be interpreted within the conditions 
and agreed-upon ideals of a particular time and also against competing contemporary 
claims. Bazerman’s scrutiny of the shaping of scientific knowledge has also pointed to 
the fact that the Platonic Socrates’s preference for living dialectic over dead wisdom 
expressed in writing is preserved in “modem valorization of oral over written” in social
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sciences,2 and the Socratic distrust in the correspondence “between scientific formulation 
and nature” has been rearticulated “with persuasive empirical evidence” (293). All these 
four scholars have described scientific knowledge and communication as a process of joint 
exploration aiming at social consensus, but tolerating different voices. Their studies, 
though concentrated on the modem rhetoric of natural sciences, have also broadened our 
vision of the ancient rhetors like Socrates and Confucius.
Presumably it is in Bakhtin’s theory of dialogic imagination that Socratic dialogue 
has enjoyed a revived reputation for its scientific attitude. Bakhtin portrays Socrates as a 
philosopher who converses with many voices and proceeds in a camivalistic world of 
everyday experience. And Bakhtin shows that Socrates’s method of inquiry exhibits 
“scientific thinking,”3 for his ultimate goal is to seek truth by questioning and testing the 
ideas of his interlocutors rather than by imposing opinions on them. So, Bakhtin’s 
Socrates is an open-minded, “scientific” explorer. Bakhtin’s sense of Socrates’s scientific 
thinking and a dialogic method are rightly echoed by Julia Kristeva. She believes that 
“Socratic dialogues are characterized by opposition to any official monologism claiming to 
possess a ready-made truth” (81), because truth is the product of a dialogical relation of 
the participants in the dialogues. Methodologically, Socratic dialogues, according to 
Kristeva, are expressed by two devices: one is syncrisis, i.e., the linguistic network has to 
confront different discourses on the same topic; the other is anacrises, i.e., one word 
prompts another in this network. Therefore, the Bakhtinian reading contributes to a 
translinguistic science by demonstrating to us certain intertextual relationships, or 
“intertextuality”4 in the Socratic dialogues.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
Consistent with the Bakhtinian portrait of Socrates, detailed analysis has also been 
made about Socrates’s scientific attitude and method in the past twenty years. Vlastos5 has 
expressed a continuous interest in Socratic elenchus of the early oral stage as a 
philosophical method, in Socrates’s epistemic certainty in “seeking knowledge 
elenctically” and also in his mathematical exploration. Brickhouse and Smith’s research 
also focuses on the “Socratic Method” used to obtain a correct understanding of the 
subject matter with his discussants, thus presenting Socrates as a figure who speaks and 
listens to different claims while dismissing “the appeal of false beliefs” (1-29).
In essence, then, Socrates has been seen increasingly as a precursor of the systematic 
skepticism of Francis Bacon, considered the father of the “scientific method.”6
Among contemporary scholarship on Confucius’s scientific attitude, Joseph 
Needham has developed a dialectical understanding of Confucius’s ambivalent attitude 
toward science.7 He believes that Confucius is basically rationalistic and stands against 
superstition in any form, and that his skepticism and critical thinking contributed to the 
development of the science of ancient China. However, his “concentration on human life 
and exclusion of non-human phenomena negated all investigation of Things, as opposed to 
Affairs.” More recent study of Confucius has been made by Kuang Yarning,8 a Marxist 
critic. Kuang’s systematic and historical inquiry has shed much light on the Confixcian 
“humanistic science” concerning his political theory and strategies, economic thought and 
claims, and more importantly, his educational philosophy and pedagogy. Kuang’s research 
represents the most comprehensive and insightful Marxist critique of Confucian
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philosophy since the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), a counter-cultural 
movement that totally denied any theoretical and pragmatic value to Confucianism as a 
major heritage in Chinese civilization.
In recent comparative studies of Socratic and Confiician dialogues, much effort 
has been made to reveal the considerable humanistic scientific attitude of these two early 
philosophers. Maurice Cohen’s contrastive research (159-68) explains how Confucius and 
Socrates remained attached to a method of analysis rooted in the clarification of concepts 
and how Confucius’s subtle elenchus or examination is comparable in purpose to 
Socrates’s request for a definition. And A. S. Cua’s analysis (131-47) stresses a conflict 
between two irreconcilable conceptions—Socrates’s primacy of rationality versus 
Confucius’s primacy of practice, or theoretical knowledge versus practical knowledge. G. 
E. R. Lloyd, a prominent philosopher of science, has also observed that the pluralism of 
ancient Chinese cosmologies during the Warring States period resembles that of the Greek 
(141-45). Although the Chinese philosophical schools like those of the Confucians, 
Daoists, Mohists, Logicians and others differ on the question of the possibility of 
developing understanding and on the significance of the investigation of nature and of 
human society, they hardly made a clear distinction between nature and culture. So, the 
Greeks were ready in their scientific and philosophical work to follow “wherever the logos 
or argument leads” (144) as was manifest in Socratic dialogues, whereas the Chinese 
valued the pragmatic usefulness o f reason, and tended to reject a view that ran against 
ordinary experience or was purely theoretical.
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These observations and conclusions by recent scholars are generally based on 
detailed comparative studies of Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogues and illuminate to 
modem readers the characteristics of “scientific thinking” represented in a dialogjcal form. 
However, this kind of bifurcation of “theoretical versus pragmatic” or “rationality versus 
practice” monologizes or polarizes otherwise the more originally pluralistic and open 
system of philosophy in the Socratic and Confucian traditions in terms of their scientific 
attitude and method . One of the most obvious examples to refute the simplicity of 
bifurcation might be that of Socrates’s “logos”9 and Confucius’s “Way.” These two basic 
concepts themselves have to be interpreted or decoded in the context of a heteroglossia of 
“languages.” “Logos” points to “practical usefulness” apart from its theoretical implication 
while “Way” theorizes both the natural and human philosophy in the situation in which 
practical knowledge is highlighted for the maintenance of social order.
Using the Bakhtinian dialogical approach, however, we can demonstrate that their 
scientific attitude is often reflected in a rhetorical practice based on their theoretical 
claims, their method of investigation and interaction designed to open the mind o f the 
interlocutors/ participants to the pluralism of the self and the other, and their contribution 
to technical communication. Specifically, I hope to emphasize that Confucius and 
Socrates are important in the history of science because they were most distinguished early 
thinkers who sought truth by an open dialogue which tested all accepted ideas, who used 
the dialogue form to achieve social consensus and often move systematically from idea to 
idea, and who taught that the truth is more important than authority of the speaker.
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The present chapter will first explicate how Confucius’s dialogue is devoted to an 
open system of the earliest Chinese ethical theory with “benevolence” at its centre, and 
with the harmony between humanity, heaven and nature as its goal; then, it will 
demonstrate how his rhetorical practice is generally guided by his theory o f “enlightenment 
and inference” (Ch. 7.8) which emphasizes the interaction between participants, values 
different voices in philosophical inquiry and rejects glibness in Ci ( J ^  , words and 
rhetorical devices) isolated from the context of communication; finally it will demonstrate 
how Confucius’s scientific attitude that contributed to Chinese agricultural administration, 
food culture, travel and technical communication.
With regard to Socrates, this chapter will explain how his scientific attitude helps 
to establish a series of concepts or definitions which construct his knowledge about an 
ethical science through a continuous pursuit of “human goodness” and ultimate truth; also, 
it will analyse the Socratic “true rhetoric” itself as a scientific method that starts a face-to- 
face examination of the soundness of the diverse viewpoints through a question and 
answer sequence, and moreover, that generally denies authoritarianism and polarities in a 
philosophical search; and the chapter then attempts to manifest the relationship between 
Socrates’s dialogue and technical communication concerning the basic principles of his 
theoretical claims.
In the last section of Chapter Two, a comparative analysis will be made of 
Confucius’s and Socrates’s scientific attitude in opening the human minds to the world of 
knowledge, in providing a method to challenge the self-imposed restrictions and limits on
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their imagination, and also in preparing us modem readers for the real world 
communication in an era of information explosion. In the meantime, this study also points 
to Confucius’s rhetorical devotion to communal or joint search for knowledge, his sense 
of practicality or a pragmatic attitude in communication, and also his philosophical 
understanding of the aspects of daily life as opposed to Socrates’s passion for knowledge 
as an individual inquirer, his inquisitiveness in the examination of people and thought, and 
his sensitivity to matters of practicality and instrumentality in communication.
n. Toward Knowledge: Confucius’s Theoretical 
Claims and Rhetorical Practice
Confucius’s scientific attitude is best represented in his dialogical rhetoric that 
established the earliest open system of ethics in the East, a system that aims at a true and 
impartial reflection of human nature and provides some general moral principles to model 
the behaviour o f intellectuals as well as common people and to keep the balance of the 
society. Once Confucius summarized his ethical theory in the following words: “I set my 
heart on the Way, base myself on virtue, lean upon benevolence for support and take my 
recreation in the arts” (Ch. 7.6). Here, “Way” refers to a general goal of human society, 
which is expressed in the practice of virtue ( ), the basic principle for daily behaviour;
and the core of this principle is “benevolence” ( ) which is generally rendered as the
“love for others” and embodied in the acquisition o f “six arts”: ritual ceremony, musical 
study, archery, carriage driving, reading and mathematics. Why does the Confucian
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rhetoric attach so much importance to “benevolence”? Let us first trace the original 
meaning of his concept. Xu Shen (58-121 A.D.), in his Explanation o f  Chinese 
Characters, defines the word, Ren {\t- , benevolence), as Oin (Jf.^ ), meaning the 
extending of love to those around oneself, because the left part of the word stands for 
“human”( A .) and right part “two”( ), the whole word implies “benevolence” or “love 
for those around you.” Xu’s definition helps to explain Confucius’s basic understanding 
of “benevolence” : his decoding of humans as being kind and close to each other by nature 
when they are bom,10 and his dialogic concept of the relationship between self and other, 
between this and that.
With regard to human nature, Confucius once stated to his disciples, “Men are 
close to one another by nature. They diverge as a result o f repeated practice” (Ch. 17.2). 
Though he does not make clear whether human nature is benevolent or evil, Confucius 
tends to believe, from his repeated analysis of “benevolence,” that to be benevolent is 
human. It is because of the differences in their life practices that people begin to develop 
different standards of morality. Thus defined, moral education under the principle o f 
“benevolence” becomes a necessity to perfect human nature and to maintain ideal human 
relations in accordance with his doctrine of “loving the multitude at large” (Ch. 1.16). In 
a form of dialogic thinking, Confucius explicates two major moral practices in his ethical 
theory. One is that “the practice of benevolence depends on oneself alone, and not on 
others” (Ch. 12.1 ). This observation implies that to practice benevolence is 
fundamentally an “inner,” “private” or “secular” self-oriented activity, though this “self’ is
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not an undividable and self-closed whole, for Confucius’s sense of “self-cultivation”
) is not only suggestive of a process of self-contemplation and self-discovery to
to try to achieve self-cultivation in response to a multitude of voices and the desires of self 
that are in discord with benevolence.
The other and more significant moral practice is “loving others” or “loving your 
fellow men” ( Ch. 12.22 ). So, to be benevolent is also a “public,” “altruistic,” and open- 
ended activity and depends on a continuous and others-oriented participation in social life. 
To love others is actually a starting point of Confucius’s life goal, because his rhetorical 
activities are generally resulted from his humanistic concems-the concerns for those 
around you in your family, in your neighborhood, in your village, or in your state. 
Confucius believes that if a governor knows how to demonstrate benevolence to others 
people will come to him with children and relatives from far away and they will be glad to 
build a new life of their own, and simutaneously they will make the state prosperous and 
strong. So, loving others is always the core of his political and philosophical exploration. 
Since the practice of benevolence displays the characteristics of being relational and 
interactive with others, Confucius makes much effort in his dialogues and discussions with 
his disciples to reach a definition and promote a gradual extension from one’s affection for 
his parents and brothers to that for his neighbours, community, and then to his lords and 
country, Gods and ancestors, and finally to his ultimate truth, the “Way.” Therefore, his 
theory of benevolence may be expressed in the following figure:
establish a belief that it is I myself who desire benevolence ( -  , Ch. 7.30 ), but
also dialogic, for its purpose is to “discipline oneself’ ( %, &  , Ch. 12.1),11 or to be exact,

















Figure 5: Confucius’s Theoretical Structure of “Benevolence”
In this structure, benevolence consists of two parts: self-cultivation and loving others.
The former is subdivided into self-contemplation and self-discipline while the latter is 
extended into a more complicated system. The objects of loving start from the very roots, 
the family members, then to the community, or from the closest relatives to the remote 
social relations, from particular persons to human beings in general, and from the concrete 
observance to the abstract truth, though Confucius never indicates explicitly that equal
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amount of benevolence should be extended to all these entities. In addition, Confucius’s 
understanding of benevolence has specific implications in terms of the moral practitioner’s 
relations with others. For instance, with one’s parents, Confucius highlights the quality of 
“being filial” (^ .  ); with one’s friends, he values “trustworthiness” ( ); with one’s
lords, he expounds “loyalty” ); with Gods and ancestors, he focuses on “respect” 
and with the ideal, “Way,” he expresses passion and belief. From a general 
examination of Confucius’s major ethical pursuit — the doctrine of benevolence, it is not 
hard for us to trace his exploration of the ethical issues that concerns him most, and more 
accurately, his logical thinking and inquisitive investigation.
In view of Confucius’s scientific attitude to an ethical pursuit, more attention 
should be paid to the dynamic relations displayed in his representation of some specific 
topics that have led to much misinterpretation in the Confucian studies.12 The first is his 
investigation of the ethical relation between man and woman. The traditional portrait of 
Confucius’s observation o f women’s status focuses on his partiality and prejudice because 
of his well-known saying, “In one’s household, it is the women and the small men that are 
difficult to deal with. If you let them get too close, they become insolent. If you keep 
them at a distance, they complain” (Ch. 17.25). Since Confucius identified women with 
“small men” (vl'A - ), a term that refers to either children or morally inferior humans, 
modem readers tend to be critical of his negative evaluation of women, which was 
codified in the later moral standard of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) that subjected 
women to men, and hindered the improvement of women’s political and
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economic status. However, scrutiny of Confucius’s rhetorical situation indicates that his 
statement on women reflects the general opinion of women as an “inferior” sex and the 
unfavourable treatment imposed on them because of their subordination to men 
economically. Confucius’s observation here is defined by the social ideology and 
dominant voices of his time, for women, as a whole, were actually kept at the lowest 
level of society in early China. In other words, Confucius’s statement is based on the 
social consensus of his time. Even so, it is still premature for us to characterize 
Confucius’s ethical idea from a single statement on a certain occasion, because 
Confucius’s ethical pursuit often proceeds systematically from idea to idea and his true 
understanding of women and the relation between men and women is represented in a far 
more comprehensive “heteoroglossia” of voices. In discussing one’s attitude to his father 
and mother, he admonishes that one should not go too far in his travel if his parents are 
alive (Ch. 4.19). Shiji (The Historical Records) describes vividly how much trouble 
Confucius took to find his father’s tomb so as to bury his mother and let them rest 
together underground peacefully. On the subject of how to treat one’s sons and 
daughters, Confucius stresses kind-heartedness (Ch. 2.20). He expressed due respect for 
the mistress of a lord in accordance with Li (rites) even if the lady enjoyed no good 
reputation (Ch. 6.28). Moreover, gender issues are incorporated in his naming theory.
For instance, in one of his moral discussions, Confucius corrected the “name” (J ) for 
women in domestic, public or diplomatic occasions (Ch. 16.14), thus confirming, though 
indirectly, the social role of females. Besides, Confucius is also among the first Chinese
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philosophers who discussed openly the topics of sexuality with his disciples. And his 
dialogues (Ch. 3.8, 3.20, 9.31) vehemently defended true love between man and woman, 
which forms a sharp contrast with late Chinese moral inquiry that usually shuns direct 
conversation about love affairs and sexuality. Considering his liberal-mindedness in the 
context of a rigid feudal society about twenty five hundred years ago, we can hardly deny 
the scientific consciousness in Confucius’s ethics of sexuality, which is based on his 
knowledge of sexual psychology (Ch. 9.31) and physiology (Ch. 16.7). Such a panoramic 
reading of Confucius’s oral expressions concerning the issue of women, gender, and 
sexuality exhibits his impartiality in reporting his ethical exploration in many voices, and 
suggests a dialogic decoding of women as a topic that refuses to surrender to one 
definition.
Similarly, Confucius’s rhetorical approach to the relation between lords and 
subjects also reflects his scientific approach to examining the relations between society and 
individual, between moral principle and political strategy, and in establishing his moral 
standards by testing the accepted ideas, authoritative or non-authoritative. It is generally 
acknowledged that this Confucian discussion fostered a tradition of loyalty of subjects to 
lords and helped to consolidate a long-lasting authoritarian system in China. This kind of 
reading overlooks Confucius’s scientific passion in placing the quality of loyalty in the 
context of different, even conflicting voices or views. For instance, Confucius is in 
opposition to blind loyalty and he believes that benevolent administration should be open 
to the monitoring of the people. This is why he regards those who dare to remonstrate
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with their lords as “benevolent men” ( , Ch. 18.1). This demonstrates Confucius’s
critical attitude to the practice of blind loyalty. If such a practice prevailed, he would 
stand up to defend his principles. When his disciple, Ran Yu, failed to persuade his lord to 
stop the non-benevolent practice of bullying others, Confucius criticized him for his 
neglect of duty (Ch. 16.1). On the other hand, Confucius insists that one should not argue 
about what is already accomplished and should not condemn what has already gone by. 
Here, he displays an attitude against the remonstration or argument that can hardly play 
the function of persuasion (Ch. 3.21). Then, if the lord turns a deaf ear to any 
remonstration, and the Way does not prevail in the state, a gentleman, according to 
Confucius, should hide himself away and concentrate on his own moral cultivation (Ch.
8.13). Here, Confucius’s scientific exploration of morality and politics leads him to a 
dialogic reading of the relation between social participation and personal cultivation.
Methodologically, Confucius’s life-time curiosity about and exploration of the 
unknown (A 'fr ) helped to open the mind of his discussants by emphasizing a dialogue 
form of question and answer, valuing different voices of critical thinking, and presenting 
an interaction between self-exploration and enlightenment from the other. In modern 
terms, he sought open testing of concepts and objectivity. To begin with, the-question- 
and- answer dialogue is a major Confucian rhetorical method to gain knowledge rather 
than simply to maintain mundane communication, to continue his philosophical exploration 
rather than to develop the rhetorical fluency o f the participants. The simple fact that the 
participants in his dialogue and discussion range from high officials to common people,
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from scholars to rustics, from men to women, and from old to young suggests that his oral 
exchanges with others work to test the thought of all present and broaden their views of 
an unknown world. The Analects records how Confucius asked so many questions about 
everything during his visit to the Grand Temple that he was suspected to be completely 
ignorant of Li ( j f ^ , rites) in spite of his reputation as a master o f Li (Ch. 3.15).
Moreover, Confucius advocates consulting those who are beneath you (Ch. 5.15). In a 
volume entitled Question and Answer between Confucius and Xiangtuo,13 there is a vivid 
dialogue between Confucius and a seven-year old boy concerning popular scientific 
knowledge of mountains, rivers, trees and life. Surprised at the scope o f the boy’s 
knowledge, Confucius exclaimed that “it is fitting that we should hold the young in 
awe,”14 because they are quick to learn, can catch up with and surpass the grown-ups 
sooner or later. Benefiting from such a method of exploration, Confucius often 
encouraged his disciples to question themselves as well as others about ways to enrich 
their knowledge, and this scientific attitude also accounts for the reality that in The 
Analects alone there are more than one hundred records of Confucius’s sayings beginning 
with questions to his discussants.
Confucius’s proto-scientific attitude may be further traced in three ways he uses 
the rhetoric of dialogue to test assumptions: the first is his dialogic approach to a relation 
between learning and thinking. He believes that “If one learns from others but does not 
think, one will be bewildered. If, on the other hand, one thinks but does not learn from 
others, one will be in peril” (Ch. 2.15). To Confucius, learning from others in the oral or
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written form is just one channel through which to acquire knowledge; however, the 
mastery of knowledge or the clarification of one’s bewilderment depends on thinking, 
particularly critical thinking. It is the interplay between “learning” and “thinking” that 
qualifies one for his social responsibility, and prepares him for an independent personality. 
Conversely, even if one is profound in learning, he can not necessarily appropriate his 
knowledge to make it applicable for specific occasions and opportunities. Similarly, 
thinking without the acquisition of knowledge leads to a failure in one’s life because this 
kind of thinking is not based on a shared knowledge of one’s community, and it is neither 
critical of the existing value standards nor creative for a possible contribution to the 
development of cognition. The understanding of the complementary elements in learning 
and thinking distinguishes Confucius’s dialogical activities in teaching and exploration. He 
is strongly against the attitude of following one’s teacher blindly, and simultaneously, he 
articulates nine ways of thinking (Ch. 16.1) to facilitate the process of learning both as 
knowledge-seeking and as personal cultivation.
The second aspect is Confucius’s scientific method of “enlightenment and 
inference.” Confucius once stated his method of teaching: “I never enlighten anyone who 
has not been driven to distraction by trying to understand a difficulty or who has not got 
into a frenzy trying to put his ideas into words” (Ch. 7.8). This method is established 
upon the realization that cognitive development for a learner is a gradual progress, and an 
educator has to demonstrate the ability to instruct and enlighten his learners step-by-step. 
Such a method refuses to regard the learners as separate “containers” that have to be
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“filled in” with knowledge by their instructors. Instead, teaching itself is a dynamic
process, which involves strong motivation, critical reasoning and accurate expression on
the side of the learner, and also meticulous observation, appropriate allusion and
individualized instruction on the side o f the teacher. Specifically, Confucius upholds the
principle that a learner has to arrive at a conclusion himself after a discussion with the
teacher. For instance, Zixia once asked about the implication of the following lines in the
Book o f Poetry:
Her entrancing smile dimpling,
Her beautiful eyes glancing,
Patterns of color upon plain silk. (Ch. 3.8)
Instead of making a detailed interpretation, Confucius reminds Zixia of the philosophical
inference in the poem: the colors are put in after the white, which helps Zixia to discern
the ethical meaning signified in the lines. Therefore, when Zixia points out the truth that
“rites” come after the possession of “benevolence,” the poetry study becomes a pleasant
and wisdom-stimulating connection between teacher and student. Besides, Confucius’s
scientific method of enlightenment pays special attention to the intellectual diversity
among the learners and the specific methods for individual learners. For instance,
Confucius divided his learners into two levels, average and above average (Ch. 6.21), so
as to decide what to converse about. Furthermore, even to the learners at the same level,
Confucius was careful about topics and discussions in accordance with the different
characters, psychological status, or the family backgrounds of his disciples in order to
achieve the effectiveness of teaching and learning (Ch. 11.3, 11.8, 11.22).
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The third aspect is Confucius’s scientific attitude embodied in a dialogical joint
search for the truth15 of a philosopher’s life . Now, let us listen to one of Confucius’s
most wisdom-inspiring dialogues:
When Zilu, Zeng Xi, Ran You and Gongxi Hua were seated in attendances, the 
Master said, “Do not feel constrained simply because I am a little older than you 
are. Now you are in the habit of saying, ‘My abilities are not appreciated,’ but if 
someone did appreciate your abilities, do tell me how you would go about things.” 
Zilu promptly answered, “If I were to administer a state of a thousand chariots, 
situated between powerful neighbors, troubled by armed invasion, and by repeated 
famines, I could, within three years, give the people courage and a sense of 
direction.”
The Master smiled at him.
“Qiu, what about you?”
“If I were to administer an area measuring sixty or seventy li square, or even 
fifty or sixty //' square, I could within three years, bring the size of the population 
up to an adequate level. As to the rites and music, I would leave that to abler 
gentlemen.”
“Ci, what about you?”
“I do not say that I should like to assist as a minor official in charge of protocol, 
properly dressed in my ceremonial cap and robes.”
“Dian, how about you?”
After a few dying notes came the final chord, and then he stood up from his lute. 
“I differ from the other three in my choice.”
The Master said, “What harm is there in that? After all each man is stating what 
he has set his heart upon.”
“In late spring, after the spring clothes have been newly made, I should like, 
together with five or six adults and six or seven boys, to go bathing in the River Yi 
and enjoy the breeze on the Rain Altar, and then to go home chanting poetry.”
The Master sighed and said, “I am all in favor o f Dian.”
When the three left, Zeng Xi stayed behind. He said, “What do you think of 
what the other three said?”
“They were only stating what they had set their hearts upon.”
“Why did you smile at You?”
“It is by the rites that a state is administered, but in the way he spoke You 
showed a lack of modesty. That is why I smiled at him.”
“In the case of Qiu, was he not concerned with a state?”
“What can justify one in saying that sixty or seventy li square or indeed fifty or 
sixty li square do not deserve the name o f ‘state’?”
“In the case of Ci, was he not concerned with a state?”
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“What are ceremonial occasions in the ancestral temple and diplomatic 
gatherings if not matters which concern rulers o f feudal states? If Qiu plays only a 
minor part, who would be able to play a major role?” (Ch. 11.26)
Lurking behind such a peaceful discussion of statesmanship and life goals, we can
experience how different voices added to a dialogue about the true meaning of an
intellectual life. What strikes us modem readers most is Confucius’s method for starting a
collective search. Obviously, Confucius never intended to force an argument among the
participants. But he was tactical enough to lead to an otherwise mundane discussion with
two challenging conclusions concerning the outside world. The first question is that the
young scholars should display a greater ambition for their future. And the second is that a
real statesman, instead of engaging himself with empty talk, has to justify himself with true
knowledge and methods suitable to the responsibility o f a professional administrator.
With such an understanding of the use of dialogue for knowledge-making, Confucius
enabled his disciples to take the opportunity for self-expression. The whole dialogue thus
turns into a “camivalistic” (Bakhtin) type of verbal activity, for the five participants,
including Confucius himself, get their individual voices heard in order to share a common
concern for knowledge of the operation of the real world.
My focus here is on Confucius’s own contribution to this knowledge-making
process and his manipulation of dialogic interaction. Throughout the dialogue, Confucius
made no comments except when Zeng Xi finished his utterance, the one that exhibits no
direct relation with the state administration. Why should he prefer Zeng’s opinion?
Because of his scientific approach to the dialogic relation between human society and its
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environment, and between personal cultivation and social participation. To Confucius, the 
ideal administrator is one who always situates himself in a natural contact with the other 
living beings, and more significantly, finds himself in harmony with the natural world.
Such an administrator puts personal cultivation prior to anything else, for he discovers the 
truth not to impose anything he does not desire himself upon “the others” (Ch. 12.2), he 
knows how to “enrich his people” and develop his state, and he reminds the listeners of 
the issue of the co-existence of human beings and pleasant, un-exploited natural 
surroundings. Here, Confucius’s scientific attitude is reflected not only in his deep 
concern for the true knowledge of statesmanship, but also in his clear awareness of the 
power of the natural environment that helps shape one’s knowledge and enhance one’s 
moral cultivation. Above all, Confucius’s rhetorical method encourages a joint effort for 
and social consensus in knowledge-making. He never denies any contribution to the topic. 
With the free exchange of individual philosophical exploration and Confucius’s logical 
comments, we are able to read a theoretical framework of an ancient political discussion 
which touches upon economic, military, diplomatic, ritual as well as moral aspects of state 
administration.
Finally, my analysis will focus on Confucius’s scientific contribution to  technical 
communication—the rhetoric of the scientific method that enables one to inform his 
audience through an objective presentation of facts.16 Since his mission was to seek the 
truth of Way and to enlighten his audience, a great part of Confucius’s life was spent in 
his tours in different states and the essential form of his communication was dialogue. The
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Confiician dialogue itself thus becomes instrumental in expressing directly his concern for 
issues of popular science and technical problems. Confucius might be one of the first 
scholars who recorded the progress in technology—the application of specific techniques 
to solve problems—in ancient China. When he mentioned that “The great inventors 
(among the Chinese ancestors) were seven in number” (Ch. 14.37), Confucius obviously 
referred to the “sages” who invented the plough, the cart, the gate and so on.17 Perhaps 
the most marvellous contribution he made is to appropriate diet and public health, which 
helped to produce a global cultural phenomenon—Chinese restaurants. Confucius 
established standards for Chinese cooking: “color” (food served should look fresh and 
pleasant), “smell” (it smells delicious and arouses an appetite), and “taste” (it is finely 
sliced or cut up, and properly cooked with corresponding sauces, vinegars, wines or 
ginger) (Ch. 10.8). Simultaneously, Confucius raises exact diet precautions for health, for 
instance, having reasonable proportions of drink, meat and main food, and taking 
measures to prevent food contamination. With regard to physical education, Confucius 
recommends recreational activities like swimming, bathing, wind-bathing (Ch. 11.26), 
archery (Ch. 3. 16), travel along a river or in mountains (Ch. 6.23), and meanwhile, he 
presents effective ways to keep fit, i.e., to guard against obsession in sexual activities 
when young, against bellicosity in the prime of life, and also against acquisitiveness (often 
in the form of insatiable greed for money or property) in old age (Ch. 16.7). From the 
perspective of the modem fashion industry, Confucius is among the earliest scholars who 
made detailed descriptions of design, tones of colors, fabric or fur materials (Ch. 10.6,
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10.7). In regard to his attitude to regenerable natural resources, Confucius also displays 
some knowledge o f “ecology” in its early stage. For example, he refused to catch fish 
with a net that would let no fish, big or small, escape, and he never shot birds that flew 
back to their nests (Ch. 7.26). The above topics of Confucius’s dialogue or speech, 
though generally presented within a moral theory under a principle of Li (rites), do suggest 
his scientific consciousness even in light of modern standards.
Confucius’s dialogue is thus characterized by its practicality, not “some mundane 
and bread-and-butter activity of character” (Bernstein, x), but rather practicality as 
scientific principles that have nourished the spirit of modem pragmatism and pointed to 
the dialogic relation of human conduct active to the life of particular communities. In this 
sense, we may say that the Confiician dialogues are often usage-oriented. For instance, 
Confucius’s ethical principles are highly verifiable and applicable in the area of work-site 
cooperation. He insists on nine standards for state employees: be careful in observation; 
be acute in listening; be warm in expression; be appropriate in manner; be honest in 
speech; be serious in work; be modest in consulting others; be predictable of the 
consequences before you lose your temper, and be worthy of your pay (Ch. 16.10). These 
principles are not only intended to guide professional ethics in technical communication, 
but also help to lay some foundation for decision-making in today’s Chinese business 
management. Confucius’s sense of practicality is also reflected in his interest in 
information-gathering. He studies how to seek information through reading, listening to 
and discussing with others, and independent field work. Moreover, he relies on methods
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in processing information through induction and deduction, through comparison and 
critical thinking. All these have strengthened the applicability and operatability of 
Confucius’s general principles for technical communication.
A more general but profound aspects of his theory of communication is his 
understanding of rhetorical/linguistic activities as a social production that generates social 
relations between communicators and effectuates social reforms. Confucius’s dialogue is 
first directed to establish a link among those who follow the same political, philosophical 
or technical pursuit (Ch. 15.40), because it is common interest and cooperation that finally 
lead to the realization of the Way. This belief accounts for the fact that Confucius’s 
rhetorical activities are usually open to those who are always ready for the topics of the 
discussion, though often the perspectives from different participants present 
“camivalistic” interpretations of a common concern. And this also partly explains 
Confucius’s indifference to any direct communication with those who can hardly 
contribute to his philosophical inquiry (Ch. 11.4).18 Second, Confucius tends to believe 
that discourse and teaching are both inseparable from the political institution and 
organizational structures, so they are generally conducted to shape the personality o f a 
gentleman and actuate a social reform. With double purposes in his mind, Confucius 
understood technical communication in the same way as modem rhetoricians, that is, from 
the perspective of social constructionism. Word ("g , rhetorical activities in either oral or 
written form) can both advance personal cultivation by starting an interaction between the
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speaker himself and others, and help to bring out social reform by making such reform the 
common goal of community with the power of persuasion.
m . Socrates’s Ethical Science, Elenctic Method 
and Craft Knowledge
After an exploration of Confucius’s dialogues, let us examine how Socrates, a 
philosopher active in the same historical period as Confucius, displayed a scientific attitude 
in his dialogue which anticipated all subsequent science and rhetoric o f sciences in the 
West. Such a scientific attitude is first expressed in Socrates’s representation of the basic 
concerns of humans versus that of divinity, therefore setting up a framework o f moral 
philosophy based on the assumption of multiplicity, intertextuality and interpersonality. 
Presumably, it is easy for us modem readers to take for granted Aristotle’s conclusion that 
Socrates’s method is a scientific method designed to yield certainty in ethics, because this 
conclusion is drawn after a logical synthesis of Socrates’s application of inductive 
argument and his inquisitiveness that inevitably leads to the later exploration for a 
universal definition. The Bakhtinian reading, however, presents Socrates’s scientific 
attitude in a different light, namely, that the early Socratic dialogues argue against a 
monologized reading that pretends to possess “a ready-made truth” o f ethics,19 and argues 
that the juxtaposition of different voices by various parties makes it possible to search for 
truth. Now, I would like to demonstrate with the following diagram such dialogic 
thinking in his structure of ethics:
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Happiness (eudaimonism)■ •Human goodness
Virtue •Happiness Life Death
Good — Evil Benefit •Harm
Human virtue Gods’ help Spiritual sufficiency— Material poverty
Justice Injustice Supremacy---------- Inferiority
Health-------------- Disease Ignorance------------ Moral knowledge
Body- Soul
Figure 6: The Structure o f Socrates’s Ethical Issues 
Socrates’s ethics is established on a series of concepts2 0 or definitions which structure his
search for scientific knowledge about ethical meanings. Aristotle is the first who points
out in his Metaphysics Socrates’s scientific methodology:
...But Socrates is rightly said to have examined the question What is? For he tried 
to think syllogistically, and the principle on which syllogisms are based is the 
attempt to state what is. In his day dialectic was as yet not sufficiently developed 
to enable men, even apart from the question What is? to analyze contraries and to 
include the knowledge of contraries in a single science. But there are two 
contributions which one justly credits to Socrates: inductive arguments and general 
definitions, both of which are scientific principles (episteme). (1078b23-30)
Aristotle believes that definition in the form o f inductive argument is instrumental in
Socrates’s science of ethics.21 Moreover, this type of definition, unlike conventional
normal definitions, reaches the essence of scientific knowledge. What interests me most,
however, is not the relation of Socrates’s definition with the then contemporary science,
but how his definitions are made through dialogic thinking, which reflects his
understanding of the principles of ethics.
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In the center of Socrates’s theory of ethics is ew^«no/ws7n—happiness, the 
importance of which is presented in the Symposium: “Of one who wants to be happy there 
is no longer any point in asking, ‘For what reason does he want to be happy?’ This 
answer is already final” (205a). So, happiness becomes the ultimate goal, because it 
reflects the human nature which denies any further explanation or exploration, and to seek 
happiness is, according to Socrates, indisputably human goodness. What posits a problem 
for human beings is the relation between happiness and virtue, for an appropriate 
understanding of such a relation provides the standards with which one is judged to be 
happy or not. In considering this problematic relationship, Socrates finds himself saying in 
the Gorgias, “So there is every necessity, Callicles, that the temperate man who, as we 
have seen, will be just and brave and pious, will be a perfectly good man, and the good 
man will act well and nobly in whatever he does, and he who acts well will be blessed and 
happy; and that he who is wicked and acts badly will be miserable” (507b-c). In this 
definition, we are convinced of a dialogic interpretation of the relation of virtue to 
happiness. That is, virtue is instrumental in obtaining happiness, and wickedness is 
instrumental in destroying happiness. Conversely, to be happy signifies the possession of 
virtue, and to be miserable the absence of virtue. A conclusion is reached if the two 
inductive arguments are put together: virtue and happiness are independent of and 
interactive with each other. Thus this double-voiced claim for a scientific definition 
encourages a further exploration of other ethical issues pertaining to virtue and happiness.
Among the subordinate ethical structures in Figure 2, Socrates’s delineation of 
justice and injustice also displays much of his scientific attitude through his inquisitive
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inference and continuous investigation of accepted concepts. In the Crito, Socrates 
displays a dialogic understanding of a relation in happiness and justice, and in response to 
Crito’s argument against his choice to stay in prison, he claims his principle of justice. He 
infers that living well and living justly are the same thing (48b8-9). Thus, a just agent is 
living a happy life. And in the Apology, Socrates further insists that any man worth 
anything should take an account of danger or even the risk of his life (28b5-9). Now, a 
single problem facing Socrates’s definition is whether justice may bring a shadow over 
one’s otherwise happy life. Aware of a possible counterargument against his apparently 
reductive definition, Socrates attempts to make clear a process of the mutual definition of 
the concepts of health and disease in the body in comparison with that of justice and 
injustice in the soul (47d7-48al). In Socrates’s opinion, when one’s body is ruined with 
disease, then the body becomes worthless. Similarly, when the soul is destroyed with 
unjust action, then life becomes meaningless. So, to uphold justice, one secures a superb 
and good life, but to follow unjust action, life is reduced to nothing but the diseased body 
without a soul. Such an inference also defines Socrates’s concept of life and death. He 
never admits the accepted idea that the execution of his physical being can destroy his life, 
because the soul nourished with the human good--justice—can never be destroyed. This 
powerful defence of his justice/injustice definition demonstrates his broad knowledge of 
life, both its physical side and its spiritual side. Moreover, it suggests that the existence of 
the human soul can hardly be falsified even in view of the eternity of the human search for 
justice and truth.
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One of the most memorable characteristics of Socrates’s scientific approach is its 
dialogized relativism in his ethical doctrine. His relativism is not a pure Sophistic 
argument, but a way of critical thinking about moral issues. Some critics believe that the 
Socratic theory of ethics reflects “an adaptive attitude,” because Socrates thinks that the 
good person tends to adapt to the circumstances around him, as when he tells Callicles in 
the Apology that “the good person must do whatever he does well and nobly” (Irwin, 114- 
17). But, this interpretation of “adaptability” is inadequate to account for Socrates’s 
principle of a relativist and dialogic representation of some touchy ethical issues. Here, I 
would like to demonstrate this Socratic principle in his reasoning concerning “harm.” 
Socrates was found declaring in the Athenian court, “Neither Meletus nor Anytus could 
harm me—that is not possible—for I do not think it is permitted for a better person to be 
harmed by a worse” (30c8-dl). Obviously, the Socratic concept of harm starts, in 
Bakhtin’s sense, a dialogue of two voices, one representing common-sense knowledge 
referring to “physical, financial damage,” or even worse, “physical extinction,” the other 
philosophical knowledge referring to vicious intention/activity to destroy one’s soul, or to 
produce an evil soul as described in the Gorgias (480e5-481bl). In Socrates’s 
understanding, the harm in the first voice only incurs physical or financial penalties, such 
as imprisonment, exile or fines, and just deprives one of a few advantages, or external 
goods as he listed in the Euthydemus (467e4-6), so that is the only “harm” according to 
common sense. Even if this type of “harm” reaches its extreme, the death penalty, it could
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hardly bring real damage to a good man, for physical life is not a necessary condition for 
happiness. It is the goodness of one’s soul that composes a sufficient condition of 
happiness. Then what is the scientific approach of Socrates toward the harm? His critical 
reasoning in the Gorgias deems harm as the vice that appears to be a great evil to do 
wrong (469c 1-2, 474c4-475e6), because to avoid suffering the penalty and to survive with 
an evil soul prove to be the greatest evil (480e5-481bl). In the Crito and Phaedo, 
Socrates argues continuously against any attempt to do wrong— to escape from the 
penalty of being deprived of all his possessions or his life, instead of suffering the death 
penalty enforced by the Athenian laws. With his consistent presentation of the relativity of 
“harm,” Socrates was able to falsify the generally accepted concept o f “harm,” and to 
verify its true meaning through a double-voiced discussion or argument, which broadens 
the vision o f the participants of an ethical science.
Socrates’s scientific thinking—an attitude against partial, absolute, and mechanical 
reasoning in philosophical exploration—is further developed by bringing into his dialogues 
a historical sense of time and space in the light of his relativity. For example, Socrates 
tried to concede that although Meletus and other prosecutors might bring some physical 
damage in the form of unjust treatment to his existence for the time being, they could 
never harm his soul in the long run, let alone have any evil impact upon an inquiry with his 
interlocutors in his afterlife. By the same token, from the perspective o f space, even if his 
moral opponents could put an end to his physical life in Athens, they could not stop his 
rhetorical activities with his followers in the Underworld (Crito, 112b-l 14b), which would
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be guaranteed by the laws of the Hades. Such a relative understanding of “harm” affects 
all his early dialogues, and displays before us a vivid picture of his dialogic imagination. 
Moreover, in his dialogues on issues like goods, benefits or evil, we can also experience 
Socrates’s scientific attitude in an open system of ethics.
Next, my discussion will focus on Socrates’s dialogue as a scientific method. To 
begin with, Socrates’s dialogue, like Confucius’s, is also a process of knowledge-making, 
which is usually focussed on certain philosophical topics, rejecting any accompanying 
interest in popular opinions or the authorities. As we know, the so-called “Socratic 
method” is “eA.eYxo9” (elenchus), which is generally translated as “critical examination” 
or “refutation.” Socrates, in his dialogues, never attempts to make a definition of 
elenchus. But his Apology has drawn a general picture of his method. When he was 
imagining how his moral opponents intended to suffocate his voice by saying, “You shall 
no longer engage in this search nor philosophize” (29c), Socrates distinguished his 
philosophical method as “a search,” a process to discover truth. Then how did he search? 
Again in the Apology, we hear his response: “The god has commanded me...to live 
philosophizing, examining myself and others” (28e). So his method is to search by 
examining himself and others, and such a mission was given by God, namely he was 
keeping a communication with God while conducting his own examination. The final 
question is: what does Socrates search for? Again, we find the answer in the Apology—he 
searched for and engaged himself in an “examined life” to persuade people to change their 
wrong values (29d7-30a2) and to join him in a continuous examination so as to secure the
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greatest good for human beings (3 8a 1-6). It is with such an understanding of the method, 
participants, and the purpose of elenchus that Socrates maintains that an elenctic 
examination denies any appeal to popular opinion or to authorities outside of the process 
of examination (Meno, 7Id). In the Gorgias, Socrates tells Polus, “If I do not produce in 
yourself a single witness who agrees with what I say, in my view I have accomplished 
nothing of value in regard to whatever we might be discussing. Nor, in my view, have you 
accomplished anything of value if you do not produce me as your sole witness and forget 
all the others” (472b-c). Here, in this statement Socrates raised at least three principles 
that directed an elenctic investigation: first, something of value, to be exact, something of 
philosophical and moral value has to be discovered; second, such a scientific search has to 
be done with the joint efforts of the participants; third, and the most significant, the 
accomplishment of philosophical exploration is a process of critical reasoning, which, 
different from the Sophistic rhetoric, discourages any attempt to follow, imitate or quote 
the popular viewpoints or certain figures of public reputation. These principles have laid a 
foundation for the Socratic scientific method, and they demonstrate a dialogic 
understanding of the interaction between a topic and examiners, between examiners 
themselves, and deny a single, established or authoritative voice that hinders an otherwise 
creative thinking, and above all, they value the goal of an elenctic activity: to persuade the 
individual interlocutors through a “double-voiced” dialogue. Such scientific method 
essential to elenchus can be experienced in Socrates’s other early dialogues like 
Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, and Republic I
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when the participants are all engaged in a dialogic activity to address the fundamental 
topic of the Socratic philosophy, “What is it?” so as to present a clear picture of his ethical 
theory.
Another purpose of my analysis is to account for the destructive and constructive 
elements of Socrates’s method. Some critics have already examined the destructive aspect 
in his effort to construct a moral theory.22 It has been observed that as a characteristic of 
Socrates’s conversational model more than half of his early dialogues close with an 
unanswered or undefined moral issue, leaving either examiners or interlocutors in a state 
of perplexity or confusion. It seems as though Socrates gives his interlocutors no hope to 
reach the final truth and that he himself is indulging in the pleasure of “dissimulation” and 
“insinuation.” (Rossetti, 225-38). It becomes natural for Socratic readers to question, “Is 
Socrates’s method constructive or destructive? If both, how are these two elements 
appropriated in his philosophical discovery?” My analysis, in the light of Bakhtin’s 
dialogic interaction, tends to account for Socrates’s method as a moral construction 
through deconstruction. Let me start an explanation from Aristotle’s conviction. As I 
mentioned earlier, Aristotle believes that Socrates’s method is designed to yield certainty 
in ethics (A987bl-4), and he catches the essence of the Socratic dialogues which have 
tremendously influenced the establishment of Plato’s Form and his own logic theory. 
Socrates’s method is first and foremost a process of discovery. In addition, it is also a 
process of deconstruction through dialogic verbal activities, for it is employed to search 
for the truth that “is not bom nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual” but
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rather “is bom between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their 
dialogic interaction.”23 It is through such a process that Socrates attempts to deconstruct 
the Athenian religious beliefs and construct an ethical transformation of gods (i.e., the 
transformation of gods into ethical beings) in his dialogue. In the Euthyphro, when 
Euthyphro presents his supposition~a widely accepted Athenian myth—that the gods fight 
and disagree, Socrates immediately expresses his doubt and confirms that such stories 
about gods are hard to believe (6a6-8) because Socrates insists that gods are wise and 
thoroughly moral. Any of the mythical and literary conceptions that portray gods as 
beings who inflict the humans with disasters is in opposition to Socrates’s own belief. 
Here, fresh in Socrates’s mind may be the works by Homer, Hesoid, Aeschylus or 
Euripides, who present the mythical world as much the same as the human world: gods, 
evil or good, are conflicting with each other out of motivations just or unjust, moral or 
immoral. Socrates’s method of deconstruction is chiefly directed to Euthyphro’s reductive 
presentation of the relation between gods and men. Through his elenctic examination of 
Euthyphro’s theological structure of holiness Socrates is able to rephrase Euthyphro’s 
“give and take” relation (14e) as the basic form of gods’ relation with men, and we finally 
hear Euthyphro confessing that holiness is nothing but an mutual art of commerce between 
gods and men. In other words, Socrates tries to demonstrate that if holiness can be 
interpreted as simply “asking from the gods and giving to them” (14d), then holiness loses 
completely its moral connotation and is reduced to a business of buying and selling, and an 
everyday subject of money and business. Such critical reasoning gains more profound
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meaning when Socrates establishes consistency between Euthyphro’s belief and that of 
most of the Athenians. His refutation becomes at once destructive to the illusion of 
Athenian specific knowledge about divine things. Socrates’s deconstruction cuts further 
when he calls attention to the brutal fact that without accurate knowledge o f holiness and 
unholiness a son like Euthyphro could even prosecute his father as a murderer who 
punished a criminal out of indignation but caused his death. Here, Socrates’s inference 
may well be read as a challenge to Sophistic rhetoric24 that employs argument in law cases 
in disregard of holiness and morality.
It seems that the dialogue, Euthyphro, ends up with confusion on the part of 
Euthyphro and with disappointment on the part of Socrates. Such an ending, like some 
other early Socratic dialogues, produces a sense of incompleteness, and also an effect of 
pure destructiveness—its destruction of Athenian piety. When we look carefully, however, 
we find that a constructive process going with Socrates’s deconstructive method. Then, 
what does Socrates construct through his elenchus in the dialogue? To begin with, 
holiness is a science of knowledge which leads to the wisdom of divinity but has to be 
gained through elenctic investigation. That is how Socrates, an examiner, purges 
Euthyphro of his pretense of wisdom, and describes to him a suitable pursuit for “an all- 
glorious product” that the gods hope to produce by involving one’s “attention to the 
gods” (1 le-13e). Second, gods are moral and wise, which makes his ethical claim 
consistent with the “divine sign,” but destructive to any unholy action against the authority 
of justice (4e), and it also makes his elenctic method beneficial to human souls. Finally,
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once again Socrates’s dialogic relation with a private “divine sign” is confirmed by 
Euthyphro’s own communication with the Athenian gods, which helps to defend 
Socrates’s claim of piety and encourages a critical reasoning of the accepted religious 
belief based on a mythical interpretation of gods. By displaying Socrates’s scientific 
attitude in constructing his ethical issues in the Euthyphro through a course of 
deconstruction, we are enabled to experience the same spirit reflected in other early 
Socratic dialogues like the Apology, Meno, Crito, Charmides, Laches, Hippias Major or 
Hippias Minor.
Now, I would like to describe Socrates’s scientific thinking concerning technical 
communication. As a philosopher active in rhetorical activities, Socrates should be 
regarded as the first great Western thinker who devoted all his life to a divine mission of 
popularizing his moral philosophy. Socrates’s early dialogues portray him as a bare­
footed, poorly-dressed scholar who brings philosophy from the domain of elites to the 
common people, old or young, learned or ignorant, rich or poor alike, and takes a great 
pleasure in examining and philosophizing about everyday life as well as about human 
souls. Moreover, such a philosopher who is depicted by Alcibiades in the Symposium as 
someone who “knows nothing and is ignorant of everything” (216d) deems oral 
communication not just as a basic element of human communication, but as an instrument 
in knowledge-making. Socrates’s understanding of his philosophical exploration is also 
expressed in his emphasis on voluntary and active participation in a free discussion. This 
process of participation is defined by the following five characteristics: first, honesty in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
the communication has to be tested, as Socrates demands of Thrasymachus in the 
Republic I: “my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don’t answer counter 
to your real belief’ (346a), because the participants can get nowhere and reach no result if 
honesty is not upheld; then, the general moral purpose of the communication has to be 
focussed, that is, to persuade the participants to cease caring for money, property and 
fame and not caring for the essence of human life~the virtue or the good (i.e., Apology, 
29e-30a); third, the topic on time or participants for such a communication should not be 
restricted, for Socrates claims to be ready for a dialogue with anyone on any topic at any 
time (Apology, 29d,); fourth, the communication is characterized by a mutual 
enlightenment, as Socrates emphasizes in his refutation with Protagoras that the argument 
and intention of both “you” and “me,” self and other have to be taken into consideration 
(Protagoras, 33 lc) in an effective dialogue; last but most innovative in Socrates’s theory 
of communication is his deep insight into the power of orality. While contemporary 
scholars like Havelock and Ong have convincingly argued against the Platonic Socrates’s 
occasional representation of writing as inhuman and destructive to memory (79-81), they 
have failed to note that the subsequent prestige given to Socrates’s dialogues may 
contribute to today’s managerial communication theory and perhaps to the increasingly 
effective electronic dialogue. Since the Socratic dialogue is problem-focussed and values 
real-world concerns, the question-and-response sequence, a strong motivation for a final 
solution, active participation, and a dramatic manner in animating an otherwise mundane 
topic, contemporary communicators often feel that they have benefited from such a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
method or oral exchange. For instance, in the classroom environment, Socratic pedagogy 
is a long-standing method for educational communication.25 The even greater influence of 
the Socratic dialogue may soon be found in wave upon wave o f an electronic revolution 
when simultaneous group chat (in the written form, though), oral message delivery over 
the Internet, and visual phone talk will become gradually prevalent, and research on the 
artificial intelligence of phonetic-identification (direct decoding of oral message into 
written message regardless of linguistic differences) is expected to make a breakthrough in 
a not too distant future.
Specifically, I am emphasizing that the concept of technical or craft knowledge is 
repeatedly articulated in Socrates’s dialogues, though he maintains that this kind of 
knowledge or wisdom is inferior to moral knowledge. In fact, scholarship on Socrates 
generally concentrates on detailed study of how Socrates highlights moral insight and 
downplays technical skills.26 My argument is that Socrates’s consciousness of technology 
and his classification of different technical skills themselves have already directed attention 
to the structure of human knowledge and scientific method in a theoretical understanding 
of technical communication. Let us make an exploration of the Laches, a dialogue that 
presents some principles and skills of technical communication. The professional morality 
in “taking counsels and advising with someone” (189c), according to Socrates, is the 
possession of expertise in a topic to be discussed. Socrates justifies this statement with an 
example of popular science, when he argues that only those who obtain knowledge about 
the dynamics of sight and hearing can offer helpful advice about the eyes or the ears
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(190a-b). And this epistemological principle is further articulated when Socrates claims 
that Laches, Nicias and he himself are all in the right position to probe the real meaning of 
“courage,” because, as we know, both Laches and Nicias were the courageous generals 
who were later killed in the Athenian war with Sparta,27 and Socrates, too, served as a 
warrior with endurance of courage on the battlefield.
Then, how does Socrates present technical knowledge in his argument? He 
depicts at least six technical or professional skills he is familiar with. The first is that of a 
money changer who knows how to invest his money wisely in order to gain more profits in 
the end (192e). The second is that of a physician expert in curing his patients of certain 
inflammations. The third is that of an army commander who has a mastery of military arts. 
The fourth is that of a cavalryman who is skilled in horsemanship. The fifth is that of a 
peltast or a bowman who has some knowledge of how to use the sling or the bow. And 
the sixth is a sportsman who is good at diving. Socrates’s depiction of the above six types 
of technical knowledge expresses at least two aspects of his scientific thinking. First, 
technical knowledge itself is represented in a diversity of human skills, or in Bakhtin’s 
term, a “heteroglossia” of technical “languages,” each contributing to a general sense of 
ancient knowledge while signifying its particularity and indispensability. Second, and the 
more important, it is from a study of technical knowledge that people come to understand 
the human pursuit o f moral knowledge, which not only secures a harmony between words 
and deeds (193e), but also justifies and helps to develop some sensitivity to technical 
knowledge. For instance, a doctor’s “courage” exists in his sophisticated skills in
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treatment. Without that, a doctor could possibly endanger his patient’s life if his decision 
on a treatment is not based on his skills in diagnostics and prescription of medicine, but is 
made just out of “carelessness” or “rashness.”
Let us again take Socrates’s own life experience for example. He is always proud 
of his wonderful service on the battlefield for Athens. Without certain military skills in 
calculating, information-gathering and martial arts, how could he have built such a 
reputation? Socrates’s self-confession of his ignorance in moral knowledge rather than in 
technical knowledge does not imply that he disdains the latter. Instead, he is always 
conscious of the significance of technical skills in preparing an inquirer for a life-long 
search for virtues and goods, which secure humans a real “happy” life. My argument for 
Socrates’s unique insight into technical knowledge may also be supported by his choice of 
Laches and Nicias, who possess knowledge of military strategies and tactics, as his 
interlocutors, and thus they are better qualified for a philosophical exploration together 
with him. Finally, I attempt to emphasize that Socrates’s constant recourse to the topic of 
technical skills in his early and transitional dialogues also indicates his scientific 
understanding of the concepts of practicality and instrumentality, which distinguishes him 
from the sophistic rhetoricians, who generally focus on an eristic representation of the art 
of argumentation. We have reasons to believe that the knowledge of practical skills much 
facilitated Socrates’s dialogue with his interlocutors and enriched his moral theory as the 
result of a scientific exploration.
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IV. Confucius’s and Socrates’s Dialogical Practice, Scientific Method 
and Technical Communication
So far I have provided a general account of Confucius’s and Socrates’s proto- 
scientific attitude toward a moral philosophy, their methods, and their tendency to 
practicality. Now, a comparative study will examine their dialogical practice as a method 
to open the human minds to both moral and technical knowledge, and will demonstrate the 
scientific element responsive to the particular content of their oral and written 
communication.
As is emphasized in the earlier analysis, the dialogue form works like a scientific 
methodology for Confucius and Socrates to involve and motivate all the 
participants/discussants and to develop an understanding of the truth/knowledge o f a given 
issue because each of them realized or implied that knowledge is not inborn virtue28 but 
often has to be acquired in a dialogic and living moment. It is during a free discussion that 
people are enabled to approach a topic of interest, voice their own opinions, or give their 
ears to different viewpoints. As a consequence, they develop a better understanding of an 
issue that bears either some theoretical significance or some practical value. Though in 
Confucius’s time communication might be carried in some written form, it is the dialogue 
that proved to be the most popular and efficient form in people’s daily life. Similarly, in 
Socrates’s era, dialogue was also one of the most favourable form in academic life, and it 
functioned as a basic means for those who wanted to make a living with a power of 
persuasion. To Confucius and Socrates, dialogue is a way of learning and a way of 
scientific exploration, and their method of dialogue may be represented in Figure 7.










Figure 7: Dialogue as a Scientific Method 
Lying in the center of both Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogues is generally a scientific or 
moral issue concerning Truth/Way, which is to be discussed, articulated, or defined. The 
philosopher or the teacher is often the first examiner/speaker, and he may function as an 
organizer of a joint exploration. There are generally three dialogic relations: the relation 
between participants and a scientific/moral issue, that between the philosopher/teacher and 
individual participants/ interlocutors, and that among participants/interlocutors themselves. 
Such a relationship is both dynamic and bi-directional, namely, it is established in an on­
going oral exchange, and the utterance of one participant is responsive to those of others. 
Even in the relation between participants and a topic, many voices resonate because a 
topic itself is charged with multiple meanings and interactive not only with “an alien word 
that is already in the object,” but also with the interpretation of a participant which
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attempts to be influential.29 Again, take Confucius’s dialogue, Ch. 11.26, for example. 
Confucius encourages his disciples to address Zhi (,<.•, one’s ambition, life goal). His 
dialogic understanding of Zhi has enabled him to discern a diversity in possible responses 
to such a philosophical issue, and his question therefore touches upon two aspects 
essential to a meaningful discussion. One is to get prepared for the interaction of various 
presentations of such a common concern, and the other is to be specific and individualized 
in one’s own contribution ( ^  , to express what is in your mind). A 
philosophical exploration, according to Confucius, has no restrictions and limitations. As 
a consequence, the whole discussion should prove to be such a fruitful and pleasant 
exploration that it produces not only different innovative opinions resulting from persistent 
philosophical inquiry but also thoughtful and colorful conversations—the vivid 
presentations of ancient ceremony, military forces, poetic life style, musical background, 
etc. Also worth our attention is the Confucian open-mindedness in his expression, “Never 
feel constrained because of me (my life experience and learning)” (-$--£^& ),30 indicating 
that in a joint search for the true meaning of life an authoritative voice does more harm 
than good to a free discussion. It is such a scientific attitude toward an open discussion 
that facilitates one of the most memorable philosophical dialogues in only three hundred 
and fifteen Chinese characters.
Similarly, Socrates’s early dialogues are also opposed to any authority or “official 
monologism” (Bakhtin). As is discussed in my analysis of the Laches, the Platonic 
Socrates is always ready to listen to different interpretations, certain or uncertain, of
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“courage,” for an understanding of “courage” is a science “concerned not only with good 
and evil of the future, but of the present and past, and of any time” (199c), and it is worth 
a joint and continuous search. Compared with Confucius, Socrates shows an even 
greater passion for an examined life. The conclusion in the Laches is quite unexpected in 
that Socrates suggests all the three discussants, including himself, go to school to get 
further education, for the whole company exhibits much ignorance about the issue of 
“courage,” and moreover, “the unexamined life” is the most undesirable. In actuality, such 
perplexity at an incomplete exploration of a moral issue and such a zest for knowledge 
are displayed in other of Socrates’s early dialogues like the Apology, Lysis, Charmides, 
Euthyphro and Gorgias, too. All in all, Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogical rhetoric is 
still actively reflected in today’s scientific study, for modem science itself is a dialogue 
among all researchers and “scientific community” always encourages free exchanges of 
ideas. Latour and Woolgar31 have observed, for example, that dialogues occurring over 
the laboratory bench or conference table bind scientists together for the goal of producing 
scientific statements accepted by a relevant audience. Moreover, such a dialogic spirit 
often inspires scientists to communicate with one another so as to “construct their own 
internal dialogues in the same language.”
Both Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogues aim at the enlightenment of the 
participants through established methods of inquiry. Confucius attaches much importance 
to his method of “enlightenment and inference” and such a method, consistent with his 
ironic representation of “knowing” (■£<» ) and “not knowing” ( )32 in the
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development of human wisdom, is directed to inspire a spirit to become “eager to learn”
’ Ch. 6.3), which may result in the “knowledge of benevolence” (•*<"(- ), the 
knowledge of Word (Jfa “% ) and the knowledge of humans Confucius’s
“enlightenment” ( )  emphasizes a persistency in defending moral truth (Ch. 15.36), 
an ability to infer (Ch. 7.8), and critical thinking (Ch. 2.15). Such a method exhibits a 
scientific attitude to knowledge by insisting that both teacher and student, examiner and 
examinee, questioner and questionee can benefit from the process of learning through a 
sequence of question and answer.33 Confucius’s rhetorical practice seems to suggest that 
both question and answer, and discussion and refutation start an interaction among the 
participants in a dialogue, and enlightenment is achieved by both teacher and student 
because creative reasoning often contributes to a better understanding of a philosophical 
issue raised by the teacher. Confucius’s sensitivity to mutual enlightenment is vividly 
expressed in his relation with his favourite disciple, Yan Hui. When the latter exclaimed to 
other disciples that the Master (Confucius) “broadens me with culture and brings me back 
to essentials by means o f the rites. I cannot give up even if I wanted to, but having done all 
I can...,” the former complained that sometimes “Hui (Yan Hui) is of no help to me at all” 
because of his blindness in following whatever the teacher says (Ch. 11.4).
Comparatively, Socrates’s scientific attitude is likewise reflected through his 
rhetorical practice, though his focus is on an elenctic dialogue—the one that examines 
moral quality critically by way of refutation.34 His elenchus is founded on two 
convictions: that “the unexamined life is not worth living” (Apology), and that truth cannot
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be taught but must be sought through a dialogue in a question and answer sequence.
Thus, dialogue becomes a way of life and the best process of knowledge-making. Since 
Socrates’s philosophical goal is to expose to his exminees/interlocutors their ignorance, 
his method, as is represented in my analysis, often turns to deconstructing any self­
professed knowledge of truth even while he moves towards the construction of a moral 
theory. Both his deconstruction and construction are conducted in a dialogue form that 
features many voices, including different voices of Socrates himself.35 Socrates never 
resents such a diversity of voices. Instead he always feels enlightened from the interaction 
of many voices. What perplexes him is a manifestation of reluctance to contribute to his 
elenctic investigation or a monologized attempt to impose closure on a search for truth.
As Bakhtin vividly observes:
The camivalistic base of the Socratic dialogue, despite its very complicated form 
and philosophical depth, is beyond any doubt. Folk-camival “debates” between 
life and death, darkness and light, winter and summer, etc., permeated with the 
pathos of change and the joyful relativity of all things, debates which did not 
permit thought to stop and congeal in one-sided seriousness or in a stupid fetish 
for definition or singleness of meaning—all this lay at the base of the original core 
of the genre.36
This dialogic reading not only points to the nature of the Socratic dialogue, but also 
illuminates Confucius’s philosophical claim against one-sidedness and an authoritative 
voice in a search for Zhi (•£<*, knowledge), though his dialogue, despite its openness to 
different voices, seldom proceeds in the form of “debates.” Moreover, their dialogical 
practice seems to reveal that scientist/explorer is not important as an individual, and it is 
the joint search that incorporates the agreed-upon ideas and produces scientific
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knowledge. Such a revelation is still essential in the scientific practice o f our time.
The last but the most intriguing point to the modem mind may be the heritage of 
Confucius’s and Socrates’s scientific understanding o f technical communication. Each of 
the two philosophers throws new light on the field of popular science and on technical or 
craft knowledge, though their influences are intellectual rather than direct. Apart from 
their passion for moral theory, Confucius and Socrates display a sense of practicality or a 
pragmatic attitude37 in various aspects of technical communication. In Confucius’s case, 
popular science concerning diet, hygiene, sports, health, ecology, etc., is a constant topic 
of his dialogue and speech. Due to his pragmatic tendency, Confucius’s moral theory is 
both responsive and applicable to technical communication. His dialogues cover the 
topics (in the modem sense) of professional morality, information-gathering, negotiation, 
decision-making, rhetorical devices, and gender study in the environment of classroom 
discussion, political administration or everyday communication. Moreover, Confucius’s 
rhetorical claim of an oral exchange in the form of Wen ( foj , raising questions) and 
Jiehuo ( fjjij , clearing confusion with answers) seems to suggest clearly his scientific 
approach to knowledge-making as socially constructed 38 because his focus is laid on 
knowledge from interpersonal activities (Ch. 7.22) and from participation in social reforms 
(Ch. 18.7). Similarly, Socrates’s dialogue displays his epistemological depth by a 
classification of moral knowledge and technical knowledge. His frequent references to 
technical skills not only demonstrate his familiarity with ancient science and technology, 
but also contributes to his stratification of human knowledge which puts a moral pursuit
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above craft skills. The Socratic dialogues encompass geometry, medicine, military arts, 
law-suits, myth and folklore, finance, architecture, the discussion of which facilitates his 
process of examining and philosophizing ethical concepts. In the meantime, his elenctic 
dialogue itself functions as a popular philosophical activity in the streets, squares, law 
courts, or classroom, thus much enriching real world communication, and also bridging 
oral and written exchange, because his dialogue is, after all, passed to us modem readers 
in a written text. Like Confucius, Socrates also enhanced our understanding of 
knowledge-making as a social construct, for his philosophical life is always exposed in a 
social context with various interlocutors whose active participation enables him to shape 
his ethical doctrine.
Certainly, while discussing Confucius’s and Socrates’s understanding of technical 
communication, we have to be aware of their occasional theoretical confusion about 
technical knowledge. Confucius’s disdain for agricultural skills (Ch. 13.4) has encouraged 
a tendency to isolate book/theoretical knowledge from practical skills in Chinese society, 
and moreover, his criticism o f business communication (Ch. 11.19) is indisputably one of 
the factors that accounts for the traditional Chinese prejudice against the business 
profession. Socrates, by the same token, occasionally depreciates technical knowledge. 
Though the unfavorable impact of some his theoretical prejudice was much modified 
during the Enlightenment in the West, we can still feel the influence of the Socratic 
separation of scientific philosophy from rhetoric (i.e., the Gorgias).39 These monologized 
conceptualizations of technical knowledge have, to some extent, led to some conventional
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perspectives that take such a scientific category as Moji ( , the most trivial skills) in
the East, or as some “knacks” in the West. However, the advance of science and 
technology in the later half of the twentieth century not only helped to distinguish the 
position of technical knowledge in our life, but also started a revival of academic interest 
in Confucius’s and Socrates’s scientific attitude, to be exact, their proto-scientific attitude 
reflected in their theory and practice of technical skills, and made possible a dialogue 
between two ancient philosophers whose communication theories might still contribute to 
an era of global information revolution.
Notes
1. Hu, Shi, Ph. D of Columbia University and former Chancellor of the National Peking 
University (1938-1942), is a major representative of the New Culture Movement of 
China.
2. Bazerman’s observation of Socrates’s preference for orality in public knowledge has 
also enabled him to demonstrate how the written texts of modem science are 
enmeshed in social activities and are closely related to four contexts: the object under 
study, the literature of the field, the anticipated audience, and the author’s own self.
See his Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity o f the Experimental 
Article in Science. 21-24.
3. See Bakhtin’s “Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology.” 24.
4. Inlertextuality (intertextualite) is a concept introduced by Kristeva, originally referring 
to transportation of one or more systems of signs into another, accompanied by a new 
articulation of the denotative and enunciative position. See her La Revolution du 
language poetique. 56-60.
5. SeeVlastos’s Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. 266, 269-73. Vlasto’s 
study focuses on Socrates’s elenchus in his early dialogues and his mathematical principles
in his late dialogues. Worth mentioning is also his finding that the term (method), was a
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coinage by Plato, which occurred after the early Socratic dialogues. See his “The Socratic 
Elenchus.”
6. Author of Advancement o f Learning, Novum organum, and New Atlantis, Francis 
Bacon (1562-1626), displayed a totally sceptical attitude to the Aristotelian tradition 
and human learning of medieval period, and set his new scientific method and scientific 
rhetoric based on the understanding of human nature that “posits distinct capacities 
corresponding to each stage in the development and communication of knowledge” 
(Zappen, 74-88).
7. See Needham’s Science and Civilisation in Chitta. v2, 3-32. Also refer to Ronan’s 
The Shorter Science and Civilisation in China: An Abridgement o f Joseph Needham's 
Original Text. v4, 19-20.
8. See Kuang Yarnin’s Kongzi pingzhuan (A Critical Bibliography of Confucius). That I 
believe Kuang’s book reflects the latest in Confucius studies in mainland China is not 
only because of the scope of its research, its theoretical depth and critical conclusions
of his exploration, but also because of the fact that this book is actually the product of 
a joint research of dozens of Chinese Confucian scholars. See his epilogue. 489-96.
9. “Logos” is a Greek term developed from one or both of its ordinary senses “reason” 
and “word.” As logical appeal, it is understood as something focussed on consistency 
and substantive reasons. As ethical appeal, it suggests something to do with logical 
validity. In the rhetorical domain, “logos” is a notion which is directed not only at the 
understanding of what is good and true but, more importantly, at the most possible means 
of persuasion. See George E. Yoos’s “Logos” in Encyclopedia o f Rhetoric and 
Composition. Ed. Theresa Enos. 1996. 410-14.
10. This idea is further articulated by Mencius (390-305 B.C.), another great thinker of 
Confucianism who once said, “It is of the essence of man’s nature that he do good.
That is what I mean by good. If a man does what is evil he is guilty of the sin of 
denying his natural endowment. Every man has a sense of pity, a sense of shame, a 
sense of respect, a sense of right or wrong” (Ch. 11.6). See Mencius. 113.
11. This is W.T. Chen’s translation. See his “Chinese and Western interpretations of ren 
(humanity).” Refer to D.C. Lau’s translation “to overcome oneself’ and Herbert 
Fingarette’s “to master oneself’ in his “The Problem of Self in the Analects." And
also see Arthur Waley’s “is able himself to” in his The Analects o f Confucius.
12. Ever since the May Fourth Movement in 1919, much criticism of Confucius has been 
centred on his prejudice against women. Besides, some Western critics also regard 
Confucianism as a major source of Chinese misogynism. For instance, Julia Kristeva
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fails to distinguish the original Confucianism and the Confucianism of a ritualizer of 
later feudalism, and insists that it is Confucianism that prevents the women’s liberation 
in China. See her About Chinese Women. 66-99.
13. This volume of the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.) was discovered in Dunhuang 
Grottoes in Gansu Province, China early this century, and later was edited by Wang, 
Chongming in his Duanhuang bianwenji. 2vols. ( «. ^  ) (Dunhuang
Collection o f Essays). Also refer to Shiji. ganmuozhucm. («  t j t L '  j ) 
(The Historical Records).
14. A similar exclamation is made in Ch. 9.23 of The Analects.
15. Chad Hansen asserts that the Chinese language as well as the Confucian language is a 
“pragmatic” language, which lacks interest in “truth” and “falsity.” This influential 
viewpoint in the West is established on the observation that the classical Chinese is, 
different from most Western languages, not grounded in the prepositional utterance, 
therefore the ancient Chinese philosophers depend on noun function which may not be 
judged true or false. This conclusion is, however, contradictory with the linguistic fact 
that the Confucian rhetoric always emphasizes the quality of “sincerity” ( | ^  ), 
“trustworthiness” ( \ % ) and “straightforwardness” (_|L ) in language, and these 
concepts suggest the “truth”of language in one way or another. See Hansen’s 
“Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy and ‘Truth’.”
16. I follow John Harris’s definition to emphasize the rhetorical aspect of technical 
communication. And I also accept Patric Kelley and Roger Masse’s definition to 
highlight the characteristic of being objective in technical communication. See 
Harris’s “On Expanding the Definition of Technical Writing.” Also see Kelley and 
Masse’s “A Definition of Technical Writing.”
17. Joseph Needham believes that Confucius’s “inventors” here obviously refer to those 
of ancient technology. See Colin A. Ronan’s The Shorter Science and Civilization in 
China. v4, 19.
18. My belief that this interpretation partly explains the Confucian avoidance of oral 
communication on certain occasions results from the fact that Confucius’s tragic 
consciousness also functions in his rhetorical activities. See my analysis in Chapter 
Three.
19. See Bakhtin’s Problems o f Dostoesvsky 's Poetics.
20. Max Weber maintains that the concept is one of the great tools of scientific 
knowledge that was discovered consciously by Plato’s Socrates. See his “Science as a
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Vocation” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. 133-44.
21. See Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. 93 b29-94a 10.
22. Among them are Rorty, Brickhouse and Smith. See Rorty’s Philosophy and the 
Mirror o f Nature. 389-94. And also see Brickhouse and Smith’s P lato’s Socrates. 4, 
16-17.
23. See Bakhtin’s Problems o f Dostoesvsky 's Poetics.
24. Brickhouse and Smith believe that Socrates’s questioning is intended to display that 
Euthyphro did possess the knowledge o f holiness as he claimed. {Plato’s Socrates) 48. 
And Seeskin also insists that Socrates’s question shows that Euthyphro is not even close 
to mastering the moral knowledge his own behavior requires {Dialogue and Discovery: A 
Study in Socratic Method). 79. The above interpretations illuminate the epistemological 
aspects of Socrates’s refutation in the text of his dialogue. However, if put in intertextual 
contexts, Socrates’s question may also sound as a challenge to the Sophistic rhetorical 
practice which puts persuasiveness before matters of justice and injustice.
25. Socratic dialogue, as a scientific method, has been adopted in classroom instruction 
for both humanities and science studies, and in both the oral discussion and writing 
workshop. For further discussion, refer to Glenn M. Julian’s “Socratic Dialogue—With 
How Many?” Jack L. Uretsky’s “Using ‘Dialogue’ Labs in a Community-College Physics 
Course.” John F. Parker’s “To Workshop or Not to Workshop,” and Alan Hoffman and 
Jeannette B. Moon eds. Linking Law to Learning: Instructional Strategies Manual.
26. For instance, Vlastos believes that the Socratic dialogue, the Laches, is intended to 
present moral knowledge in pointed contrast to the technical knowledge possessed by 
those who have certain skills. See his Socratic Studies. 112.
27. Laches was killed in 418 B.C. at Mantinea and Nicias lost his life in 413 B.C. at 
Syracuse. See Thucydides’s The Peloponnesian War.
28. Ziman emphasizes that scientific attitude is not inborn virtue. See his Public 
Knowledge. 116. Also worth mentioning is that Confucius once said that some were bom 
with knowledge, but he denied seeing any of them himself, and instead he repeatedly 
emphasized knowledge through learning. See my analysis in Chapter 4.
29. See Bakhtin’s interpretation of such a dialogic interaction in his “Discourse in the 
Novel.” 279-80.
30. Yang Baojun inappropriately puts this expression into plain Chinese as “nobody wants
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to employ me as an administrator.” 120. It is D C. Lau’s English translation that faithfully 
reflects a tone of encouragement in Confucius’s utterance.
31. See Bazerman’s Shaping Written Knowledge. 22.
32. A tentative analysis of this ironical structure is made in Chapter Four to demonstrate 
Confucius’s epistemology.
33. This idea of mutual enlightenment for teacher and disciple ( ) is later
summarized in the Liji. xueji ( )  and may be traced in The Analects in 
Ch. 3.8, 9.23, 11.4 too.
34. One has to bear in mind that elenchos represents a “Socratic method” in the early 
Socratic dialogues, but the same term is employed in the middle dialogues to express a 
Platonic method through which Plato’s own established categorical criteria are defended.
35. See my analysis of the different voices in Socrates’s use of irony in Chapter Four.
36. See Bakhtin’s Problems o f Dostoesvsfcy' Poetics. 132.
37. Richard Bernstein believes there are “low” and “high” senses of being “practical” that 
parallelled the handbook and theoretical traditions of rhetoric. The low sense refers to 
“some mundane and bread-and-butter activity or character. The practical man is one who 
is not concerned with theory (even anti-theoretical), who knows how to get along in the 
rough and tumble of the world.” The high sense, derived from the Aristotelian concept o f 
praxis, is representative of modem philosophical pragmatism and touches upon the human 
conduct that maintains the life of the community. See Bernstein’s Praxis and Action.
38. Thomas Kuhn has made a constructionist epistemological assumption and he insists 
that knowledge (or scientific knowledge) is “intrinsically the common property of a group 
or else nothing at all.” See his The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions. 201.
39. Some contemporary scholars still believe that science and rhetoric are mutually 
exclusive. For a detailed discussion, see Carolyn R. Miller’s “A Humanistic Rationale for 
Technical Writing.”
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Chapter Three 
Dialogized Tragic Consciousness in 
Confucian and Socratic Dialogues
Chapter Three first makes a brief survey of contemporary representations of 
Confucius and Socrates concerning their tragic consciousness. Then, in accordance with 
Bakhtin’s dialogism, this chapter describes how Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogues with 
their interlocutors/ discussants, and their internal dialogues as responses to their rhetorical 
and cultural situations reflect and shape their tragic consciousness. Finally, I attempt to 
make a comparative study of the two tragic heroes to account for a rationalized 
understanding of the world and its relation to our society.
I. A Brief Review
The tragic consciousness in Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogues, different from 
that of tragic heroes in ancient mythology and literature, is basically represented in a 
conflict between a strong passion for a moral idealism associated with their social contexts 
and an experience of political frustration and personal unfulfilment. It is also reflected in a 
pessimistic understanding of their real-world philosophical exploration, which results in 
their dialogic relations with God/Heaven and Destiny. Moreover, their contemporaries’
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misrepresentation of Confucius’s and Socrates’s divine mission and life-long verbal 
activities eventually led to these great thinkers experiencing a miserable end—Confucius’s 
death in oblivion and Socrates’s execution as a martyr o f philosophy, and evoked a 
perpetual tragic consciousness among their followers and readers across the world over 
more than two thousand years. As a dynamic part o f a rationalized reading of the world, 
both Confucius’s and Socrates’s tragic consciousness is often experienced in a dialogic 
relation with their own social and rhetorical contexts. Moreover, it remains active and 
responsive to the past and tradition, and also to our contemporary society and the future.
Upon his observation of a dialectic structure of understanding,1 Hans-Georg 
Gadamer once characterized a type of “hermeneutical experience” in which two self­
involved persons encounter each other, and “each claims to express the other’s claim.” In 
search of truth, they struggle for mutual recognition and compete for “the complete 
dominance of the one person by the other” (322-32) Gadamer’s characterization 
corresponds with Bakhtin’s description of “discourse with an orientation to someone 
else’s discourse.”2 However, Bakhtin’s category of discourse, unlike Gadamer’s, makes 
possible a range of discursive practices in which one voice defines itself in relation to 
another without surrendering itself or objectifying the other. It seeks no rhetorical 
comformity or discourse dominance, but articulates its difference in a dialogical interaction 
with the other or the others. Both Gadamer’s and Bakhtin’s concepts of discourse help us 
to understand better the dialogized tragic consciousness in Confucius’s and Socrates’s
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dialogues, though Gadamer’s definition has a tendency to produce a monological 
interpretation when dominance is emphasized in an interaction of discourses.3
Before we begin our journey to trace the tragic consciousness between the lines of 
the two philosophers, we have to address an interesting historical phenomenon: critical 
studies have basically overlooked the tragic aspect in Confucian and Socratic discourse.
In the East, students of Confucius concentrate on either exegetical studies or the 
philosophical, educational and religious elements of his discourse. Few scholars have ever 
made a comprehensive rhetorical survey of Confucian discourse, not to mention a detailed 
analysis of the “pathos”4 in the emotional structure of his texts. It is also rare that 
comments are made on Yoiihuan yishi—the sense of anxiety and worries as a major 
characteristic of his verbal activities.5 Lin Yutang might be one of a few scholars who 
touched upon the character of Confucius. Lin presented Confucius as a generally “gay” 
and “cheerful” “real man” (26-28), but seldom made any comments on his spiritual 
frustration and occasional pessimistic discourse. One of the most recent comparative 
studies of Greek civilization and early civilization in China is made by David N. Keightley 
(15-54), who draws the conclusion that early Chinese philosophy differs from that of 
Greece in its “epistemological optimism.” Keightley observes that “Confucian optimism 
about the human condition was maintained even in the face of Confucius’s own failure to 
obtain the political successes that he needed to justify his mission,” and that Confucius and 
Qu Yuan6 are two examples proving the “subversive thought that the best intentions might 
lead to chaos and regret.” Keightley is right to point out that early China is generally 
lacking in the sense of tragedy, but he fails to discern that Confucius’s personal experience
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and his discourses do produce a sense of tragedy, that of a most controversial Chinese 
thinker being misinterpreted, fragmented, or condemned in his own time and also in our 
contemporary cultural situation.
In the West, Socrates is viewed in a way similar to Confucius. Nietzsche 
describes Socrates as a theoretical optimist because of his belief in reading the abysses of 
being and correcting it in the theoretical world by using the thread of logic, though he 
turns to being a pessimist in the practical world (91-96). Ever since Nietzsche, 
interpreters like Walter Benjamin have repeated the idea that Socrates represents the 
tradition of the sage as “untragic hero” that originates in Plato’s dialogues, and that Plato 
the poet destroyed his tragedies in order to become Plato the philosopher (149-50). To 
put it in plain words, Socrates is no longer a tragic hero when he talks as a teacher and a 
philosopher. The Nietzsche-Benjamin critique of the “untragic hero” has become so 
ingrained that critics have so far offered no practical criticism on the tragic character of 
Socrates. Socrates also is not a type of tragic hero in Aristotle’s sense7 of one who 
should be able to evoke both our pity and fear and who suffers a change of fortune from 
happiness to catastrophe because of his harmartia~“e rror o f judgement.” Sticking to 
Aristotle’s criteria, we experience little tragic emotion in Socrates’s dramatized dialogues, 
for Socrates makes no explicit appeal for pity in his defense speech8 and his personal 
tragedy is not terror-striking at all. Yet, we can hardly deny that there is a different form 
of tragic consciousness in Socratic discourse, which strikes its audience with a strong 
feeling of failure and sacrifice, and establishes in rhetorical history an eternal image of a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
128
passionate speaker and unflinching fighter for absolute truth even in the face of the death 
penalty.
n. You and Huan All His Life: Confucius’s Tragic Consciousness
What does dialogism contribute to our interpretation of Socrates’s and 
Confucius’s tragic consciousness? As I discussed in my “Introduction,” a dialogic reading 
of discourse aims to describe the relations of voices resonant in a given context. One of 
the primary tonal relations is between self and other, and between the speaker’s or the 
author’s voice and the response from historical and cultural implications of his time. In 
Confucius’s context, we have no difficulty identifying the interaction between his own 
voice and the cultural orientation of the Western Zhou dynasty (1100—771 B.C.). 
Throughout his dialogues and speeches, Confucius idealized the ethical, ritual and musical 
concepts of the Western Zhou, which resulted in his dissatisfaction with the social reality 
of his time. Confucius’s dialogized tragic consciousness is often explicitly expressed in 
two particular words: You ( r | j r  , anxiety) and Huan ( , worries).9 You, in ancient
Chinese, connotes the emotions of anxiety and sorrow, and Huan entails the emotions of 
worry and disaster. These two words are employed by Confucius to reflect his pessimistic 
attitude toward social reality. Once, Confucius said:
“The gentleman devotes his mind to attaining the Way and not to securing food. 
Go and till the land and you will end up by being hungry, as a matter of course; 
study, and you will end up with the salary of an official, as a matter of course. The 
gentleman worries about the Way, not about poverty.” (Ch. 15.32)
Here the “Way” refers to the harmonious social order,10 the highest goal of Confucius’s
political pursuit. What Confucius says raises one of the major distinctions between the
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“gentleman” or the “superior man” ) and the “small man” or the “inferior man”
(>}' A -): one worries about the Way, the other poverty. In this tension-filled double­
voiced interplay between two social groups, Confucius takes it as natural that each focuses 
on its own concerns for life. Since the Way “falls into disuse” (Ch. 15.7), the gentleman 
can never stop worrying about the destiny of a state, of his time. He is wandering about 
and pursuing the Way in his earthly and spiritual journey. Only when he devotes himself 
to learning, he becomes “so full of joy that he forgets about his worries” (Ch.7.19). Here, 
Confucius actually confesses to his disciples that apart from his academic studies he 
always suffers from the endless worries about social deterioration in his role as a moral 
philosopher and social reformer who can find nowhere to realize his ideal. This Confucian 
consciousness of Youhuan has developed into a cultural tradition among Chinese 
intellectuals and literati, which is most prominantly expressed in the motto of Fan 
Zhongyan (989—1052), a scholar of the Northern Song dynasty ( 960-1127 ): To be the 
first one to endure sufferings for your country and your people; to be the last one to seek 
happiness and pleasure for yourself.11 Fan’s response to Confucius further elucidates the 
consciousness of You (■-§? , worries, sufferings) as contradictory to Le (j&  , happiness, 
pleasure), and helps distinguish the nature of You as being tragic, voluntary, lofty and 
other-oriented.
However, Confucius’s interpretation of “You” may also become dramatized when 
he states that “The gentleman is free from worries and fears” (Ch. 12.4). If his former 
definition refers to a sense of political responsibility, in this case he directs his attention to
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the “inward examination” of a gentleman (Ch. 12.4), because the “gentleman” is a carrier 
of perfect personality and serves as an objective of any individual in a life-long process of 
personal purification. This voice of general classification also addresses another voice of 
confession from a painful and anxious philosopher: “There are three things constantly on 
the lips of the gentleman none of which I have succeeded in following :‘A man of 
benevolence12 never worries; a man of wisdom is never in two minds; a man of courage is 
never afraid”’ (Ch. 14.28). Confucius’s explicit self-consciousness of his weakness in 
three emotional aspects, namely, You (. jk , worries), Huo ( ,  hesitation, confusion), 
and Ju ( j-JL , fear) entails a true understanding of his moral self in contrast with the model 
of his established other. This double-voiced relation in his discourse is extended further 
when it is answered by Zigong. Confucius’s self-examination cannot anticipate its 
“inflection,” and thus it does start a new dialogue with his interlocutors in which his 
contribution is open to diverse interpretations. Zigong’s response that “What Master 
(Confucius) has just quoted is a description of himself’ (Ch. 14.28) represents only “an” 
evaluation of Confucius’s personality, that has no dominance over Confucius’s voice. And 
the latter suggests an intrinsic contradiction between the idealized personality of a 
“gentleman” and a real personality of a scholar who is keen on learning. On the other 
hand, Confucius’s self-evaluation generates a non-ending interaction between an “untragic 
sage” free from worries and a tragic man of wisdom whose pursuit of the Way originates 
from his consciousness of worries over the absence of the Way in his time. As his life 
experience proves, Confucius’s tragic consciousness of Youhuan works as a starting point
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With his disappointment at the social chaos of the “disuse o f Way,” “ the ruin of 
rites” and “the collapse of music” in his time, Confucius’s tragic consciousness can often 
be read in its tonal relation with tradition and the past, especially with the tradition of the 
Western Zhou (1100—771 B.C.). Confucius once exclaimed that “The Zhou13 is 
resplendent in culture, having before it the example of the two previous dynasties (the Xia 
and the Yin). I am for the Zhou” (Ch.3.14). Confucius attempts to confront the social 
and moral disorder of his time with the ritual system of the Zhou. His belief in the rites 
encourages him to go on with his social reform in a vulnerable and difficult situation. In 
addition, to listen to the ancient music and to teach the songs and poems of the past 
dynasties together constitute a voice of dissatisfaction with and resentment toward the 
society in which he survives. Especially when he realizes his failure in a political career, he 
continues his editing of the books on poems, history, rites, and music in accordance with 
the rites of the Zhou.14 The constant recourse to a historical tradition becomes a dynamic 
part of Confucius’s tragic consciousness. Although in a suppressed position, his voice can 
still be heard through his active participation in academic and educational activities. A 
careful reading of Confucius’s relation with tradition also reveals that his following the 
tradition is always in a critical rather than a blind way. One example is his concern with 
the rites of the Zhou. Confucius raises his voice to defend the principles o f the Zhou 
against the anti-ritual practice of his contemporaries like the Ji family who “use eight rows 
of eight dancers each to perform in their courtyard” (Ch.3.1),15 and the same family who
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“were going to perform the sacrifice to Mount Tai” (Ch.3.6).16 Regarding such 
pejorative behavior, Confucius exclaimed with deep sorrow, “Who could say that the God 
of Mount Tai is not as rite-abiding as Lin Fang and would accept Ji’s sacrifice?” (Ch.3.6)17 
In Confucius’s interpretation, however, the ritual system of the Zhou should not be 
completely dogmatic and rigid, but be active and responsive to historical development. 
Such a system can be refined and reformed, and can be anticipated with the help of human 
wisdom (Ch.2.23), because this ritual system has kept its interaction with past dynasties 
and still maintains its interaction with the present and future for “hundreds of generations” 
(Ch. 2.23). As Shigeki Kaizuka insists, true knowledge, to Confucius, “consisted not in a 
blind acceptance of, but in a critical way of the tradition concerning the earlier dynasties” 
(124). Based on a dialogic reading of the tradition, Confucius criticized indirectly the 
practice of burying the slaves alive with their deceased masters with the following speech: 
“It is not benevolent to use the tomb figure as the sacrificial object”18 and “...to bury the 
dead with what the living use is equal to bury them with the living.”19 To Confucius, it is 
intolerable to bury the dead with anything that is suggestive of human life, not to say with 
living humans. Though the tradition of burying the slaves alive as sacrificial “objects” was 
once popular in the Zhou, it was, according to Confucius, against the principle of 
benevolence-the core of the ritual system of the Zhou, which was always dialogic in its 
interaction with the changing social contexts, and should never prevent his contemporaries 
from building their own society into a more harmonious and pragmatic whole.
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basic concern for human life, and also for the materials human beings depend on. His 
bitterness and indignation over the extravagant and non-benevolent practice of burying the 
dead has helped to distinguish his own voice and to reconfirm the basic values of the Zhou 
tradition.
Confucius’s tragic consciousness is also represented in his dialogic relations with 
Heaven, the imaginative vision of both an omniscient existence and his alienated self. His 
tonal relation with Heaven tells of the loneliness and depression of a philosopher at the 
bottom of his heart, and also of a rich imaginative world where the speaker contends 
bitterly with a heteroglossia of voices striving to present diverse interpretations of the Self. 
Simultaneously, the constant dialogic activities also enable the Self to address its 
otherness in this dimension, and provide a context in which the Self is allowed to realize 
its catharsis of emotions: fear, pity, anger, despair.... After about fourteen years’ 
wandering in different states advocating his ideas of state administration and seeking an 
official position, Confucius felt completely frustrated, and finally he sighed, “There is no 
one who understands me.” When asked about the reason, Confucius explained, “I do not 
complain against Heaven, nor do I blame Man. In my studies, I start from below and get 
through to what is up above.20 If I am understood at all, it is, perhaps, by Heaven”
(Ch. 14.35). This dialogue of Confucius with his disciple Zigong reveals his 
dissatisfaction with but tolerance of the voices of misunderstanding and misrepresentation 
of his claims and practice by rulers, literati, hermits and even some of his disciples. If 
human beings, the other, can not understand him, then it is Heaven (Tien, ) or Gods
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(,Shen, ) that can read his mind and communicate with him. The further exploration of
the Confucian concept of Heaven will explain that Heaven often functions as an 
omniscient existence and also as his alienated self. This dialogic imagination works not 
only in the stream of his consciousness but also in that of his unconsciousness, his dream 
world. Once Confucius sighed to his disciples that “How I have gone downhill! It has 
been such a long time since I dreamt of the Duke of Zhou” (Ch. 7.5). The Duke of Zhou 
was the founder of the Lu state where Confucius was born, and one of a few ancient sages 
his heart admired. Only during his old age did Confucius find that he seldom 
communicated with Duke of Zhou in his dreamland.
Confucius’s dialogic relation with the other, Heaven in particular, culminates when 
he was singing in tears seven days before his death:
“Ah! The Taishan (Mountain) is crumbling down!
The pillar is falling down!
The philosopher is passing out!”21
Although using a tragic and desperate tone, Confucius never fails to glorify his mission 
which he compares to the Grand Taishan Mountain, the symbol of the Chinese cultural 
heritage, and his personality which is compared to the straight pillars of a palace. And he 
seldom hesitates, especially in his old age, to eulogize the wisdom of a philosopher, which 
produces a great voice of self-evaluation of his life-long philosophical pursuit. His last 
recorded public utterance repeats the theme that only Heaven understands his ambition, 
his desire to be a benevolent administrator of the state, his joy in pursuing a successful 
career as a scholar, a teacher and an editor, his sorrow of facing the cruelty that no rulers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
have confirmed his political claims, and his lament that “I am done for this life” (Ch.9.9). 
Heaven, as a dominant power over nature and humans in his imagination, seems to be 
both the source and the end, subject and object of his dialogic relations in his spiritual 
pilgrimage. This final dialogue with Heaven reconfirms the Confucian belief in the 
inseparability of humans from Heaven. We are thus on safe ground in presuming that in 
Confucius’s dialogized tragic consciousness only Heaven shares joys and sorrows with the 
philosopher, communicates with him, and promises a continuous dialogue with him. 
Confucius has opened a dimension of communication for later scholars who long for 
such a dialogue when in depression. That is the reason that Li He, a poet of Tang Dynasty 
(618—907), sighs in his poem that “Heaven is also growing old if it shares feelings with the 
human beings.”22 The Chinese intellectuals after Confucius seldom give up their 
conversation with Heaven. From Heaven they get their belief confirmed , and to Heaven 
they exposed their emotional world and divine pursuit. In the meantime, Confucius’s self­
composed elegy is also a response to voices from opponents and followers, officials and 
laymen, the “superior man” and “inferior man,” and it suggests that the end of his life 
would not prevent his voice from being heard for “hundreds of generations,” for his ideal, 
like the ritual system of the Zhou, is also characterized by its predictability and 
addressivity.23
Now, let us focus on the topic of how silence as a rhetorical behavior, works in 
Confucius’s dialogized tragic consciousness. The orientation of his silence to “an other” is 
obvious and persistent. It is never passive, and can be regarded as a silenced voice, and it
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is an active participant amidst a heteroglossia of voices striving to represent the 
phenomena of social disorders. As a teacher who first established a private school on a 
large scale in early China, Confucius took conversation as a major form of his pedagogy, 
but sometimes he remained silent to maintain a particular communication with his 
disciples, the rulers and his society. Once he told his disciples that “I am thinking of 
giving up speech.” Zigong asked, “If you did not speak, what would there be for us, your 
disciples, to transmit?” Confucius said, “What does Heaven ever say? Yet there are the 
four seasons going round and there are the hundred things coming into being. What does 
Heaven ever say?” (Ch. 17.19) To begin with, Confucius’s silence is pessimistic by nature, 
and it originates from his conclusion that no one really understands him. Being a moral 
philosopher aiming at a rationalized social order, the restoration o f the essential ritual 
system of the Zhou, Confucius is fully aware of the moral degradation in his time: “I have 
never seen people attracted by virtuous scholars as they are by beautiful women” (Ch.
9.18). Confucius seemed to realize that a philosopher had to remain silent if people 
around him turned their eye and ear to the issues of power, money and women only. It is 
often the case that Confucius would leave a state silently after making sure that the ruler 
there had no interest in Way,24 because his silence itself sent out a message that “There is 
no point in people taking counsel together who follow different ways” (Ch. 15.40).
Confucius’s silenced voice is also marked by its interanimation with the voices 
from his disciples who, according to Confucius, tend to interpret his messages uncritically. 
When he asserted that the four seasons go around without voiced engagement from
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Heaven, Confucius actually voiced his dissatisfaction with the passive attitude of some 
disciples in their participation in the dialogue; and instead of terminating the dialogue, 
Confucius illuminated his disciples with the inference that they could still hear their 
master’s voiced opinions and “transmit” them to the generation to come if they really 
“understand ten things after being told about one thing” (Ch. 5.9). Thus, his silence, as an 
indirect criticism, opens a new avenue for exchanging ideas between teacher and students. 
And it works as a type of “hidden dialogue, in its augmented and anxious inaudibility, 
perseveres in the inaccessible depths of ourselves” (Jabes, 93). On some other occasions, 
Confucius’s silence also works in contempt of either the narrow-minded rulers or those 
who are not appropriate for normal direct dialogical relations.25 Confucius’s silence, a 
particular voice from the oppressed, serves, above all, as a sign of protest against the 
abusive use of speech, which he criticizes as “cunning words”(Ch. 1.3) or “a glibness of 
tongue” (Ch.5.5), and which may possibly put a state at risk. So to speak, Confucius’s 
recourse to silence represents his sense of suffocation, his anxiety to make the self 
understood and his strong intention to distinguish the self from the other, particularly the 
voice of the “oppressing.” This practice o f a silent participation helps to shape 
Confucius’s tragic sense by laying a focus on the reciprocal relations between the 
expressed and the audible, silence and utterance, self and other, and meaning and context, 
and enriches his art of communication.
Confucius’s tragic consciousness is reflected in his rhetorical contact with Taoist 
hermits too. And the dialogic relation between them presents a tragic image of Confucius
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as an estranged social reformer who was not only kept away from the mainstream of 
society, the powerful and the rich, but was also distanced by the groups of Taoist 
hermits. While wandering in different states to advocate his claims, Confucius often had 
encounters with Taoist hermits, some of which are reflected in The Analects. After 
leaving Yin, Confucius returned to the state of Cai. By a field they met two secluded 
Taoist philosophers who made sarcastic comments on Confucius’s mission to his disciple-- 
Zilu, and persuaded him to stop his journey with Confucius: “Throughout the Empire men 
are all the same. Who is there for you to change places with? Moreover, for your own 
sake, should it not be better, instead of following a Gentleman who keeps running away 
from men, you followed one who runs away from the world altogether?” (Ch. 18.6) 
Confucius felt quite disappointed on hearing this and responded,26 “One cannot associate 
with birds and beasts. Am I not a member of this human race? Who, then, is there for me 
to associate with? While the Way is to be found in the Empire, I will not change places 
with him.” Aware of the fact that the hermit addressed him indirectly, Confucius 
attempted first to resist the temptation in his voice while clarifying his stance as an 
influential social reformer with human society as his object. What strikes us contemporary 
readers is not only Confucius’s dialogic perspective in its denial of the dominance claimed 
by “an other,” the hermit, but also its insistence on a “double-voiced” (Self and Other) 
dialogue at two levels. While refusing to change his place with the hermit, Confucius, at 
one level, makes available the self to be defined by the social context, which requires an 
active participation in public life; and at another level, to be further defined by the hermit’s
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voice. The result of this continuous interaction seems to suggest fresh dialogues rather 
than ending them, although with silence the hermit denied a direct conversation with 
Confucius.
The Analects records another dialogue of Confucius with an old hermit. Once, in 
the presence of Zilu, an old man criticized Confucius for being “unable to toil with his 
limbs or to tell one kind of grain from another” (Ch. 18.7). Catching the implied criticism 
of his rhetorical activities, Confucius immediately identified the speaker to be an old 
hermit, and he encouraged Zilu to go on talking with him, only to find that the man 
disappeared. From the mouthpiece of Zilu,27 Confucius’s response is expressed that “Not 
to enter public life is to ignore one’s duty. Even the proper regulation of old and young 
cannot be set aside. How, then, can the duty between ruler and subject be set aside? This 
is to cause confusion in the most important of human relationships simply because one 
desires to keep unsullied one’s character” (Ch. 18.7). It is clear that Confucius was 
anxious to further his discussion with hermits to justify his opinion from the perspective of 
the ethical relationship which was acknowledged to be the foundation of early Chinese 
society. Confucius believes that it is the gentleman’s highest responsibility to participate 
in public service, and to engage himself in a relation with the ruler, which contributes to 
social harmony. If one shuns a political life in order to keep his personal cultivation 
unaffected by social disorders, he virtually neglects the most essential moral relation that 
he is expected to establish, and simultaneously he misses an opportunity to obtain his life 
goal. To uphold his moral standard, Confucius took no notice of the hostile tone in the
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with him. Confucius’s rhetorical behavior seems to suggest that he benefitted from this 
kind of verbal relation. Then, what is the strong motive lurking behind his dialogical 
enthusiasm? We might discern a tragic orientation in Confucius’s ideological structure in 
his alienated self, an inner voice echoing the hermit’s interpretation of a philosopher’s 
choice, to run away from society. It is not hard to see Confucius’s tendency to 
sympathize with some Taoists’ argument for their attitude toward social chaos. In such a 
difficult social context, Confucius, more than once expressed his preference for seclusion. 
He admonished his disciples to “Show yourself when the Way prevails in the Empire, but 
hide yourself when it does not” (Ch. 8.13), and “If the Way should fail to prevail, then I 
were to put to sea on a raft” (Ch. 5.7). It may be true that the above utterances are no 
more than temporary complaints or self-sarcasm when Confucius’s political and career 
ambitions are frustrated. But they are undercurrents that occasionally surface along with 
Confucius’s spiritual journey with the destination of being a Superior Man. These voices 
from an implicit other, his alienated self, do enhance his understanding o f his life as a 
failure and a tragedy, especially in the later part of his life. Simultaneously, they moderate 
or restrain his tone in a dialogic relation with an explicit other, a voice from the hermits, or 
the voice from the social reality from which he distinguishes his own. Later scholars are 
able to outline a particular cultural tradition in Chinese history, Confucianism’s exterior 
and Taoism’s interior, to represent a painful and an unusual spiritual journey of a large 
number of Chinese intellectuals.28 This construction of character, however, may well be
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traced back to the dialogic composition of Confucius’s own personality, vividly reflected 
in his rhetorical activities.
III. Socrates: A Tragic Hero in His Defense, Exploration and Execution
Socrates’s tragic consciousness, much similar to that of Confucius, is also 
embodied in various dialogic relations of his philosophical pursuit, of his verbal encounters 
and his emotional structure as a tragic hero. In his attempt to recapture the power of 
Socratic dialogue, Gadamer writes, “Dialectic consists not in trying to discover the 
weakness of what is said, but in bringing out its real strength. It is not the art of arguing 
that is able to make a strong case out of a weak one, but the art of thinking that is able to 
strengthen what is said by referring to the object” (330-31). Gadamer’s hermeneutical 
reading has spotlighted an essential rhetorical aspect of the Platonic Socrates—to articulate 
his voice in its interaction with those of his interlocutors. This dialogic relationship has 
been further explored by Bakhtin when he observes Socrates’s “new artistic-prose model 
for the novel” and “scientific thinking”29 expressed in dialogized tonal relations with his 
interlocutors and with his own rhetorical contexts. Once we turn our eye to such a 
particular rhetorical emphasis, Socrates’s tragic consciousness becomes more readable and 
explicable.
Socrates’s tragic consciousness is basically represented in a sense of failure and 
frustration engendered from his verbal encounters throughout his life. In actuality,
Socrates can hardly persuade his interlocutors, friends or foes, academic opponents or 
philosophical disciples, unfamiliar jurors or life-long associates, of his definition of virtue
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(e.g., in Euthyphro, and Republic), true rhetoric (e.g., in Gorgias), epistemological 
identification (e.g., in Apology), or political beliefs (e.g., in Crito and Phaedo). He is 
forever a lonely traveler “on the journey to the place” where he claims to “be happy both 
in life and death” (Gorgias, 527). Almost every one of the Socratic dialogues helps to 
conjure up an image of a non-fatigued speaker, who is often aware of his own failure, 
embarrassment, disappointment and ill-treatment, but never stops in his pursuit of justice 
and virtue. He always moves as a “solitary reaper” with a hope for knowledge in the 
theoretical world while leaving behind him his pessimistic understanding of the transient 
nature of life and his personal tragedy to be felt by his interlocutors and readers. When we 
read the early Socratic dialogues, we begin immediately to experience a sense of 
incompleteness and dissatisfaction with an abrupt ending.
In the Euthyphro, the young interlocutor is induced by Socrates to define the 
concept of “holiness.” However, Euthyphro’s statement originating from a myth brings 
to Socrates bewilderment rather than enlightenment. When a further general definition is 
made by Euthyphro, Socrates is able to find a logical problem with it, and takes the 
opportunity to offer his own explanation which is questioned by Euthyphro for its 
vagueness as a new concept. The relation between holiness and the gods aroused an 
argument between the two participants. Socrates suggests a fresh start to continue his 
cross-examination, which is, unfortunately, denied by Euthyphro who becomes resentful at 
this circulating and non-ending pursuit. Socratic enthusiasm seems to be frustrated, and 
he feels Euthyphro “dashing me from that great hope which I entertained,”30 though he is 
oriented in the direction of his topic: holiness is knowledge one must keep seeking.
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In regard to his encounter with Sophists, the Gorgias represents Socrates’s major 
efforts to launch a severe attack on the Sophistic rhetoric and to give an account of what 
rhetoric should be. Concerning the description of Gorgias’s concession to debate in the 
dialectical mode, the contemporary scholar, Richard Leo Enos, feels justified to write, “It 
is difficult to imagine that the real Gorgias, noted for his elegant prose, would have agreed 
to such a format. It is also ironic that as the dialogue develops it is Socrates who 
elaborates his statements in details and Gorgias is reduced to virtually passive silence” 
(Richard Leo Enos, 94). However, even in such a favorable rhetorical situation, Socrates 
still fails to convince Callicles of his argument that Sophistic rhetoric is wrong in its most 
vigorous and dangerous form. The readers are led to believe that Socrates could hardly 
finish his lengthy and passionate final speech without generosity on the part of Callicles. 
Besides, it is Callicles who foretells the ominous prospect of Socrates’ trial and death at 
the hands of an “utterly vicious and debased creature” (521). Full of confidence in his 
“true art of politics,” Socrates declares his refusal to carry on his “habitual discussion with 
a view to gratification,” which explains that his continuous conversation with the 
interlocutors may sometimes be interpreted as “an old wife’s tale” or “a myth.” And it is 
his dialogic imagination of his speech being understood that enables Socrates to value a 
dialogic existence of his unwilling and impatient interlocutors. Theoretically, Socrates 
believes in the happiness both Callicles and he himself can seek from their argument, but a 
tone of embarrassment and bitterness is often heard in each of their contacts where no
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consensus is ever reached and each of the participants just distinguishes his own rhetorical 
claim from the other’s . If Socrates’s unsuccessful confrontation with Meletus in the 
Apology is understandable because the later symbolizes an overwhelmingly powerful anti- 
Socrates’s force, Socrates’s dialogic relation with his life-long friend Criton in prison 
produces more bewilderment among the readers, and even greater pains in both of the 
participants. Neither of the speakers can persuade the other, due to his identification with 
a different value system. The dialogue arrives at such a deadlock that Socrates, for the 
first time in his verbal activities, hints at stopping their conversing.32 Their tonal voices in 
the Crito, though distinct in being heard to each other, are eager to emphasize in their 
interaction a different space and time orientation, as the following illustrates:
Socrates
Criton
Friends: followers of Socrates
in this world/the present time
Laws in the house of Hades
in the next world/ the future time
Figure 8 : Socrates’s and Criton’s Dialogic Relations in the Crito
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The diagram indicates the dialogic relations in Socrates’s dialogue with Criton. The topic 
about a possible escape from the prison remains at the center of their communication, 
because it is the argument between the participants that keeps their exchange on.
However, within this routine channel, Socrates never stops his communication in his 
imaginative domain with the Laws in the house of Hades that empower him with a sense 
of justice/injustice and lawfulness/unlawfulness, and induce him to value the spiritual life in 
the next world in an infinite future. Similarly, Criton, the representative of all Socrates’s 
friends, establishes his persuasion on the personal freedom of Socrates in this world, the 
standards of value of his time for friendship, family relations, and earthly life, chiefly 
through his tonal relations with his friends, the followers of the Socratic doctrine. In 
addition, Socrates often indulges himself in a dialogue with the next world in space, and 
directs his attention to the future time. By contrast, Criton always sticks to the moral and 
personal concerns of this world and seeks a response from the present time. In such a 
heated, passionate but friendly verbal encounter, their arguments develop in the same way 
as two trains driving in opposite directions along two parallel tracks. They can never meet 
each other. The further they communicate, the farther they get separated from each other. 
What can still link them is friendship. For Socrates, the tragedy lies in despair that his 
greatest friend should try to persuade him to violate the laws that he has obeyed all his life. 
For Criton, the tragedy becomes inevitable that they will forever lose Socrates, “the 
bravest and also the wisest and the most just in our time” (Phaedo, 118a). This reading 
of the Crito helps to sharpen a sensitivity on the part of the audience to a tragic conflict
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activated by Socrates and Criton across time and space in the domains of philosophy and 
rhetoric.
Presumably, it is the Apology that demonstrates most fully the inseparability of 
Socrates’s tragic consciousness from his dialogic imagination. The dialogic relations in 






Figure 9: Tragic Consciousness through Dialogic Imagination 
Socrates starts his most explicit dialogic relation with Meletus. Meletus is as much a 
prosecution witness as a prosecutor, because what he says is both affidavit and charge. 
Athenian law enables Socrates to cross-examine him and to oblige him to answer his 
questions. Some critics like T. G. West33 believe that Socrates’s arguments in regard to 
the charges by Meletus are irrelevant and ridiculous. In my opinion, Socrates’s defense is 
relevant to the charges, and his way to undermine Meletus’s credibility is both reasonable
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and intelligible. Socrates’s examination reveals that Meletus has taken a frivolous attitude 
toward serious matters. He has irresponsibly brought Socrates into court, and he has 
never cared about what he has professed to be seriously concerned with. As a result, 
Meletus fails to provide adequate evidence for his charges and his responses are either 
being at a complete loss for words or simply arousing the indignation on the side of the 
members of the jury. Meletus’s victory over Socrates simply tells that social prejudice 
against Socrates has real power no matter what kind of mouthpiece it chooses. Certainly, 
it is Socrates’s dialogic relations with the jurors that decide his fate. Standing in the seat 
of a defendant, Socrates is always aware of his contact with the jurors, though this 
communication is realized in a particular form: the jurors keep open their channels of 
communication with the defendant and prosecutor with the help of voice and gestures.34 
However, Socrates faces two choices: to defend himself for the sake of his ideal, or to 
moderate his tone in accordance with the response from the jurors so as to secure an 
acquittal. Apparently, he chooses the former, though he does appeal to the jury at the 
beginning of his defense, confessing his ignorance of the language of court. To make 
known his ideal and mission, Socrates can hardly prevent it from happening that the 
delineation of his life-long pursuit of a divine cause infuriates a large number of jurors. 
Moreover, to secure the time and opportunity for his defense, Socates never hesitates to 
blame those who respond to his speech with an uproar. The difficult rhetorical context 
filled with a hostile attitude to Socrates foreshadows his destiny, and it is inevitable that 
his dialogic relation with the jurors will end in a disastrous vote.
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Another two of Socrates’s dialogic relations are implicitly maintained with a wider 
audience excluding those present at the court, and also with his innerself. In fact, Socratic 
scholars have long been studying the motive of the Socratic type of defense. As R.E. 
Allen states, “Socrates’ aim was to gain neither conviction nor acquittal, but to tell the 
whole truth in accordance with justice.”35 This conclusion does tell part of the story, but it 
goes too far in denying that one of Socrates’s motives is to be acquitted with the force of 
his oral discourse, which is admittedly secondary to his purpose of defending his 
philosophical life. What scholars like Allen overlook is that Socratic passion in producing 
his ideas also comes from his imaginary dialogic relations with his family, friends, disciples 
and also all the Athenians absent from the court, and more important, his innerself. My 
argument is based on the following observations: first, Socrates is well aware of the 
possibility that this might be the last chance for him to speak to his audience in public; 
second, Socrates’s mentioning of his refusal to haul his wife and sons into the court 
reveals both his reluctance to appeal for pity in usual form36 and his desire for 
understanding from his family; third, Socrates is confident of the human potentiality for 
reaching absolute truth and of enjoying a reputation among those who understand his 
philosophical pursuit; finally, the dialogic relations portray Socrates as a new type of tragic 
hero who walks to the end of his life with love but without hatred, with passion but 
without indignation, with a sense of sacrifice but without anxiety over the peacefulness of 
his soul.
Socrates’s consciousness as a tragic hero in the Phaedo culminates in his talk with 
Crito, Phaedo and other followers gathered in the cell on the day of his death:
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“You will make your several journeys at some future time, but for myself, e’en 
now as a tragic hero might say, ‘destiny doth summon me’ : and it’s just about 
time I made for the bath. It really seems better to take a bath before drinking the 
poison, and not to give the women the trouble of washing a dead body.” (114c- 
116c)
Socrates’s talk about “destiny” forms a contrast with his “divine god.” His rhetorical 
activities and philosophical pursuit are consistent with “divine god,” but are in odd 
relations with “destiny,” because to interpret human life in terms of destiny is to emphasize 
some unexpected or unfavorable aspect in the course of life. Destiny is often irresistible 
and inevitable, so when destiny “summons,” Socrates has to answer it, even if it is against 
his will. That Socrates hears the destiny’s summons also enhances his consciousness of 
the transiency of human life-life is short and is determined by trans-human existence. To 
admit the transient nature of life is apt to reflect a tragic understanding of life in this world, 
although a human individual may take death as a natural separation of soul from body. As 
a hero, Socrates faces death calmly and bravely, and he regards “drinking the poison” and 
“washing the dead body” as indispensable tasks given by destiny. His tonal relations are 
oriented from the present to the future when he is imagining the rough female laborers 
washing his dead body, and he shifts his topic from life-related ones to death-related ones 
(e.g., poison, and procedures to undergoing the penalty). He purportedly estranges 
himself from the present with a possible intention to calm his intellectual passion 
permeating his whole life, and also to extinguish gradually his desire for and anxiety over 
this earthly world. Socrates’s future-oriented speech is also addressed to his fellow- 
philosophers concerning their “several journeys at some future time.” Socrates
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encourages them to set themselves free at the end of their journey “from imprisonment in 
those regions of earth” so that all those who “have purified themselves sufficiently by 
philosophy live thereafter together without bodies” (112b-l 14b), and owing to the 
immortality of soul they will be able to follow Socrates in the next world. Thus Socrates 
opens a new space of imagination for himself to continue a dialogue with his fellow 
philosophers.
Socrates’s death as a tragic event is characterized by its projection on the vision 
and hearing of the Others—his friends and the prison officer at his last moments.
Socrates’s courage and somber-mindedness before his execution form a sharp contrast 
with the melancholy and sorrow of the others present. When he expressed his admiration 
for Socrates’s nobility during his long imprisonment, the prison officer burst into tears.
He felt sorrowful for the departure of such a man of character. After Socrates’s tragedy 
was thus interpreted by a man who was accustomed in his daily work to numerous deaths, 
Socrates began to put an end to his life path. As soon as he drained the hemlock in one 
drought, all his friends there could no longer keep back a flood of tears. They either 
covered their faces or went out of the cell to cry. They felt sad for their “own calamity in 
losing such a friend,” but not for Socrates. Why not? Because they deemed it to be 
greatly respectful to Socrates not to misunderstand his attitude toward death, and because 
they felt convinced that for Socrates the departure of an immortal soul from its habitation 
in the body is nothing painful. But, Socrates’s last words are still open to our discussion: 
“Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; please pay the debt, and don’t neglect it” (116d-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
118). He still felt indebted to this world and he was obviously thinking of his unfulfilled 
responsibility before his departure. Socrates left behind himself the eternal joy he sought 
from his human communication, which is consistent with his uncertainty about the next 
world where only “God leads the way” (Criton, 53b-54e).
IV. Dialogue between Confucius’s and Socrates’s Tragic Consciousness 
So far I have discussed about how Confucius’s and Socrates’s direct dialogic 
relations with the others, and their internal dialogues as responses to their rhetorical and 
cultural situations have reflected and developed their respective tragic consciousness.
Now I attempt to make possible an intercultural dialogue between these two passionate 
speakers and truth-seekers so as to account for how such a mutually-illuminating 
encounter helps to describe the shaping of a dialogized tragic consciousness at the birth of 
Eastern as well as Western civilizations.
To begin with, both Confucius and Socrates as moral philosophers have to meet 
the dilemma in their own rhetorical situation: they take it as their life-long mission to 
advocate and defend their ideals (for Confucius, it is “Way”; and for Socrates, it is the 
“Final Truth”), but their thoughts are often misinterpreted or misrepresented either by 
those in power (in Confucius’s case) or by the majority (in Socrates’s case). Moreover, 
their voices are threatened with being silenced by death. Once Confucius had to pass 
through Song state in disguise, because his oral criticism of Heng Kui, a high-ranking 
official of that state, for his extravagance in making a grand stone coffin, had infuriated the 
officer who thus plotted to murder him on his way.37 Then, when Confucius went to Wei
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state with his disciples, they were surrounded on their way by armed mobs of the Kuang 
state, and were almost killed (Sima Qian, 1919). Socrates’s execution is an even more 
prominent example of how an individual voice is suffocated. The tragic experience of the 
two philosophers in the East and the West indicates that the ancient philosophers may 
often endanger their lives in order to get their ideal heard. What impresses the audience of 
their time and still of the present-day is Confucius’s and Socrates’s attitude toward the 
issue of death. To Confucius, the truth he seeks from the Way is more significant than 
life, so “I would not live in vain if I should die the day I’m told about the Way”38 (Ch.4.8). 
Here Confucius points out that the value of his life lies in his continuous search for the 
truth about the harmonious social order, and he feels greatly satisfied once he reaches the 
truth. Confucian scholars have often neglected the dynamic word, Wen ( f^j , to hear 
about or to be told about), in his confession which emphasizes an oral and dialogic 
relation with the Way rather than a written or monological approach to the truth. Besides, 
Confucius believes that one often has to fight for his ideal at the risk of his life. That is 
why he demonstrates the relations between life and death in accordance with the core of 
his thought Ren (benevolence):
“For Gentleman of purpose and men of benevolence while it is inconceivable that 
they should seek to stay alive at the expense of benevolence, it may happen that 
they have to accept death in order to have benevolence accomplished.” (Ch. 15.9)
Here Confucius distinguished the “gentleman” from the “small man” by his moral practice
--to always put his ideal of “benevolence” (love for others) before his own life. This
Confucian idea was further developed by Mencius,39 and has become so deeply rooted in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
153
Chinese society and other Eastern societies that numerous people have accepted it as their 
life principle and died for their political ideals without complaint or regret. This kind of 
tragic heroism is apparent in Socrates’s defense in the Apology, too. Socrates is 
determined not to give up his divine mission of “conferring in private the greatest benefit 
on each citizen” (56c) even if he “is to die many times over.” If he is deprived of the 
freedom to go on with his philosophical enquiry, his life would be reduced to an 
“unexamined life” that is “not worth living for a man” (38a). That is why Socrates, like 
the Homeric tragic hero, Achilles, has enough courage to “belittle danger and death”
(27d). Confucius and Socrates, though in a similarly vulnerable and endangered position, 
have both gained the power for their philosophical inquiry, for they are among the first 
thinkers who get their tone rationalized and defined in their continuous encounter with 
other voices, sympathetic or hostile, in a cultural situation where human society is taking 
pains to seek a “self-knowledge” (Socrates), or the knowledge of “cultivating self’ 
(Confucius) (Ch. 14.42).
The tragic consciousness is also reflected in their hesitation and perplexity when 
Confucius and Socrates were compelled to respond to their unfavorable situation and 
disastrous destiny. Different from tragic heroes in ancient mythology and literature, they 
are far more conscious of the inability of human beings in presenting a proper 
interpretation of a tragic experience, and they are far more eager to seek some self­
consolation and self-transcendence in one way or another. In one of his interactions with 
the hermits, Confucius’s pessimistic understanding of his political trips to different states is
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expressed through Zilu who sadly murmured to himself, “As for putting the Way into 
practice, he (Confucius) knows all along that it is hopeless” (Ch. 18.7). The confession 
that they are actually trying something hopeless and impossible presents an adequate 
explanation for their constant setbacks and failures. Thus, here is Confucius’s own 
comment:
“It is Destiny if the Way prevails; it is equally Destiny if the Way falls into 
disuse....” (Ch. 14.36)
Confucius comes to the realization that either the accomplishment or the destruction of the 
Way is independent of the will of the human beings. He seems to suggest that Destiny 
{Ming, )40 determines the realization of the Way. Human beings are not expected to 
stand in defiance of Destiny, for it is irresistible and uncontrollable. This also accounts 
for the fact that Confucius once emphasized that the gentleman is in fear of Destiny (Ch. 
16.8). So, when Confucius makes a self-evaluation that “at fifty I began to understand 
Decree of Heaven” (Ch. 2.4), it suggests that he knows how to behave in accordance with 
destiny rather than exerting any personal influence on an inevitable course o f social 
development, though it never entails that one should go against Way if it is in discord with 
destiny. From this standpoint, Confucius enables himself to feel justified for what he has 
done for social reform, and his tragic experience is thus rationalized, for he is prepared for 
setbacks and failures in a philosopher’s life, which are part of his destiny. It is not totally 
by coincidence that Socrates also turns to Destiny when his divine mission is frustrated 
and his life is doomed. In his spiritual world he hears that “the destiny summons me.” His 
tonal relations with the divine god who has been with him ever since his boyhood now tell
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him peacefully that it is the very time for him to put an end to his earthly sojourn. Without 
worries and complaints, Socrates’s wandering in a visionary world conjures up in our 
mind a picture of an elderly philosopher who starts his journey to the next world, leaving 
behind him all his worldly concerns.
If inquiring further, we may find that neither Confucius nor Socrates can satisfy 
himself with a merely spiritual sustenance from Destiny. They go even further to find their 
own “dreamland” when feeling tired of this world. Our re-reading of Confucian dialogues 
helps to reveal his seemingly contradictory attitude toward Taoist hermits who value a life 
of self-purification and secluded meditation away from a society o f corruption and 
disorder. Confucius, on the one hand, distinguished his own position as a social reformer 
from that of hermits who do nothing for society. On the other hand, he ranks those 
shunning society as the men of good quality (Xianzhe, ) (Ch. 14.37). And in the 
meantime, he has made great efforts to exchange ideas with the hermits in order to 
develop some mutual understanding between the two philosophical schools characterized 
by Rushi ( ,  active participation in worldly affairs) and Chushi ( , standing
aloof from the earthly world). Actually, at the deep structure of his consciousness, 
Confucius is now and then enticed to follow the hermit’s way of life, though he dreams of 
a space not only far away from society but also far away from the land—sailing aimlessly in 
the infinite sea (Ch. 5.7). The dialogic imagination that possibly results from different 
voices interacting with each other in his innerself helps to present a real image of 
Confucius—a man wandering painfully in his spiritual world. So, the Confucian tradition
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remains a mirror image of Chinese intellectuals who often find themselves laboring along 
their spiritual pilgrimage in a transition from a “yeller” (one who keeps advocating his 
political and philosophical claims in opposition to the existing social reality) to a 
“wanderer” (one who feels frustrated and tends to stand aloof from the society).41 Then, 
where does Socrates find a home for his soul? It is in the next world, where he should 
“find staying there a wonderful thing” (Apology, 41b) and where he will go on cross- 
examining people without being disturbed by “an unjust judgment.” The philosopher’s 
free association of his death with an immortal soul springing from a dead body and with 
the eternity of spiritual happiness does fill his dialogues of his last days with consolation 
and hope, though an awareness of an uncertainty about the unknown world sometimes 
shadows his dialogic imagination across space and time.42 Socrates is, after all, a real man 
of learning who establishes his philosophical understanding upon his practice of cross- 
examination. Like Confucius, he does not have to hide his limitation in extending his 
knowledge to the understanding of an unfamiliar and unexamined world. And he seems 
only to care about whether such a dialogic imagination can secure him a spiritual 
sustenance and satisfy his ambition.
Unlike that of the traditional type of tragic heroes, Confucius’s and Socrates’s 
tragic consciousness does not result from their “wrong judgment” (Aristotle), and it has 
never been accompanied with regret or self-criticism. As wisdom-lovers, their full 
commitment to learning of human knowledge and to dialogic rhetorical activities often 
overwhelmed a tragic consciousness of social injustice and personal unfulfillment. It is
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because of their optimistic attitude about life that later scholars often portray them as 
“untragic” or “joyful” thinkers. However, comedy and tragedy are, as Nietzsche observes, 
often two sides of the same story. Tragic and untragic voices may often be mutually 
defined in the consciousness structure of the Self, which is always responsive to and 
interactive with the Otherness of a world characterized by its diversity and heteroglossia. 
Confucius once made some comments on three tragic figures in the Yin dynasty (1700- 
1100 B.C.): The Viscount Wei was forced to leave King Zhou (one of the most notorious 
tyrants in early Chinese history), the Viscount Ji was debased to be a slave (because of his 
criticism of tyranny) and Bi Gan (uncle of King Zhou and also an high-ranking official) 
was killed for remonstrating with King Zhou. They were three benevolent men in the Yin 
dynasty (Ch. 18.1 ).43 While expressing his admiration for these tragic heroes, Confucius 
has no intention of following their suit, because he believes that “Superior Man” ( ̂  -7- ) 
should not serve the state or the country where the Way fails to prevail. That is the reason 
Mencius calls Confucius “sage of the time,”44 implying that Confucius is keen on the 
diversity of the Otherness and takes into his consideration the proper time, place and 
situation when he strives for his ideal of the Way. Even in the most miserable situation, 
Confucius never loses his interest in the study of poems, music and rites. Once he offered 
a self-portrait as “a man who forgets to eat when he tries to solve a problem that has been 
driving him to distraction, who is so full of joy that he forgets his worries and who does 
not notice the onset of old age” (Ch. 7.19). This portrait best describes how Confucius’s
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optimistic and comic consciousness enables him to “forget about” his tragic experience 
when he is indulging in his search for knowledge.
A similar event happened in Socrates’s consciousness structure. Because of 
Socrates’s attempt to make existence appear comprehensible and thus justified, Nietzsche 
has discovered in Socrates an essential conflict between an optimistic element and a 
pessimistic element, and between passion and knowledge, and eventually a victory of 
“theoretical man” over the “tragic world view.” Nietzsche feels justified in regarding 
Socrates’s rationalism as a form of cowardice before a reality that is actually 
incomprehensible. Nietzsche’s attack seems to have oversimplified Socrates’s far more 
complicated perspective of tragic and comic consciousness. Socrates’s rationalized 
passion had always prepared him for his continuous dialogic relations with a world that is 
theoretically comprehensible and interpretable to him. However, Socrates never puts an 
end to a tragic view of existence which has already been demonstrated in his uncertainty 
about the difference between life and death, body and soul, and this world and next world. 
His unclosed eyes and mouth after the execution are symbolic of a desire to cast an eye 
into a new world of knowledge and to start another dialogue of philosophical inquiry.
Both Confucius and Socrates opened an epoch of rationalism in their own cultural 
contexts. And the structure o f their tragic consciousness becomes a dynamic part of such 
a rationalized understanding o f the world. Surprisingly interesting to the modern mind, 
their tragic consciousness still remains dialogic with our society. When Confucius was 
ruthlessly criticized for his alleged sympathy for the restoration of a feudalist slavery 
system and for his diminishing o f the historic function of the people at lower social levels
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during Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in China, could we not 
experience a refreshed tragic consciousness for such an ideological system that has 
undergone its ups and downs for two thousand and five hundred years? When the re­
reading of Socratic dialogues repeatedly dismantles the “authority” and “dominance”of 
Socrates in the fields of philosophy, rhetoric and literature, could we not hear Socrates’s 
own open-ended defense of such questioning at work?
Notes
1. Georgia Wamke made such a comment in Gadamer, Hermeneutics, Tradition and 
Reason. 100.
2. See Bakhtin’s The Dialogic Imagination. 128.
3. Bialostosky insists that Gadamer’s category is primarily dialectical and monological 
though it could be developed to entail a dialogic conversation. My understanding is that 
Gadamer’s category could become monological only when dominance is achieved in an 
otherwise dialogic interaction of different discourses. Refer to Bialostosky’s “Dialogic, 
Pragmatic, and Hermeneutic Conversation: Bakhtin, Rorty and Gadamer.”
4. In her discussion about the “pathos” in Chinese rhetoric, Mary M. Garrett argues that 
Confucius emphasized the hypocrisy and deceit entailed in an “instrumental” approach 
which advised a speaker how to “analyze the audience’s psychology and then tailor his 
appeals to whatever happened to be the audience’s values, desires, and feelings.” See 
Garrett’s “Pathos Reconsidered from the Perspective of Classical Chinese Rhetorical 
Theories.”
5. Youhuan yishi has become a deeply-rooted cultural tradition among Chinese 
intellectuals. This concept is defined in Xu Fuguan’s Zhongguo sixiangshilunji (Essays 
on the History of Chinese Thought).
6 . Qu Yuan (340-278 B.C.) was a great poet and civil official of the Warring States 
period, and also a tragic hero who drowned himself in the river as a protest against 
social corruption and national betrayal on the 5th day of the 5th month by the Chinese 
lunar calender. The day has since then become the Dragon Boat Festival in memory of
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Qu yuan. During the festival, people row dragon boats and throw dumplings wrapped 
in reeds into the river to feed fish lest Qu Yuan’s remains be eaten.
7. Aristotle defines tragedy as a form of narration which incorporates “incidents arousing 
pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish the catharsis of such emotions.” See Aristotle’s 
Poetics.
8. I agree with Thomas Lewis that Socrates tries to claim credit for not using the appeal 
for pity when he implicitly turns to the appeal, though I tend to reject Lewis’s labeling 
of this practice as an art of deception. See Lewis’s “Identifying Rhetoric in the 
Apology.”
9. According to my statistical study, these two words are used for more than thirty times 
in The Analects.
10. Yi. Shuogiia, divides the Way into the Way of Humans ( ) ,  the Way of Heaven 
( A i t .  ) a°d the Way of Earth ( ) -
11. See Fan Zhongyan’s essay “Yueyanglou JF  in Fan Wenzheng Gong Ji.
12. “Benevolence” ( )  in Confucius’s doctrine is a primary quality for a gentleman to 
acquire. So “a man of benevolence” ( A- ) is equal to “a gentleman” ( ^  -f • ).
13. “The Zhou” is elliptical for the Zhou dynasty. Here it refers to the Western Zhou. 
(1100-771 B.C.)
14. See Sima Qian’s Shiji (The Historical Records). 1935-37.
15. According to the rites of the Western Zhou, only the King can enjoy performance on 
such a scale. Dukes are allowed to have a performance by forty eight dancers, and 
barons thirty two dancers. Ji is a baron, and his violation of the ritual system poses a 
challenge to the authority of King.
16. This is again a violation of the rites because only the King is entitled to perform the 
sacrifice to Mount Tai.
17. My own translation. Mount Tai is a grand mountain in northern China and was 
symbolic of Heaven. Lin Fang was a scholar of Confucius’s time who once consulted 
Confucius about the rites.
18. Tomb figures are earthen, wooden or pottery models of human figures buried with the 
dead in ancient times.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161
19. Mencius. Lianghuiwang Shang records Confucius’s sharp criticism of such a cruel 
practice of burial: “Could those who initiated the practice of burying the dead with 
human figures have descendants?” Confucius implied that those who started such a 
burying practice should be punished by Heaven. “No descendants” was regarded in 
ancient times as the most severe punishment for evil doing.
20. Here D.C. Lau’s translation of “ “V ” is a little vague in meaning. Huang
Kang offers his interpretation in Lunyu Yishu that “ ” refers to learning the
essence of human life while “ ” refers to the understanding of the destiny
determined by Heaven. Since human beings have their ups and downs, one should not 
complain about others; since destiny entails both fortune and misfortune, one should
not complain about Heaven. The contemporary scholar Yang Buojun attempts to 
interpret “ "F ^  ” to be the learning of common sense, and “ X  ” to be the 
understanding of some profound truth.
21. See Sima Qian’s The Historical Records. 1944. The song was translated by Lin 
Yutang in his The Wisdom o f Confucius. 97.
22. Li He (790--816) is a well-known poet of the Tang Dynasty (618-907).
23. Bakhtin’s concept of addressivity insists that to understand existence as addressed to 
Self does not mean that Self is a passive receptacle, but instead, that Self constantly 
responds to utterances from the different worlds it passes through.
24. SeeCh. 15.1. of The Analects. Duke Ling of Wei state asked Confucius about 
military matters. Being aware of Duke Ling’s indifference to the ritual system,
Confucius left Wei the following day silently.
25. Mencius, in talking about Confucius’s teaching activities, emphasizes that there are 
different methods in teaching. One o f them is to teach by refusing to teach. See 
Mencius. Lilou.
26. Here the original phrase Wuran (>[#. ) is used to describe Confucius’s tone and
facial expression on hearing the argument of the hermit. According to Shuowen Jiezi 
(Simple Explanation of Chinese Characters, 121 A.D.), “Wuran” means the facial 
expression of feeling lost and embarrassed. Confucius was stricken with a sense of 
tragedy because the hermits, a group o f learned philosophers he had respect for, told some 
truth about his dilemma of constantly “running away from the rulers who turn a deaf ear 
to his Way.”
27. These comments are made in the name of Zilu. Actually the similar ideas are found 
elsewhere in Confucius’s sayings (e.g., in Ch. 9.16). So I think that they are either
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directly produced by Confucius or are expressed through the mouthpiece of Zilu.
28. See Chen Yinke’s “Tao Yuanmingzhi sixicmgyu qingtcm zhi guawcf’ (The Relations 
between Tao Yuanming’s Thought and “Pure Talk”), in Jinmingguan conggao 
chubian (Chen’s Essays, First Series). 205.
29. See Bakhtin’s Epic and Novel. 24.
30. See Euthyphro in The Last Days o f Socrates. I want to emphasize the tone of 
disappointment in the last paragraph of the dialogue, though traditional interpretation 
may insist on its ironic implication.
31. See Richard Leo Enos’s Greek Rhetoric before Aristotle. 94.
32. See Crito in Great Dialogues o f Plato. 118. In regard to his attitude toward death, 
Socrates said to Criton, “As far as I can see, you may be sure that whatever you may
say contrary to this, you will say in vain” (54E). Obviously, Socrates here intended to put 
an end to their dialogue.
33. West insists in his Plato's Apology o f Socrates (1979) that the examination of 
Meletus is really a comic competition between Socrates and Aristophanes, and he 
presupposes that Socrates’s arguments are simply ridiculous.
34. I believe that Plato would not have liked to describe the response of jurors, if there 
was any, in detail for the purpose of always keeping Socrates in the center of the court 
scene.
35. R.E. Allen maintains in Socrates and Legal Obligation that the Apology is not a 
defense, and a similar view is expressed by F. Comford in his “The Athenian Philosophical 
Schools, I: The Philosophy of Socrates.”
36. Many scholars have accepted Socrates’s refusal to appeal for pity at its face value. 
Thomas Lewis offers a different reading in his essay “Identifying Rhetoric in the 
Apology. Does Socrates Use the Appeal for Pity?” He argues that Socrates’s refusal is 
consistent with his choice of words from Homer “To quote the very words of Homer, 
even I am not sprung from an oak or form a rock,” and he is reminding the jurors that 
he, like Odysseus, also has relatives. Actually he is disguising his appeal for pity so 
that he can both employ the appeal and claim credit for not employing the appeal.
Lewis’s argument sounds convincing. But he has neglected how Socrates keeps his 
dialogic relations with his relatives by the explanation of his disavowal of the appeal 
for pity. Socrates gets along well with his wife and cares about the moral behaviour
of his sons. His public refusal to turn to the appeal also sends the message to his
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family that he loves them and has no intention to bring shame on them by hauling a 
tearful family before the public.
37. See Li Ji. Tang Gong Shan in Li Ji Zhtt Shu, Vol. 8, Sibu Beiyao. Ed. Chen Degang. 
It is recorded in Li Ji that on seeing Heng Kui’s men spending three years preparing a 
luxurious coffin for his future use Confucius commented that “His dead body would
be better decaying as fast as possible if he has to be so extravagant in making such a 
coffin.”
38. My own translation.
39. See Mencius. Gaozi shang. Mencius (372-289 B.C.) believed that one should 
accomplish righteousness at the sacrifice of his life if he has to make a choice between 
the two. In the past two thousand and five hundred years, many Chinese sacrificed 
their lives for their own political ideals. It is also the case in the contemporary history 
of China. Both Mao Zedong, the Communist leader, and Jiang Jieshi, the Nationalist 
leader, regarded their heroes who died during the Anti-Japanese War and China’s Civil 
War as “gentlemen of purpose and men of benevolence” ( A- ).
40. Confucius’s concept of Destiny (Ming, ) is not always consistent in The Analects. 
He seems aware that it is beyond his knowledge to give a definition to Destiny. This 
issue will be further discussed in Chapter Four.
41. The most learned and famous contemporary Chinese writer Lu Xun (1881 - 1936) 
takes a negative view of Confucianism, but his vivid description of the painful experience 
of Chinese intellectuals as first “yellers”—those who call for radical social reforms in 
China, and then “wanderers”—those who feel hopeless for themselves and for Chinese 
society, often reminds us of a long cultural tradition originating from the Confucian 
mode of tragic consciousness.
42. When Socrates closes his defense on trial, he demonstrates an ambivalent attitude 
toward a world of death by addressing his audience “... I to die, and you to live; but 
which of us goes to a better thing is unknown to all but God” (Apology, 41a).
43. My own translation. Bi Gan is one of the greatest tragic heroes in the Chinese 
history. As a punishment, his heart was cut out because King Zhou wanted to prove the 
saying that there are seven holes in a sage’s heart.
44. See Mencius. Wangzhang Xia.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Four 
The Use of Irony in Confucian and Socratic Dialogues
Irony is a traditional and challenging topic of study, and a cross-cultural study of 
irony is an even more complicated task for the students of rhetoric, for rhetorical criticism 
has yet to search for an explanation of all that we call ironical in discourses that produce 
particular cultural implications. Chapter Four will compare the irony in Confucius’s and 
Socrates’s dialogues, and explore how their irony, as a dynamic rhetorical method, helps 
to facilitate a dialogic imagination by representing an understanding of the confluence of 
two or more viewpoints potentially working in their discourse of philosophical exploration 
and in their verbal communication with the society. My initial purpose of this chapter is to 
trace the major development in the concept of irony. Then I will investigate how irony 
functions as a marked rhetorical element in Confucian and Socratic dialogues in the 
second and third sections. Finally, I attempt to make a comparative study and indicate 
how a dialogic reading of Confucius’s and Socrates’s irony may produce something of 
rhetorical significance and broaden our vision of their philosophical inquiry.
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I. A Brief Review
The word “irony” originates from the Greek word eiraneia that referred to the 
underdog who, both clever and weak, often defeated the stupid and arrogant alazon in 
Greek comedy. The rhetorical image of irony (Socratic irony) was created in the Platonic 
Socrates’s speech and dialogue to represent a noble-intentioned speaker who seeks truth 
with his interlocutors while denying any moral or intellectual virtues of his own. In the 
Rhetoric, Aristotle defines irony as “the mockery o f oneself’: “the jests” of the man which 
are practiced “at his own expense: the buffoon excites laughter at others” (1419b7).
Cicero presents irony as the “wholly admirable urbane pretense of Socrates” (1.30.108). 
Quintilian’s formula of irony seems to have stood the test of time. He regards irony as a 
trope “in which something contrary to what is said is to be understood” (9.22.44). Until 
the mid-eighteenth century people could still find a similar definition of irony in Dr. 
Johnson’s monumental dictionary: the “mode of speech in which the meaning is contrary 
to the words” (1755). This definition has passed intact down to our time. Here is the 
entry on irony in the Webster’s Dictionary o f English Language (1985): “Irony is the use 
of words to express something other than, and especially that opposite of, (their) literal 
meaning.”
Today the concept of irony has been further classified into Classical Irony, 
Romantic Irony, Tragic Irony, Cosmic Irony, Dramatic Irony and Poetic Irony,1 although 
the major theoretical development may be better traced through the contributions by the 
prominent ironologists Friedrich Schlegel, Connop Thirlwall, Donald Muecke, Paul de
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Man, Wayne C. Booth, David S. Kaufer, and Richard Rorty. The German scholar, 
Schlegel, believes that irony is a form o f paradox, and he sees irony as the “recognition of 
the fact that the world in its essence is paradoxical and that an ambivalent attitude alone 
can grasp its contradictory totality.”2 An ironic performance, according to Schlegel, 
suggests that “everything should be playful and serious, guilelessly open and deeply 
hidden.” SchlegePs notion of irony develops a consciousness of literary modernity 
because of his understanding of the relationships of illusion and reality, self and world in 
terms of artistic playfulness.
The contribution of another German scholar, Thirwall, lies in his concept o f a 
“dialectical irony,” which, different from verbal or rhetorical irony, emphasizes that irony 
may exist without an ironist, and may function in an attitude of the observer or in a 
situation that leads to an ironic observation by the reader (483-537). Muecke, in response 
to the German Romanticism of the eighteenth century, classifies two types of irony, 
verbal and situational (232-33). Verbal irony is created by an ironist intentionally while 
situational irony reflects the concept that life itself is fundamentally ironic, making all of us 
victims of an impossible situation.3 Accordingly, Muecke’s analysis of verbal irony points 
to the techniques of the ironist, but with situational irony the focus of his analysis is on 
the observer’s ironic sense and attitude.
Paul de Man’s rhetorical reading of irony4 is based on the consideration that 
reading arises from the rhetorical character of any text: its possibility of producing a 
figurative as well as a literal meaning, de Man describes irony as a discrepancy between
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sign and meaning, and an absence of coherence among the components of a discourse, and 
an inability to escape from a situation that has become intolerable.
Scholars like Booth and Kaufer have further enhanced the concept of irony as a 
rhetorical phenomenon. In his A Rhetoric o f Irony, Booth argues that to judge a text to 
be ironic or not depends on the authorial intention, and the reader’s ironic interpretation of 
a text becomes possible only when the author produces such a textual feature as to induce 
an ironic reading. Booth seems to define a causal relation between author and reader, text 
and reading in his attempt to elevate verbal irony over situational irony (33-44).
Richard Rorty’s theory suggests how literature, such as in works by Orwell and 
Nabokov, succeeds in awakening the readers to the humiliation, prejudice and cruelty of 
certain social practices and individual attitudes. This ironic perspective on the human 
condition is achieved “not by inquiry, but by imagination, an imaginative ability to see 
strange people as fellow sufferers” (xvi). Rorty’s interpretation of the power of the 
literary irony comes from his understanding of the literary imagination which helps readers 
to “form a beautiful mosaic” of rich and diverse classical texts and to present access to 
“commonly accepted general moral principles” (81).
The major part of modem theories of irony pays attention to its rhetorical function 
in reconstructing the reader’s consciousness of the authorial intention in his local and finite 
situation, although the theorists present diverse pictures of such a process of 
reconstruction. Rorty’s stress on “an imaginative ability” suggests to me the possibility of 
a dialogic reading, in Bakhtin’s sense, of the ironic implications of Confucius’s and
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Socrates’s dialogues. Dialogism emphasizes that any utterance is a link in a very 
complexly organized chain o f other utterances, namely, each utterance, demarcated by its 
articulating voice, contributes to the ongoing, never ending dialogue, and the author’s 
voice of irony not only interacts with his own voice elsewhere in his texts, but also with 
the situation and the audience (in his own time and in our time). The Bakhtinian reading 
may prove that “irony” can shed light on the plurality of its functions and implications. As 
Linda Hutcheon observes, “Under that deceptively comprehensive label (of irony) is 
included a complex and extensive range of tones, intentions, and effects” (44). With such 
a dialogic reading, we are able to discuss how the use of irony in Confucius’s and 
Socrates’s dialogues demonstrates the plurality of their philosophical exploration and 
enables a cross-cultural communication.
Modem scholarship, however, so far has produced only a few critical studies on 
Confucius’s ironical representation. Confucius’s irony was first observed by the Chinese 
scholar, Lin Yutang, in the 1930s5, and was studied by the Norwegian critic, Christoph 
Harbsmeier, in the 1990s.6 Both of the critics have portrayed Confucius as an emotional, 
informal and humorous man, a man capable of subtle irony, though they never touch upon 
the aspect of irony as a dynamic rhetorical method in his dialogue. In contrast, Socrates, 
as “a lifelong ironist” (Symposium, 216e4), has been studied in numerous works for his 
invention of irony, which makes it possible for us to use Socrates as a mirror image to 
present a clearer picture of Confucius’s irony.
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My comparative study will reveal the similarities between Confucius’s and 
Socrates’s irony in three aspects. First, irony is expressed in their disavowal o f a claim to 
knowledge versus their claim to wisdom/ability in seeking and acquiring knowledge. 
Confucius admits more than once that he is not bom with knowledge and he possessed no 
knowledge. But his dialogues present him as different from others in that he is curious 
about everything, keen on learning and knows how to acquire knowledge and how to 
enlighten others. Such an ironical presentation of Confucius’s epistemology actually 
accounts for the process of knowledge-making from different angles. Similarly, the 
Socratic sense of wisdom is well attested in the Apology. The principal lesson o f the 
oracle story for Socrates is that he proves to be the wisest of men, because only he realizes 
the extent of his own ignorance. Such an ironical confession of ignorance and wisdom is 
also common in other Socratic dialogues like the Gorgias, which may be interpreted from 
the perspective of its dialectical spirit and ironic implications: true knowledge lies in the 
realization of one’s ignorance, and ignorance does not necessarily mean the lack of 
wisdom.
Second, both Confucius and Socrates confess their piety and acceptance of the 
supernatural, but ironically they avoid justifying the existence of gods, which seems in 
discord with their continuous search for knowledge. In regard to the topic o f religion, 
Confucius states that “the gentleman is in awe of the Decree of Heaven” (Ch. 16.8), which 
assumes, though not in a clear picture, a theoretical existence of “the Decree o f Heaven”
) that exerts much influence on the fortune of individuals. And in the meantime, he 
follows all regular sacrifices to gods and ancestors. But he himself, as a knowledge-seeker,
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never attempts any explanation of the existence of gods, and his understanding of the 
ritual practice of sacrificing to gods seems to suggest that the existence of gods is subject 
to human consciousness in terms of time and situation (Ch. 3.12). This stance may also be 
suggested by the evidence that he often refused to discuss gods with his disciples, and on 
certain occasions he even doubted the possibility of a safe and healthy life through pious 
blessing (Ch. 12.5). By the same token, Socrates never hesitates to respond to Melletus’s 
charge of impiety against him in the Apology. However, his claim that the gods’ 
inspiration and sermons reach him through extra-rational channels—dreams or a personal 
“divine sign” (e.g., in Phaedo, Ion, and Euthyphro)— can hardly prove that he is not a 
“god-maker” himself. Eventually, Confucius and Socrates, as practitioners of their moral 
philosophy, display some proto-scientific attitude in getting true knowledge of their world, 
and general skepticism of those finalized presentations of the supernatural, which form an 
intrinsic irony in their religious attitude.
Third, there is also irony in the political theory of both philosophers’ works. 
Confucius and Socrates often appear to be the opponents or enemies of democracy, but 
their political and rhetorical activities might contribute to modem democracy. Confucius’s 
lifelong efforts to restore the Zhou Li ( the ritual system of the Western Zhou dynasty) 
result essentially from a motivation to reconstruct and consolidate a feudal autocratic 
administration, which has affected the development of Chinese society for two thousand 
years. Yet, Confucius’s rhetorical claims and activities are still intriguing to the practice 
of Chinese and East Asian intellectuals striving for political and academic democracy.7 In
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Socrates’s case, the irony lies in the fact that Socrates stands against Athenian democracy 
at the expense of his reputation (of being labeled as a people-hater) and eventually his life, 
but his philosophical exploration and dialogical activities convincingly suggest some 
essential elements which helped to shape the Western conception of democracy.
The above general survey of irony in Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogues is 
intended to present the basis for a cross-cultural study between the two ancient 
philosophers. Through the application of Bahktin’s concept of dialogism, we are able to 
perceive their irony as a discursive practice that registers ideological oppositions 
represented within the text and also in the process of negotiation between the 
listener/reader and the text. Besides, irony in their dialogical rhetoric determined by the 
relation of “two voices” sometimes serves to decode the text by revealing its authorial 
voice, a voice hidden behind the narrator’s voice. The significance of a comparative study 
may also be achieved when it reveals that one of the results of irony in Confucius and 
Socrates is to oppose a meaning that claims its own completion.
II. The Confucian Irony in Dialogue 
Confucian use of irony is both a rhetorical strategy and a philosophical 
presentation. It is generally characterized by seemingly paradoxical utterances over some 
epistemological issues (e.g., knowledge, belief, state administration, etc.) without explicit 
authorial intention, namely, Confucius often does not sound like an ironist. To gain the 
power to recognize the Confucian irony in his dialogue, one has to, in the first place, 
realize that Confucius’s emphasis on sincerity and conscientiousness in one’s rhetorical
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activities often directs the reader/listener’s attention to the coherence (or the golden 
thread) in his exploration rather than to the ironical implication hidden in his discourse. 
This partly accounts for the Karl Kao’s observation: “Sarcasm or irony has never been 
prominent in the Chinese tradition. When criticism is called for, it is thefeng  ) mode,
or ‘indirect criticism’, that is normally preferred, for it avoids affronting the addressee.”8 
More importantly, the Confucian mode of irony, as a dialogic dynamic of his text, has to 
be interpreted in the process of negotiation between the voices in different rhetorical 
situations, between the narrator and speaker, and between Confucius and the readers of 
our time.
Let us first explore the irony expressed in his utterance concerning the topic of 
knowledge. As an inquirer of moral philosophy, Confucius realized the extent of his own 
ignorance. Such a confession of ignorance is reflected in two forms: the disclaiming of 
knowledge, and the disavowal of being bom with knowledge. The latter displays a more 
sophisticated rhetorical strategy and is worth more attention from modem readers. Once 
Confucius told his disciples, “Do I possess knowledge? No, I do not. A rustic put a 
question to me and my mind was a complete blank. I kept hammering at the two sides of 
the question until I got everything out of it” (Ch. 9.8). While denying his possession of 
knowledge, Confucius here implies that he knows how to attain knowledge. Moreover, 
this disclaimer is further elaborated in his discussion about how human beings become 
knowledgeable:
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Those who are bom with knowledge are the highest. Next come those who 
attain knowledge through study. Next again come those who turn to study after 
having been vexed by difficulties. The common people, in so far as they make no 
effort to study even after having been vexed by difficulties, are the lowest (Ch.
16.9).
Here, with regard to the relation between human beings and knowledge, Confucius 
classifies people into four groups: those bom with knowledge; those gaining knowledge 
through learning; those seeking knowledge when vexed with ignorance; and those seeking 
no knowledge in spite of their ignorance. What confuses modem readers is Confucius’s 
description of the first group of people without further articulation. A question is 
naturally raised, “Who are those bom with knowledge?” From his own confession, it is 
clear that Confucius himself does not belong to this group of people, because he admits, “I 
was not bom with knowledge, being fond of antiquity, I am quick to seek it” (Ch. 7.20). 
Neither does Confucius mention that he has ever known anyone of this group personally. 
He tends to identify this group of people with the “sages”9 whom he once admitted that he 
would not be able to meet.
Obviously, Confucius’s distinction of such an entity in his conversations about 
knowledge reflects the “contradictory totality” (Schlegel) of knowledge. As always 
expressed in his pragmatic statements, Confucius shows contempt at the tendency to draw 
a conclusion without careful thinking (e.g., his criticism of Zilu in Ch. 13.3), and he 
emphasizes, “To say you know when you know, and to say you do not when you do not, 
that is knowledge” (Ch. 2.17). Inferring from this statement, we are led to think that the 
Confucian irony in presenting those who “are bom with knowledge” with those (including
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himself) who are bom without may express his true understanding of knowledge. And it 
can be used to serve his seemingly discursive and unsystematic exploration of a process of 
knowledge acquisition for the following reasons. First, the Confucian rhetoric of 
knowledge suggests a dialogic understanding of a topic, namely, it encourages an open- 
ended dialogue and denies a completion of a discussion. With a concept of attaining 
knowledge through learning in his mind, Confucius first assumes the possibility of making 
oneself knowledgeable without purposeful learning, especially the learning from others. 
Although not evidenced with any historical record or personal experience, Confucius’s 
abstract confirmation of such sage-like knowledgeability helps to carry out the imagination 
of learners about the superiority of human cognitive ability, and establishes an idealized 
persona that illuminates the hearts of those who could not always follow Confucius so as 
to cultivate themselves morally or intellectually through learning. Furthermore, this 
idealized persona may be employed to help his disciples realize their own limitation—they, 
like their master/teacher, have to attain knowledge through hard learning of six arts: rites, 
music, archery, chariot-riding, reading and mathematics, because they are not bom with 
knowledge.
In addition, the purpose of Confucius’s classification of four groups in regard to 
their relation to knowledge is also to lay a foundation for his continuous exploration o f the 
source of human knowledge. If the first group can not be actualized, and the third and 
fourth groups are not desirable to follow, the only way for people to become learned is
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through the practice of learning. Therefore, Confucius feels justified to further his 
dialogues on the ways of learning.
A careful examination of his discussions can provide at least three basic ways to 
seek knowledge: to begin with, Confucius regards the ancient literature as the major 
source of one’s knowledge. Shiji Huaji lizhucm (The Historical Records) - ^
) recorded Confucius’s brief account of why he chooses and edits six ancient books 
as textbooks: Li (Rites) may regulate one’s behavior, Yue (Music) develop one’s sense of 
harmony; Shcmgshu (Collections of Ancient Essays) explain historical events; Shi (Poetry) 
express poets’ ambition; Yi (The Book of Change) deify things and Chunqiu (Spring and 
Autumn) teach righteousness. And this account is consistent with the Confucian 
comments in The Analects (I.e., Ch. 7.17, 7.18, 13.22).
Another way to gain knowledge, according to Confucius, is to learn from others. 
Confucius told his disciples, “Even when walking in the company of two other men, I am 
bound to be able to learn from them. The good points of the one I copy; the bad points of 
the other I correct in myself’ (Ch. 7.22).10 This statement reveals a simple but often 
neglected truth: anyone else could be your teacher so long as you are aware of your 
ignorance and ready to learn. What distinguishes Confucius’s opinion is its dialogic nature 
that signifies the active response of the learner to his companions. Thus, learning from 
others is interpreted to be a critical process in which a learner copies the Other into the 
Self, while perfecting the Self by deconstructing the unacceptable or “bad” concepts o f the 
Other (Ch.7.22).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
The third way to seek knowledge is through self-practice. In his dialogue with 
Zigong, Confucius recalled that he was of a “humble station when young” and that is why 
he was “skilled in many menial things” (Ch. 9.6). Confucius’ colorful life experience 
enabled him to have a great exposure to both book knowledge and social knowledge. He 
was engaged in physical labor at an early age. Then he was put in charge of a granary by 
Baron Ji, and of cattle and sheep by others. Later he served as a police commissar for 
several years. For about fourteen years, he traveled in different states advocating his 
moral philosophy, making investigations and running continuously a private school. Social 
practice made him skilled in so many things, in the fields of agricultural production, state 
governance, military strategy and educational administration. He is certainly the greatest 
practitioner of social reforms in early China.
From the above discussion, we come to realize that Confucius’s attention falls on 
knowledge through learning. Then, what is the implication of his ironical or paradoxical 
juxtaposition of different types of knowledge acquisition—knowledge gained after the 
realization of one’s ignorance, knowledge sought through a process of learning, and 
knowledge that is innate? I tend to believe that Confucius’s irony here is only a verbal and 
dialogical consequence of his attempt to merge the finite and infinite into acceptable 
metaphors of learning practice. To Confucius, knowledge is an infinite entity, and learning 
is an infinite process, but the pleasure of the learner makes it finite, and his assumption of 
human potentiality makes it reachable; ignorance (or in Confucius’s words, “not 
knowing,” A* '-%& ) becomes wisdom once you admit it; but knowledge/wisdom without
loving learning makes one dissolute and unrestrained. Therefore, Confucius’ knowledge
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(■£» ) and ignorance {K'fa ), though seemingly opposed to each other, are appropriated in 
an ironical structure and are interpreted as fluidity in their relation to each other, which 
accounts for his understanding of knowledge as a process-centered concept.
Confucius’s irony is also expressed in his acceptance of the supernatural and his 
refusal to affirm the existence of gods and spirits of ancestors. It is generally believed that 
Confucius is “neither theistic nor atheistic.”11 Actually, his dialogues suggest that he is 
both theistic and atheistic, because his moral philosophy gains its credibility from the 
established religious belief, but his scientific consciousness prevents him from a blind 
identification with the theological tradition. This ambivalent attitude results in his ironical 
representation of the supernatural. Here, I do not attempt to explore such a Confucian 
irony from the perspective of theology. Instead, I hope to articulate how his rhetorical 
strategy animated by a dialogic imagination helps to appropriate and rationalize his 
attitudes toward spiritual matters.
Although he never claims a positive knowledge of gods and spirits, Confucius 
admits in public the existence of the supernatural. Such an admission is reflected in two 
aspects of Confucian dialogue. One is Confucius’s piety in sacrificial ceremony. The 
Analects records Yao’s prayer to “God” ( ) that vividly indicates the pious
attitude of the ancient kings as well as Confucius and his disciples.12 Personally,
Confucius also believes in the effectiveness and protection of the prayer. Once, when he 
was seriously ill, his disciple, Zilu, asked permission to offer a prayer, and he also justified 
his suggestion with a formal prayer. Confucius responded, “I have long been offering my
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prayers” (Ch. 7.35). This dialogue seems to imply that Confucius followed the 
conventional religious ceremony faithfully to ask gods for blessings,13 though he began to 
doubt whether or not the gods could help him get rid of illness. As to the required 
procedures in sacrificial ceremony, Confucius’s statement that “Sacrifice as if present” is 
taken to mean “sacrifice to the gods as if the gods were present.” Therefore, he insists 
that “Unless I take part in a sacrifice, it is as if I did not sacrifice” (Ch. 3.12). Thus 
articulated, Confucius values the personal participation in the ceremony, which also 
implies that Confucius only takes part in the ceremony that is in accordance with the ritual 
system of the Zhou dynasty. The other, presumably more significant aspect of 
Confucius’s dialogue is centered on a dialogic imagination of a person at prayer which 
may facilitate his dialogue with the gods.
By imagining the presence of gods and spirits, the prayer-sayers or the sacrificers 
are expected to enhance the heretofore impersonal relationship with the gods and spirits. 
Accordingly, the ceremony itself becomes a private mediatory event in which the praise of 
the gods and spirits is rewarded, the prayer-sayer himself is blessed and his best wishes are 
responded to, and above all, his soul and conscience are purified and elevated (Ch. 1.9).
Some Marxist critics14 have drawn a reductive conclusion that Confucius just 
displays a materialistic atheistic tendency by this statement, because they believe his 
conditional clause implies that gods and spirits could only exist when and where the 
sacrificial ceremony is being held. This Marxist stance has neglected the consistency of 
the Confucian rhetorical strategy in repeatedly strengthening the relationship between
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individual and gods and spirits (or the blessed and the blesser). This consistency explains 
Confucius’s sorrow in lamenting: “It has been such a long time since I dreamt o f the Duke 
of Zhou.” The Duke of Zhou is a god-like sage or a personified god, the ancestor of 
Confucius’s homeland. Confucius regarded it as a great misfortune that he could no 
longer communicate with Duke of Zhou in his dreams.
By expounding Confucius’s pious attitude toward gods and spirits, I, however, do 
not intend to present Confucius as religious in the modem sense.15 In actuality, Confucius, 
as a practitioner of his moral philosophy, displays much scientific attitude in attaining true 
knowledge of his world, and general skepticism of the dominant power of the 
supernatural, which forms an intrinsic irony in his religious attitude. Even Lu Xun, an 
iconoclastic rebel of Confucian tradition, once offered a positive evaluation o f such a 
pragmatic attitude: Master Confucius is really great, for he refused to follow the 
convention to concentrate on the issue of gods and spirits, though he lived in an era in 
which the worship of the supernatural was generally dominant.16 Confucius’ pragmatic 
attitude of “keeping the gods and spirits at distance” (Ch. 6.22) can be further explored in 
his skepticism of the overwhelming dominance of gods, his tendency to personify the 
concepts of gods and heaven so as to meet his needs of moral education, and also his 
reluctance to discuss the afterlife.
Confucius’s dialogue sometimes raises a differing tone against the conventional 
belief in the dominance of gods. Once, in defense of his decision to maintain silence in a 
social chaos and moral corruption, he questioned, “What does Heaven ever say? Yet
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
180
there are four seasons going round and there are the hundred things coming into being. 
What does Heaven ever say?” (Ch. 17.19) Apart from his emotional dissatisfaction with 
his disciples that I have mentioned in Chapter Three, Confucius raises through this 
rhetorical question an issue of the relation between the existence of heaven or the gods 
and the natural law of the material world.17 Although this questioning is not addressed 
with any further demonstration, Confiicius seems to realize that circulation of the seasons 
and biological development in nature are not always independent of the power of the 
supernatural. A further inference may lead to Confucius’s implied meaning that heaven or 
the gods are not almighty, they have their emotional preference (Ch. 6.28, 7.23) and then- 
own limitations (Ch. 17.19). Any over-emphasis on the dominance of heaven or gods may 
prove problematic because of its inability to explain daily happenings in the real world.
Confucius’s personification of gods and heaven also distinguishes his intention to 
confine the abstract theological entities in the context of his rhetorical activities, thus 
strategically softens (consciously or unconsciously) his ironical representation of a 
theoretical domain he is unfamiliar with. Heaven or the gods, to Confucius, though hard 
to be envisioned, can often be reached by human beings through a dialogical contact. That 
accounts for his optimistic confession that “at fifty I understood the Decree of Heaven,” 
which implies that Confucius’s mission is consistent with and authorized by Heaven 
through a verbal or non-verbal communication. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
Confucius’s tragic consciousness is sometimes expressed in his dialogue with the gods or 
heaven. And in his imagination, gods or heaven are personas that possess human
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emotions. Once infuriated by humans for their non-benevolent words or deeds, gods are 
sure to punish them no matter whether they pray or not.18 Thus, Confucius has promoted 
the communication between gods and humans by bringing down gods from heaven to the 
human world. By so doing, he never has to face the dilemma of delineating gods or 
heaven as a theoretical existence, because that proves to be an issue of “the unknown”
) to him, and a gentleman is always ready to admit his ignorance o f the unexamined
world.
Confucius’s reluctance to discuss the gods, spirits and afterlife is recorded on
several occasions by his disciples in The Analects. Yet, this indisputable point about his
attitude toward the supernatural presents much irony and humor that display both his
intelligence and rhetorical art. The following is an interesting dialogue:
Zilu asked about how the spirits of the dead and the gods should be served. 
Confucius argued, “You are not able even to serve man. How can you serve the 
spirits?” “May I ask about death?” “You do not understand even life. How can 
you understand death?” (Ch. 11.12)
Obviously, Confucius’s refutation is first directed to the irrationality of the questioner
himself. Confucius believes that what one should care about is how to serve his parents,
his lords and states. As to the service o f the gods and spirits, that can be fulfilled once you
serve man satisfactorily. For instance, if you are filial to your parents, according to
Confucius, you simultaneously express due respect for the spirits of your ancestors (Ch.
11.12). With regard to the question about death,19 Confucius’s argument focuses on the
ridiculousness of the question itself, for the afterlife cannot be explained by living beings
who have no such experience. Shaoyuan biatrwu ( i< ^  -$7 »  ) by Liu Xiang
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has further detailed a similar argument of Confucius in a humorous manner. When Zigong 
asked about the consciousness of the dead, Confucius answered in an ironical tone, “You 
will find out whether the dead has his consciousness or not after your own death. It won’t 
be too late.” We are justified to say that Confucius is keen on the paradox in the 
frequently-asked questions about gods, spirits and afterlife. However, his negative 
attitude toward such questions simultaneously forms an ironical contrast with his self­
confession of the knowledge of a divine decree ( )  and his imagination of the 
existence of gods and spirits, for it is generally accepted that with knowledge of divinity 
one will not shun these questions. Although Confucius’s rhetorical strategies partly reflect 
his ironical and rational understanding of the supernatural, they are hardly adequate to 
present a valid interpretation that might be used to mediate the relation between 
knowledge and intuition (Ch. 11.12), existence and ideology (Ch.3.12) from the 
perspective of epistemology.20 Confucius is, after all, a philosopher of an early 
undeveloped civilization. He was unable to fulfil his mediation of the above relations.
That is why he himself was also ridiculed when he ridiculed those who attempted to 
explore the theological issues that concerned them most.
Now, let us discuss irony in Confucius’s life-long pursuit of an ideal feudal society 
under the rule of benevolent lords and rulers, as well as the democratic spirit21 in his 
philosophical, ethical and educational claims. My focus will be placed on how Confucius’s 
rhetorical strategies mitigate these theoretical conflicts with an ironic interpretation of his 
concept of benevolence ( ) ,  an appropriate relationship between lords and subjects,
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fathers and sons ( £  (£ )- Once, he told Duke Ding that “The ruler should employ
the service of his subjects in accordance with the rites. A subject should serve his ruler by 
doing his best” (Ch. 3.9). Here, Confucius’s statement enables the rulers to feel legitimate 
in demanding loyalty and service from their subjects.22 This stratification of superior and 
inferior, and noble and humble has served the interests of the rulers in successive dynasties 
in Chinese history, and virtually laid a theoretical foundation for the authoritarian state. 
This is the reason some later critics have declared Confucianism to be the soul of Chinese 
dictatorship (Cai Shangsi, 1950) and its ritual system to be a “man-eating” doctrine.23 The 
negative response to the Confucian statement in which loyalty to and respect for rulers 
take a dominant place has, however, neglected how Confucius’s democratic ideas and 
rhetorical practice have from the opposite side addressed and defined such a statement. In 
his dialogues, Confucius repeatedly encourages his disciples to be engaged in reforming 
and running the government so as to meet the needs of the people. These new rulers may, 
in Confucius’s own words, come from “the low ranks” (Ch. 9.6), and are “benevolent 
persons” who “love their fellowmen” (Ch. 12.22), to be exact, “love the multitude at 
large” (Ch. 1.6). Thus, there occurs a contradiction between Confucius’s defense of an 
appropriate and unchanged relation between lord and subject, and his attempt to set this 
relation within a theory of benevolent administration which functions as a double-edged 
sword that may be employed to strike any bad administration either by lords or by 
subjects. In addition, Confucius’s own rhetorical practice also embodies this intrinsic 
irony. On the one hand, he followed all the traditional standards of etiquette to express his
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respect for the rulers (Ch. 10) and his indignation against any attempts at the replacement 
of “legitimate rulers”—those who gained power due to the hereditary system (Ch. 14.12). 
On the other, he criticized those who follow others blindly as “the ruin of virtue” (Ch.
17.13), and he advocated that a minister could take issue openly with his ruler (Ch.
14.22), because spinelessness would lead the state to ruin (Ch. 13.15). At the surface 
level, Confucius’s irony seems to produce an absence o f coherence among the statements 
of his dialogues and displays an inability to escape such an embarrassing situation. At the 
deep level, Confucius’ tone of irony, facilitated by his dialogic imagination, does suggest 
that he, as a philosopher bom in a lower rank, was keen on the deficiency of authoritarian 
powers in various states, though he stood firm against any form of violence aiming at the 
replacement of these powers, and that Jicrn (~ |^, correction or criticism), as a remedy, 
should be encouraged to carry out open discussion and evaluation in the court in 
accordance with interests of the state or moral standards (Ch. 18.1).
Confucius’s irony is also reflected in his continuous efforts to set up an ethical 
model—the gentleman ( Junzi, )— for all rulers and the educated, and in his belief
that everyone could become a gentleman. It is estimated that “gentleman” is mentioned or 
discussed more than one hundred times in The Analects. Confucius’s concept of 
“gentleman,” different from that of previous times,24 is in general an ideal persona with a 
perfect character. For the purpose of moral education, Confucius’s dialogues have 
shaped an ideal image that always upholds moral principles. The gentleman is first a 
practitioner of benevolence all his life, and “never deserts benevolence, not even for as
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long as it takes to eat a meal” (Ch. 4.5); the gentleman is an observer o f the ritual system, 
and he is “widely versed in culture but brought back to essentials by the rites” (Ch. 6.27); 
the gentleman is a performer of righteous ( ^  ) acts too, and his capacity in applying his 
own moral judgement and flexibility to “interact with and integrate into ever new 
situations” (Hall and Ames, 95) stands out against the “small man’s” (• J 'A - ) obsession 
with his own profits (Ch. 4.16); the gentleman possesses the potentiality for political and 
social leadership. He can be, as Confucius’s disciple, Zenshen, says, “entrusted with an 
orphan six chi tall,25 and the fate of a state one hundred li square, without his being 
deflected from his purpose even in moments of crisis” (Ch. 8.6); as far as his personal 
cultivation is concerned, the gentleman “helps others to realize what is good in them”
(Ch. 12.16), and to think about how to develop his personal ability (Ch. 15.19), but he is 
never expected to be in contention with others (Ch. 3.7). Therefore, the gentleman is 
“easy of mind” (Ch. 7.37) and never in anxiety and fear (Ch. 12.4). Then, can a gentleman 
err? Yes. However, as Zigong argues, “The gentleman’s errors are like an eclipse of the 
sun and moon in that when he errs the whole world sees him doing so, and when he 
reforms the whole world looks up to him” (Ch. 19.21). With such a perfect image in his 
mind’s eye, Confucius always encourages his disciples to follow the model, because his 
“gentleman” is a moral being, and everyone can reach such a status, no matter what social 
rank he is from and how much knowledge he has obtained.
Confucius’s verbal description and discussion of the “gentleman” have produced a 
profound irony in terms o f the feudal hierarchical orders he himself accepted and
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defended. Its ironical connotation is evident in three aspects: first of all, it ridicules in a 
mild tone a necessary relation between ruler and gentleman; namely, a ruler is not 
necessarily a “gentleman” (Ch. 6.13, 16.8), and that is why Confucius persistently 
persuades the lords and subjects to practice the Way o f the Gentleman ( % jLjif );
second, his discussion raises a new voice to challenge the conventional distinction between 
the superior and the inferior. Comparatively, the scholars are inferior to the rulers and 
administrators in social ranks. But Confucius has regarded two scholars, both his 
disciples, as “gentlemen” for their moral supremacy (Ch. 5.3, 14.5), which suggests that 
they are morally superior to anybody else; finally, though Confucius has openly disclaimed 
being a “gentleman” himself (Ch. 7.33, 14.28), his disciples and those who were familiar 
with him always regarded him as the embodiment of the gentleman, because his 
philosophical pursuit and rhetorical activities qualified him to be a true gentleman. 
Moreover, here Confucius’s irony aims at constructing a sense of moral equality, and it 
reminds us of the fact that his idealized persona o f a gentleman as a moral being has 
encouraged Confiicians of many generations in the East. Who can deny its power, 
originating from the democratic spirit o f the Confucian dialogues?
The most remarkable irony of the Confucian dialogues is expressed in his 
statement regarding the purpose of education and the democratic spirit of his educational 
practice. In fact, Confucius never intended to be a teacher, and he is basically an ardent 
social reformer and a versatile scholar. His engagement in opening the first Chinese 
private school came as a result of his failure to win a commanding place in administration.
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Naturally, education became a method for him to train qualified administrators, to help 
eliminate social chaos, and to make his dream of bringing out the benevolent 
administration under the rule of a sage-king come true. For such a purpose, Confucius in 
his dialogues insists on intense study, hard training and persistent personal cultivation of 
his disciples. His criticism of the laziness, stupidity and narrow-mindedness on the part of 
some of his disciples demonstrates his understanding that only a few people can finally 
assume the high responsibility of state administration. In general, Confucius’s social and 
educational reform attempts to develop the sensitivity of his disciples to moral corruption 
and political disorder, and also to enhance their loyalty and sincerity for the aristocratic 
bureaucracy represented by the Western Zhou dynasty. This moral education helps 
maintain stability, cooperation and harmony, but such a moral tradition has often been 
employed to suffocate and obstruct personal development, individual freedom and social 
democracy in the following historical period of China, for it cements the accepted 
hierarchical stratification and discourages any verbal or ideological challenge to the 
existing social system. In this sense, Confucius’s educational theory is in accordance with 
political conservatism. Ironically, Confucius’s educational practice in the form of 
dialogues and classroom discussions displays much democratic spirit, which may be 
represented in the following three aspects.
To begin with, Confucius declared that “In education there is no separation into 
categories” (Ch. 15.39). With this declaration, Confucius implies that everyone has the 
right to education, regardless of his birth, age and economic status. That is why he
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enrolled students not only from the aristocratic families, but also from poor families. As 
he admitted, he “never denies instruction to anyone who, of his own accord, has given me 
so much as a bundle of dried meat as a present” (Ch. 7.7). Such a principle of enrollment 
follows from Confucius’s belief that he would undertake to make his disciples into 
gentlemen through education so long as the disciples themselves are ready to seek 
knowledge and to practice self-cultivation. This Confucian practice is actually at odds 
with then current education, because in Confucius’s time only those from the families of 
the aristocracy could afford to have tutors at home. Children from poor families were 
denied the right to basic education, to say nothing of the advanced learning of literature, 
history, philosophy, music and mathematics. The irony lies in the fact that this education 
of commoners marks the first appearance of democratic ideas in early China, although 
Confucius’s practice is intended to provide the authoritarian states of the time with a few 
morally and intellectually qualified administrators or elites. His advocacy of educational 
democratic practice, in turn, facilitates his use of irony, for the more students he taught 
from poor families, the more interests of the lower classes could be represented, and the 
closer the society would move toward his ideal of Way.
Second, Confucius encouraged a dialogic interpretation o f philosophical and moral 
exploration among his disciples, which has also been described as an “intellectual 
democracy.”26 Confucius makes efforts to get the moral issues mutually defined in 
discussions with his disciples in order to broaden their vision of moral knowledge, and 
eventually, to learn to “speak their own mind” (Ch. 11.26) and to attune their thinking to
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the changing situation. In fact, Confucius himself is exemplary of such an exploration.
For instance, “benevolence” ( ) is a kernel topic of his moral education. When
discussing this topic with his disciples, Confucius provides different answers and 
interpretations. He posits Li (rites) as the major method to achieve “benevolence” in 
response to Yanyuan’s question (Ch. 12.1). To Fanchi, he explained “benevolence” from 
the perspective of “love” (Ch. 12.22). When Zizhang expressed his curiosity for the same 
topic, Confucius stressed the five qualities—respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness in 
word, quickness and generosity—as the characteristics of “benevolence” (Ch. 17.6). In his 
answer to Zigong, Confucius focused on the quality of Shu ( , reciprocity) that would
facilitate interpersonal relations for the common goal of “benevolence” (Ch. 17.6 ). The 
above theoretical inconsistency and discursive interpretations actually aim to promote the 
dynamic responses of his disciples and suggest the rich implications of a concept of 
humanism that can hardly be confined to one “authoritative” description, because 
“benevolence” as a moral ideal of Confucius has to be reflected in “different languages” 
(Bahktin) for its addressivity to different occasions, persons and times. On the other hand, 
in giving different answers, Confucius is also attuning himself to the needs and capabilities 
of particular disciples of his. So, his exploration of “benevolence” displays some 
democratic spirit in his intellectual activities. However, such spirit is discouraged in the 
political context where non-benevolent administration is pervasive, because Confucius 
argues for “non-dialogical contact” with those who hold different moral standards (Ch. 
15.40). Confucius’s ironical representation is again appropriated in a dialogic reading of
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his rhetorical situation, and he seems to suggest that intellectual activities can hardly 
proceed wherever an “authoritative” voice is intended to acquire its dominance.
Last but not least, Confucius’s democratic ideas are expressed in his 
understanding that moral exploration is an inward process of contemplation and 
purification, which stands against any imposed forces from the outside. Therefore, the 
dialogue in the form of questions and answers proves to be most effective in moral 
education, for it helps the participants to develop a sense o f equality, to clarify their 
confusions about the moral issues concerning the task of “rectifying others” ( JE/ ^ )  and 
“purifying the self’ ( ) ,  and more importantly, to increase the awareness that moral 
elevation for an individual, although a task for personal development, is always consistent 
with social advance, and should be in dialogue with the interests of community.
Intriguing to the modem mind, Confucius’s democratic spirit in his educational practice 
presents an enduring irony in view of his political claim of a totalized feudal kingdom, for 
his moral theory can hardly provide an explanation about how the current feudal social 
system, based on the hierarchical order, may secure an inward process of moral 
purification that values moral equality. On the other hand, the ironical effect of the 
Confucian moral equality is manifest for its claim to both a sense of social responsibility 
and a passion for self-moral elevation in contrast to that of early Western philosophers 
who are usually focused on the democratic right of individuals.
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111. The Use of Irony in Socratic Dialogue
Compared with Confucius’s dialogue, Socrates’s dialogue is also presented in the 
form of irony, and is generally referred to as the first manifestation of an ironic rhetorical 
device in the West. As a master of ironic language, Socrates revealed his wisdom in a 
paradoxical presentation of the topics of knowledge, piety, life and death, and his 
philosopher-king in opposition to the Athenian democracy. My exploration will first study 
how Socrates’s confession of ignorance is employed to illuminate his true knowledge of 
human limitation, but is never paralleled by admission of moral inadequacy. Then, I will 
concentrate on Socrates’s claim of piety in contrast to his refusal to prove the existence of 
the supernatural and his reluctance to identify himself with the rest of the god-believers 
among the Athenians. Finally, I will touch upon a rarely discussed topic concerning 
Socrates’s historical attitude toward the concept of democracy and the ironical effect that 
highlights the democratic spirit in his rhetorical performance. A dialogic reading of the 
above ironical aspects in Socrates’s dialogues is intended to argue that Socratic irony, 
similar to that of Confucius, presents not only the seemingly contradictory elements of 
moral issues, but also functions as a reconciling power27 that fuses the paradox and 
ambiguity into wholeness; it addresses the rhetorical situations of his verbal activity and 
also responds to the philosophical or moral exploration of his soul.
Let us start our discussion about the irony in Socrates’s dialogues on knowledge 
and ignorance. The principal revelation of his life-long investigation, according to 
Socrates, is that he proves to be the wisest man, because he is the only person who
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realizes his own ignorance. Such an ironic confession of ignorance actually starts from the 
Apology and other Socratic dialogues.28 Having examined a politician, Socrates 
concluded:
...At any rate it seems that I am wiser than he is in just this respect; that I do not 
think that I do know what I do not know. (2Id)
Then, he examined poets and craftsmen, and identified what makes him wiser than them
with what makes him wiser than the politicians. The conclusion is that the people he
examined all lack the knowledge about “the thing of supreme importance.” What is “the
thing of supreme importance?” The following is Socrates’s explanation:
If any of you dispute this and professed to care about these things, I shall not at 
once let him go or leave him; but I shall question him and test him; and if it appears 
to me that in spite of his profession he has made no real progress toward 
goodness, I shall reprove him for neglecting what is o f supreme importance, and 
giving his attention to trivialities. (30a)
So, the thing of supreme importance is goodness—virtue, because it is goodness that
“brings wealth and every other blessing, both to the individual and to the polis.” Here,
Socrates, like Confucius, emphasized the moral aspect of knowledge. Socrates is wiser
that the poets, politicians and craftsmen who falsely believe that they knew about the most
important part of knowledge—goodness. Socrates’s argument makes visible the ambiguity
in the knowledge structure of his examinees. The edge of his irony cuts further when he
hints that even these people do realize their ignorance of the knowledge of goodness.
They are not yet as wise as Socrates himself, for their recognition might well be the result
of general skepticism. In the meantime, the Socratic type of ignorance is ironically
reflected in an awareness of his lack of the expert knowledge rather than craftsman
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knowledge, that is, the knowledge of how to arouse the moral consciousness among the 
people, of how to call attention to the god of Love whose wisdom is far superior to that of 
the human beings, and of how to bring to light the limitation of human cognition, in order 
to help people seek truth and goodness. Only in this sense can people truly understand 
that Socrates’s apparently “audacious” profession of being the wisest aims at the goodness 
and benefits of his interlocutors and audience. His claim for wisdom is, by nature, 
altruistic rather than egocentric. Thus, due to his dialogic understanding of a relation of 
his discourse to audience, the seemingly conflicting elements, such as ignorance and 
wisdom, craftsman knowledge and expert knowledge, men and god, self and other, are 
eventually fused in his on-going philosophical exploration, the process of which is 
appropriately represented in an irony that denies any monologized or partial description of 
an otherwise “double-voiced” dialogue.
What still confuses modem readers is the question of why Socrates should 
humiliate his examinees by denying their wisdom in developing self-consciousness. The 
answer may be found in Socrates’s dialogic interpretation of different stages of human 
cognition. That is, human wisdom starts from a basic understanding of human ignorance. 
This recognition is not a static existence. Instead, it is responsive to the process of human 
intellectual activities, for it stimulates those who seek human wisdom to overcome 
“ignorance” and get nearer to “knowledge” through continuous verbal encounters with 
others.
By describing the Socratic ignorance as an active process, I intend to point out 
two significant implications of this concept. First, at different stages of human cognition,
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it is with the realization of being ignorant that the man becomes highly motivated for being 
knowledgeable and moves toward a higher level o f intellectuality. In other words, 
wherever a man develops some true knowledge in a certain field or on a certain topic, he 
may possibly become more aware of his ignorance of something new. Second, ignorance 
and wisdom/knowledge are, in Socrates’s philosophy, not two distinctly separated 
domains; they are mutually defined, and on certain conditions they are interchangeable, 
functioning the same way as Confucius’s concepts of “knowing”(£<? ) and “not knowing”
). To be exact, the confession of one’s ignorance is an indication of his wisdom, 
but the unawareness of one’s ignorance leads to the poverty in one’s wisdom. Here, 
Socrates’s irony lies in a logical inference that the wisest man is often the one who is the 
most sensitive to human ignorance, and who is never afraid of having it pointed out. By 
the same token, his examinees who deny their ignorance actually deny a continuous 
philosophical exploration that may lead to true knowledge and wisdom, and eventually 
make themselves the victims of ignorance and prejudice.
Certainly, for a moral philosopher, it is a much harder task to bring to light the 
ignorance of others than to make a self-confession of his own ignorance, for true wisdom 
is achieved in the process of clearing the ignorance, confusion and ambiguity of the moral 
issues and moving along the divine cause of the god. And it is even more embarrassing for 
Socrates to display his “supreme” wisdom in the face of a group of people who are forced 
to identify themselves with those unable to recognize their own ignorance. Such a
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philosopher needs courage and wisdom. For Socrates, he needs the courage to face the 
negative response from the Athenians who would make a life-and-death decision on his 
trial, and simultaneously, he is expected to reveal his wisdom to handle a situation in 
which he was already in a vulnerable position.
To help himself out of the dilemma and to defend his moral philosophy, Socrates 
takes irony as a rhetorical strategy to ensure a dialogue between himself and his audience 
and between a profession of wisdom and a disavowal of knowledge. That is the reason 
Socrates often denies being a teacher by profession. His divine mission to seek the moral 
truth with his interlocutors has prevented him from any practice in the form of instruction, 
and he is led to the method of provocation. As Vlastos observes, “as instrument of 
Socratic teaching this irony” is “to tease, mock, perplex” a learner “into seeking truth.”29 
This observation reaches the nature of Socrates’s moral dialogues in the form of questions 
and answers, but it obscures a distinct relation between Socrates and otherness, that helps 
himself to overcome “ignorance” and reach wisdom. The rhetorical power of Socratic 
irony lies in its complexity. The question and answer, argument and counter-argument in 
Socrates’s Apology and other moral dialogues are not only provocative to the 
understanding of his interlocutors, but also provocative to his own imagination and 
exploration. This bi-directional function of Socrates’s irony helps defend the sincerity in 
his disclaimer of knowledge and gain credit for his wisdom.
The rhetorical power of Socratic irony here also comes from his paradoxical 
representation of his mysticism. It is in view of divine wisdom, the transcendence of the
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god, that Socrates is often kept conscious of his ignorance, his limitation in moral 
knowledge, and that he values the knowledge-seeking in this world and longs for his 
continuous philosophical exploration in the afterlife with his followers. So, my next topic 
will be on Socrates’s ironical attitude toward piety and his indifference to the Athenian 
god-believers.
Throughout his dialogues irony is often heard in Socrates’s confession of piety and 
his refusal to identify himself with the religion of the rest of the Athenians. Piety, as we 
know, refers to human reverence for God or devout fulfillment of religious obligations. 
Being a philosopher himself, Socrates, like Confucius and many other ancient 
philosophers, has to respond to the concepts of gods and the mysterious power o f the 
universe. He is, to a modem eye, a believer in gods, though in his own way. However, 
based on his recognition of ignorance, Socrates does not find himself in a good position to 
express plainly and accurately what his god and his piety really are and why his religious 
claims sound in discord with those of other Athenian believers. This seemingly 
paradoxical structure is obscured and moderated in his ironic presentation, which reflects 
Socrates’s wisdom, but unfortunately, drives him to a disastrous end, for he was 
convicted, tried and executed on the charge that he was impious by the conventional 
criteria of the Athenians.
Let us once again listen to the last words of Socrates before he concludes his 
defense in the Apology:
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I stand charged with impiety by Meletus here. Surely it is obvious that if I tried 
to persuade you and prevail upon you by my entreaties to go against your solemn 
oath, I should be teaching you contempt for religion; and by my veiy defense I 
should be virtually accusing myself of having no religious belief. But that is very 
far from truth. I have a more sincere belief, gentlemen, than any o f my accusers; 
and I leave it to you and to God to judge me in whatever way should be best for 
me and for yourself. (35d)
In the above speech, Socrates carried out a defense30 for his piety in a dialogic imagination
of different voices striving for a judgement over the dispute. He first presented a
contradiction between his innocent, true “self’ and an alienated “self,” a distortion of his
image generated by his accusers. His belief in God is not only reflected in his lifelong
practice of a religious mission assigned by the gods of Delphi (20e-23c) but also in a
repeatedly voiced claim of his communication with the divinity ever since his childhood.
This kind of spiritual contract with God can be traced in the Apology (3 Id), Phado
(242c), Euthydemus (272e), Republic (I. 496c), Phaedrus (242b) and Euthyphro (3b).
Contrary to his true “self,” the distorted “self’ of Socrates as portrayed in the formal
charge against him should discourage his audience from following any true religious belief.
Besides, such a charge against Socrates is apparently nowhere to be proved. Thus
demonstrated, Socrates was able to further address the accusation of his impiety with a
religious plea for a fair judgement of his case by God. It is clear that his plea itself is a
strong verbal defense of his obedience to God’s will.
Finally, his imagination attempted to create a dialogue between God and the jurors
by reminding the latter that their judgement should be responsive to God’s intention in
order to justify their own piety. Such a defense actually displays Socrates’s ironic
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intention of exposing a discrepancy between his pious religiousness responsive to God’s 
voice and the Athenian illusion of their piety influenced by the ancient mythology, and also 
of using the concept of piety as a double-edged sword which points to the religious 
attitude of both the accusers and the jurors in the process of the trial.
By emphasizing the aspect o f Socrates’s piety, I do not imply that Socrates 
successfully freed himself of the two formal charges against him, namely, he did not 
believe in “the gods recognized by the State” and that he believed in new “supernatural 
things of his own invention” (Apology, 24b). According to recent studies by Vlastos and 
Connors,31 a certain national and naturalistic tendency to reconstruct the divinity started in 
Ionian physiologia and also found its echo in Socrates’s philosophical exploration. What 
attracts the interest of a rhetorical study is, however, not the revolutionary spirit in 
Socrates’s moral philosophy, but his ironical strategy, which enables him to stand on his 
own in his divine mission and also to ridicule the conventional and rigid interpretation of 
piety. Actually, Socrates’s own understanding of piety itself constitutes an ironical 
structure, as Kierkegaard states, “Socrates’ ignorance was a kind of fear and worship o f 
God so that his ignorance was the Greek version of the Jewish saying: the fear of the Lord 
is the beginning of wisdom.”32 Here, Kierkegaard seems to suggest that it is not a lack of 
information or evidence, but a mixture of worship and fear of God that accounts for the 
irony of Socrates’s piety. Such an ironical presentation in the form of paradoxical passion 
rejects any argument about evidence or nature of God and sheds some light on Socrates’s 
self-knowledge33 of a moralistic interpretation o f God. In the Euthyphro, Socrates
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demands of Euthyphro, “Show me what benefit for the gods eventuates from the 
donations which they receive from us. It’s clear to anybody what they contribute, because 
nothing is good for us except what comes from them . . . ” (15a). We are convinced that 
gods are virtuous and benevolent because they give human beings everything good and 
never care about how they can benefit from their benefactees. So, Socrates’s gods are the 
supernatural force of virtues and that is the reason they are worshiped by the god- 
believers.
In the Meno, Socrates again praised the “divine influence, inspired and possessed 
by divinity,” that guaranteed the virtuous words and deeds of the priests, prophets, poets 
and statesmen, and stressed the communication between man and god in the form of 
divine inspiration and dispensation (99b- 100b). While expressing his admiration for the 
omniscience of God, Socrates also reveals man’s fear and anxiety as the result of a failure 
to know himself, to admit his self-deception and to possess an ability of imagination. In 
the Apology, Socrates has convinced his listeners that his self-knowledge of God makes it 
possible for him to act “in obedience to God’s commands given in oracles and dreams and 
in every way that any other divine dispensation has ever impressed a duty upon man”
(33c), and such a God’s command possesses power to make people virtuous by 
developing their wisdom, because Socrates, like Confiicius, tends to perceive God 
(Providence) as a moral force in one’s self-knowledge that is superior to any human 
wisdom and human virtue. This acknowledgment of the existence of gods is rational 
enough to keep a mortal soul in a dilemma when he is experiencing a confused feeling of
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admiration and awe for the god, and when he is seeking the channel to reach the god 
through “the inwardness of self-activity” in opposition to the temptation to identify himself 
with the rest of the Athenian god-believers.
As I mentioned earlier, Socrates’s irony is also directed at conventional religious 
beliefs. Socrates is forced to meet the challenge of his accusers, and to defend himself for 
not believing in the gods “the State recognizes.” Socratic wisdom has been well tested 
and fully expressed through his ironical approach in his argument. On the one hand, 
nowhere in his dialogues has Socrates confessed that he is in agreement with the Athenian 
traditional conception of the gods. On the other hand, Socrates makes inexhaustible 
efforts to display a type of piety in his own definition. Specifically, Socrates presents the 
gods as “wise,” “practical” and “moral” beings (Brickhouse and Smith, 1994, 182) in 
order to prove that he is the last person who wants to corrupt or destroy the youth of 
Athens. Instead of making any direct comments on the Greek mythical portraying of “civil 
war among the gods, and fearful hostility and battles, and so on—the kind of thing 
described by the poets and depicted by fine artists” (Euthyphro, 7b-c), Socrates moves 
headfirst toward a moralistic transformation of the gods. According to Socrates’s 
dialogical exploration (in the Apology, Euthyphro, Meno, or Republic), the gods are 
omniscient and benevolent supernatural beings, and any irrational presentation of the gods 
(to create disagreements between the gods and man) brings nothing beneficial to moral 
education, and also shakes the foundation of true piety, for “ordinary people do not know” 
these “wonderful things” {Euthyphro, 6b) and philosophers like Socrates “find it very
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difficult to accept” (6b). Socrates’s cross-examination in the Euthyphro further suggests 
that the traditional or sophistic interpretation of the gods can hardly account for some 
reasonable relations between the gods and believers, between the holiness of the divinity 
and the “science of sacrifice and prayer” o f human beings (14b-16a). And it becomes 
inevitable that Socrates began to challenge this kind of mythical presentation of the gods 
and the narrow articulation of piety in his later dialogues. The ironical tone of Socrates 
over the issues of divinity and piety does not aim to launch a severe attack on the 
religiousness of the Athenians. Instead, it makes clear his reluctance to identify himself 
with the Athenian god-believers, and helps to glorify his “service to the gods” rather than 
“the gods of the State” by awakening a consciousness among the ordinary people o f the 
moral force of the gods.
Now, as the last goal, my rhetorical study will demonstrate irony in Socrates’s 
dialogues, which reconciles his statements sympathetic to the oligarchic faction and his 
hostile attitude toward a constitutional democracy in an atmosphere of partisan politics 
and constant foreign and civil wars, with his democratic ideas in favor o f the Athenian law, 
the freedom of verbal activities, and equality in the discussion of his moral dialogues. For 
a long time, there has been a scholarly debate over the topic of Socrates’s anti-democratic 
viewpoints supported by the textual evidence of his dialogues, which enticed the critics to 
classify Socrates among those against the Greek democracy.34 This classification is, 
however, often refuted by other textual evidence and Socrates’s own philosophical and 
rhetorical claims, which display Socratic irony in representing his understanding of 
democracy.
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Did Socrates express any hostility to the democratic practice of the Athenian polis? 
The answer is positive, for Socrates’s arguments were often directed against the principles 
of the democratic constitution of Athens. In Socrates’s time, the government of Athens 
was operated by “the many,” and judicial decisions were made by a simple majority o f 
hundreds of jurors, citizens who were selected by lot, regardless of their wealth, 
education, capability or experience. Socrates, as an advocate of a government ruled by 
the moral elite, is certainly contemptuous of this uneducated motley crowd. In the Crito, 
he bitterly attacked the claim “that we must consider popular opinion about what is just 
and honorable and good, or the opposite” (48a), and he ridiculed those “ordinary people, 
who think nothing of putting people to death, and would bring them back to life if they 
could, with equal indifference to reason” (48c). With a stress on the topic of 
justice/injustice, Socrates becomes absolutely conclusive in his dialogue with Crito upon 
the argument that a moral philosopher should always take expert advice rather than 
majority advice, and a man with wisdom should not value all the opinions that people 
hold, but only some on a selective base. Upon a discussion of Socrates’s hostile opinion 
of the democratic principle o f rule by “the many,” one should also be keen on the ironical 
effect of his argument. Socrates points to the absurdity of a blind support o f “the many” 
by raising another democratic principle: valuing and protecting “the few,” even in the 
critical situation when his own life is endangered because of the Athenian prejudice against 
the opinion of the few. Through his ironic representation of a rhetorical encounter
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between “the many” and “the few,” between “all” and “some,” Socrates was able to make 
visible to his interlocutors and modern readers not only the significance of the democratic 
right of “the few” but also the partiality of the Athenian concept of democracy that 
suffocated the voice of the few, and obscured the standards for justice/injustice.
Another question needs to be addressed: whether Socratic dialogue expressed any 
preference for the Athenian democratic constitution. In view of the contradictory 
responses to the question,35 I tend to follow Vlastos’s argument for Socrates, mainly 
because of his insight into Socrates’s self-address, “You will depart, wronged not by us, 
the laws, but by men” (Crito, 54b-c). Socrates’ defense points to his accusers and jurors 
rather than the laws, and his rhetorical practice under the principle of “defend or obey” has 
further evidenced his favorable attitude toward the Athenian judicial system, though he 
never once idealized this system. Differing from Vlastos, I would like to point out the 
consistency in Socrates’s dialogic imagining of the Athenian laws, and the authority of 
justice as a moral being in one’s spiritual world and one’s afterlife. It seems, to Socrates, 
that the Athenian laws, the form of the Athenian democracy, are connected with and 
defined by “the Laws of Hades,” and that is why if Socrates attempts an escape from the 
jail, he not only destroys the authority of the Athenian laws, but also violates moral 
principles in the form of the Laws of Hades. Accordingly, he would be rejected by the 
divinity, and presumably be punished in the court of morality and justice, because his 
dialogic imagination of a divine voice has convinced him that the Athenian laws are both a 
political being that maintains social justice, and a moral being that tests obedience and
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fidelity to his state. Moreover, the Athenian laws are used to judge the prosecuted and the 
prosecutor, and meanwhile, also to test those law-executors. Though he values his right 
for a public defense, Socrates never intends to stand against the authority of the laws—the 
symbol of the Athenian democracy. His choice to be executed rather than to be helped 
out of the jail also indicates that he is morally justified to face the judges of the 
Underworld in his afterlife, for he has not only followed all the legal procedures of the 
Athenian laws, but also maintained his moral integrity by displaying a consistent loyalty to 
the state in his life and afterlife. Here, Socrates’s irony in expressing his attitude to the 
Athenian democratic constitution once again presents him as the victim of an impossible 
and inevitable situation.
Not totally by coincidence, Socrates’s democratic spirit, like that of Confucius, is 
most fully reflected in his theory and practice of moral education. To begin with, the 
Socratic dialogues, as I mentioned earlier, aim at the promotion of human wisdom, an 
awakening of moral consciousness among the ordinary people. Being a street 
philosopher, Socrates engaged himself in discussions with all kinds of people, scholar and 
craftsman, aged and young, friend and enemy alike. Ironically, Socrates always disclaims 
his function as a teacher, and he maintains in the Protagoras (319a-328d) and Meno (92d- 
94e) that virtue is not teachable, because no one possesses expertise in virtue. This 
understanding of moral education is directly opposed to the popular democratic belief of 
Athens that all people teach virtue to their children. Yet, this apparently arbitrary 
conclusion is drawn on the basis of Socrates’s democratic assessment of the potentiality of
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human cognition. Like Confucius, Socrates regarded moral education as chiefly a process 
of self-knowledge and self-education. This revolutionary spirit in establishing self- 
confidence points to the true moral value of the oracular statement to “Know Thyself.” 
When he and Polus were involved in a debate over the topic of the function o f rhetoric 
and orators in the Gorgias (466a-480e), Socrates interpreted the saying “Know Thyself’ 
to mean that human beings should not only recognize through a philosophical examination 
what they really believe and feel, but also, what is a good, virtuous and happy life. 
Therefore, to know oneself is far from merely a course of development of cognitive ability; 
rather, it is a course of moral cultivation and personal perfection. We are able to infer that 
the freedom of human beings is to be obtained through such a self-discovery, and the seed 
of democracy is planted in the people who follow Socrates’s belief that everyone can 
grasp philosophical truth if they can use their innate reason to reach the “correct insight.” 
Thus, Socrates’s understatement of his function as a teacher helps intensify his ironic 
intention to foreground the concept of self-knowledge and self-teaching in moral 
education.
Besides, Socrates’s rhetorical method itself comprises a democratic understanding 
of the freedom of a philosophical inquiry. Critics of high repute never fail to call attention 
to the Socratic irony in the form of “Socratic deception,” but few of them have observed 
the democratic spirit of his dialogic intention to encourage the interaction between 
speakers and interlocutors, between interlocutors themselves, and also between a problem 
and its solutions. Instead of deceiving his interlocutors, Socrates encouraged the
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participants in his dialogue to discuss, listen, clarify or question the thinking of others. For 
instance, Socrates used to say that he functioned as a “midwife of ideas” (Gorgias), for a 
midwife does not herself give birth to a child, but she is present to help during its delivery. 
He places emphasis on the practice of the moral issues raised by all the other participants 
or himself, because philosophical inquiry, to Socrates, is such a divine mission that is 
carried out in the interests of all the participants and of the Athenians as a whole. This is 
why Socrates often shifts the attention from the interpersonal conflict to the exchange of 
viewpoints about common concerns. As a result, such an intellectual democracy has 
generally guaranteed that the arguments are clarified and tested. The interaction becomes 
highly knowledgeable and morally illuminating to all the participants, even in the situation 
where those interlocutors are basically his philosophical opponents. It is my hypothesis 
that one of the purposes of Socratic dialogues is to confront the Athenian tradition of 
democracy—the rule by the many—with his democratic interpretation of moral education— 
to improve the moral status of the general public through free dialogues and discussions.
IV. A Comparative Study of Confucius’s 
and Socrates’s Ironic Representation
So far I have made a brief survey of the theoretical studies of irony, and presented 
a dialogic reading of irony in Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogues about the concepts of 
knowledge, piety and democratic spirit. My comparative study of the two ancient ironists 
is intended to demonstrate how a tone of irony enables them to realize their philosophical 
representation and rhetorical strategy at the early stage of Chinese and Greek civilizations,
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and how an ironic structure creates a cross-cultural dialogue about general moral 
principles that most interest them, and finally how such intertextual comparison, in 
accordance with the Bakhtinian dialogic imagination, responds to moral dilemmas we still 
face and denies a monologized meaning that claims its own completion in an era full of 
irony.
It is surprisingly illuminating that both Confucius and Socrates have used a tone of 
irony to represent a mosaic of rich and diverse interpretations of their world. They have 
developed a dialogic reading of discursive social and ideological representations as a 
“hetereoglossia” of discourses—a philosopher or Zeren ( ,  literally meaning “man of 
wisdom” or “philosopher”) has to negotiate not only different audiences, but also the 
variety of meanings striving for expression. Irony, as a rhetorical method in their verbal 
activities, facilitates, in one way or another, their philosophical inquiry. In Confucius’s 
case, an ironical approach is often an implicit application o f his rhetorical strategy, for he 
highly values the moral principle of being sincere and conscientious in a speech or a 
dialogue. His search for knowledge (Zhi, &  ) starts from two major premises: few men 
were bom with knowledge and true knowledge is obtained in human recognition of 
“knowing” and “not knowing.” As a moral idealist, Confucius extends his imagination to 
establish a “zero category”36 of the superiority of human knowledgeability. This category 
addresses conventional worship of the “superman” or the sage as a spiritual existence, and 
it also points to the ignorance of learners in general, because his interlocutors are thus 
urged to realize the gap between a superior knowledgeability and their own limitations. In
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view of such a use of the irony in knowledge, Confucius displayed an attitude against 
agnosticism. With his second premise, Confucius emphasized the addressivity (Bakhtin) 
of two seemingly contradictory concepts of “knowing” and “not knowing,” and this 
philosophical inquiry of the dialogical (or verbal) activities of the learning process 
expressed Confucius’s understanding of a moral principle in one’s quest for knowledge, 
and real knowledge that comes from a learner’s recognition of what he does know and 
what he does not. The dramatic effect is achieved through the double meaning of the 
same word, Zhi (-f'a ), for it conveys both the meaning “to seek, to realize” and the 
meaning of “knowledge, wisdom,” and thus foregrounds both the process and purpose of 
the learning process. This is where Confucius’s wisdom lies.
Comparatively, Socrates’s ironical representation of knowledge also starts from a 
recognition of human ignorance, and his concept of ignorance is similar to Confucius’s 
“not knowing,” for both are articulated through a verbal claim, based on self-knowledge, 
and used to stimulate the human passion for seeking and realizing something unknown. 
However, Socrates’s irony in representing human ignorance is also intended to account for 
the superiority of his philosophical and dialogical method, and to prove that he is the 
wisest man.37 Though he is able to negotiate the two contradictory claims, being ignorant 
and being the wisest, within his framework of epistemology, he is destined to affront and 
victimize his interlocutors and audience, for his distinction between wisdom and 
knowledge, between craftsman knowledge and expert knowledge, mocks the commonly 
accepted moral principle that wisdom is obtained in an accumulative process of search for
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knowledge, and that craftsman knowledge and expert knowledge are complementary 
rather than conflicting elements in the building of human wisdom. Consequently, Socrates 
himself is ridiculed and victimized when he infringes on the basic rule in verbal exchange 
that values wisdom in identifying the rhetor with his interlocutors and audience in 
intellectual activities, and that also insists on a broader comprehension of human 
knowledge.
This dialogic representation of Socrates’s irony also throws light on Confucius’s 
ironical reflection on knowledge. Once, his disciple, Fan Chi, asked to be taught how to 
grow crops and vegetables. Confucius immediately disclaimed any knowledge of crops 
and vegetables. In addition, he denied the usefulness of such knowledge for a gentleman, 
and criticized Fan Chi as a “small man” who should concentrate on “craftsman 
knowledge” only (Ch. 13.4). In an era when human survival was entirely dependent on 
agriculture, Confucius’s indifference to such basic knowledge is ironically defined by his 
self-claimed enthusiasm for Zhi (-£«*, knowledge), for he portrayed himself as a life-long 
seeker for knowledge regardless of poverty, hardships and old age (Ch. 7.19). His verbal 
irony is further responded to by those hermits who criticized him as both lazy and ignorant 
of knowledge of grains (Ch. 18.7). The display of an ironical structure in Confucius’s and 
Socrates’s self-knowledge does not, however, diminish the power of their epistemological 
concepts. Instead, irony as a rhetorical strategy not only facilitates their dialogues about 
knowledge, but also helps demonstrate the reconciling effects resulting from an 
intertextual dialogues between them, and from an interaction between their dialogues and 
our acceptance.
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If we regard Confucius’s and Socrates’s opinions in their construction of 
knowledge as an intentional verbal irony that begins with human ignorance but ends with 
general knowledge and wisdom of philosophy, we may frame their dialogues concerning 
their piety and democratic spirit in terms of a situational irony where the authorial 
intention of irony is defined and completed by the contexts and situations.38 Certainly, 
here I intend to extend the situational irony to include the dialogic relations between 
rhetor and text, discourse and imagination, and text and situation. In the situation of an 
early civilization of about two millenniums ago, Confucius and Socrates could hardly 
avoid a dilemma: on the one hand, they were confined by an epistemological inability to 
provide a satisfactory explanation of the power of nature and the supernatural; on the 
other, their philosophical exploration made it hard for them to follow the conventional 
description of the supernatural. Therefore, they have to address a topic which was 
actually beyond human knowledge ancient or modem, and which situated their dialogues 
in an intrinsic irony. In Confucius’s case, he generally accepts conventional belief in the 
gods and spirits, but instead of teaching and discussing anything theological, he tries to 
transform the traditional religious belief into his moral philosophy (Ch. 5.13). In other 
words, the religious belief in his philosophical and rhetorical structure functions as moral 
existence that helps to cultivate “the virtue of common people” , Ch. 1.9), and to
facilitate the communication between the supernatural and the human beings through 
imagination. Specifically, Confucius’s piety addresses three components of the 
supernatural force: gods, spirits, and heaven. Since his dialogical practice leads him to the
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conclusion that one could hardly prove the existence o f the supernatural (Ch. 11.12), 
Confucius tends to interpret the supernatural as moral existence or moral force that denies 
the meaning of a detailed investigation, but can be described and understood in the 
situation where it conducts, as an omnipresent power, the moral education of the ordinary 
people and encourages, as a means of communication, the dialogic imagination for the 
gentleman in his spiritual purification.39
Similarly, Socrates also refuses to prove the existence of the gods of the State. 
Moreover, his dialogic reading of the divinity as a virtuous force prevents him from any 
possible identification with the rest of Athenian god-believers, which puts his philosophical 
inquiry and rhetorical activity in a situation entirely different from that of Confucius. 
Socrates’ defense of his piety has been ironical, for his confession o f a dialogic imagination 
of the divine force always portrays him to be a non-believer of the Athenian gods. So, 
Socrates’ rhetoric of piety is basically ego-centric and results in the distinction of the 
revolutionary spirit of a tragic hero, because he never sought any compromise with his 
interlocutors and audience. His defense of piety only perfected his dialogic imagination 
and fulfilled his spiritual journey, but found him a tragic ironist as a victim of the Athenian 
piety. Comparatively, Confucius’s interpretation of piety, although somewhat 
contradictory with the conventional belief, is generally society-oriented, and ends in a 
harmonious unity between the supernatural force and moral elevation o f humans. That is 
why his rhetorical approach to religious topics often produces both ironical and comic 
effects,40 which certainly much enhances his persuasive power.
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As to Confucius’s and Socrates’s attitude toward democracy, irony in their 
dialogue is also defined and completed by their situation, and moreover, it is highly 
responsive to the democratic movement of our time. Confucius’s democratic spirit in the 
dialogue about his political, ethical and educational claims has long been misrepresented 
either in the interests o f the later feudal rulers or due to the prejudice of a large number of 
Confucian scholars in and out o f China. Ever since the May Fourth Movement in 1919,41 
Confucius’s theoretical system has often been portrayed to be in opposition to the 
democratic movement o f modem China. A rhetorical study of his dialogues and 
speeches, however, demonstrates that Confucius’s presentation of the government based 
on the principle of “benevolence” ) and dominated by the “gentleman” -J- ), and 
his educational theory and practice tremendously contribute to the democratic ideal of the 
Eastern world, though his democratic spirit is reflected in an ironic tonal relationship with 
his lifelong struggle for a social system characterized by the rule by a few elites and also 
by its hierarchical stratification. Comparatively, Socrates’s dialogues have also been 
misrepresented for his hostility to Athenian democracy, which prevents a dialogic 
representation of an ironical structure of his democratic spirit in his challenge to the rule 
by “the many” at the expense of “the few,” in his argument for the moral elevation of the 
Athenians through self-knowledge, and also in his defense sympathetic with the 
constitutional democracy—the Athenian Laws.
A dialogue between Confucius and Socrates seems to suggest that these two giant 
moral philosophers help lay a foundation for modem democracy in both the East and the
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West. Confucius’ rhetorical activities are intended to achieve a “subjective freedom”42 in 
the Hegelian sense by his moral education of benevolence for all the people, while 
Socrates’s verbal encounters encourage the freedom of speech in philosophical 
exploration, and an unconditional obedience to constitutional democracy. That is why 
20th century readers in the East, both representative neo-Confucianists43 and Marxist 
critics,44 are all engaged in the study of Confucius’s democratic spirit in his verbal 
activities. And in the West, scholars also make efforts to challenge the traditional 
interpretation of Socrates as an anti-democratic philosopher. Ironically, as Easterners turn 
an eye to the individual exploration of Socrates for his moral truth, some Westerners begin 
to examine the value of Confucianism in democratic society. This revival of interest in the 
democratic rhetoric of the ancient philosophers may produce even greater ironical effects 
when one is reminded of the fact that Confucius’s rhetoric has long been regarded as a 
source of Eastern oligarchic systems and Socrates’s dialogues actually led to his execution 
by the Athenian democracy.
Notes
1. See Brogan T. V.F. ed. The New Princeton Handbook o f Poetic Terms. 147-9.
2. Paradox, as a literary figure, unites seemingly contradictory elements but proves to 
have unexpected meaning. Schlegel followed Aristotle’s definition of irony and put irony 
under the category of paradox—a basic form of human experience (See Friedrich 
Schlegel’s Fragments. v2, n42. 152). However, contemporary theories of irony have 
gone far beyond the classical definition by Aristotle, and irony is rendered as a rhetorical 
structure that produced not only its verbal implication, but also its situational (Muecke), 
dialogic (Bakhtin), semiotic (de Man), authorial (Booth), receptional (Kaufer), or neo­
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pragmatic (Rorty) meaning. I tend to understand “paradox” as a type of irony, and irony 
itself represents a basic form of human experience, signifying human dilemma in a 
continuous interaction, with the other, both individual and communal.
3. For detailed discussion, See Muecke’s Irony. 66-77.
4. In his most influential essay on irony, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” Paul de Man 
insists that irony could be read as collapsed narrative, the narrative moves between two 
moments whose structures are mutually contradictory. See his essay in Interpretation: 
Theory and Practice. Ed. Charles S. Singleton. 173-209.
5. See Lin Yutang’s Wisdom o f Confucius. 1938. Also see his “Lun Kongzi de youmo” 
(On Confucius’s Humor) in his book of the same title. 45-52.
6. Christoph Harbsmeier has made a detailed study in his “Confucius Ridens: Humour in 
the Analects.”
7. The revival of interest in Confucianism goes hand in hand with the democratic 
movement in the East Asian countries like Korea and Singapore. And in China the 
discussion of Confucius’s democratic spirit also contributes to the political configuration 
of a slow but on-going democratic reform.
8. Here, Kao limits his description of irony within the concept o f a rhetorical figure 
rather than the concept of a rhetorical method. See Kao’s “Rhetoric.” The Indiana 
Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature. 134.
9. It is recorded in Liji. Yueji (< lisL iC '^£Ln ) that “Innovation (of knowledge) makes 
one a sage. And transmission (of knowledge) makes one achieve wisdom.” Similarly, 
Wang Chong, in Lunheng ( (gtcf) ) states, “Sages make innovation (of knowledge), 
and Good men make transmission (of knowledge).” See Wang Chong’s Lunheng.
10. When asked about the source of Confucius’s knowledge, his disciple, Zigong, 
emphasized that Confucius is good at learning from the past, and from others, and he does 
not have a constant teacher for him. See The Analects. (Ch. 19.22)
11. Tu Wei-ming states, “It is commonly assumed that Confucius was neither theistic nor 
atheistic, but to characterize his attitude towards God as agnostic is misleading.” See his 
Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual. 8.
12. D.C. Lau believes that this recording may not have much to do with Confucius except 
that it may have been used as teaching material in Confucius’s school. If this argument is 
valid, we may at least take for granted Confucius’s positive opinion of this kind of ancient
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prayer. See Lau’s notes in The Analects. 158.
13. Another provocative interpretation is that Confucius’s statement implies his 
disclaiming of the existence of gods and spirits. See Yang Baojun. 12.
14. See Yang and Kuang.
15. Religiousness in the modem sense is described as a persistent pursuit of a full 
comprehension and appreciation of “holiness,” and the “sacred of all the existing things, 
natural and supernatural.” See Alfred North Whitehead’s Modes o f Thought. 120.
16. My own translation. See Lu Xun’s essay “Lun leifengta de daota” (On the Collapse 
of Leifeng Pagoda).
17. This idea was further articulated and developed in Xun Zi’s (313-238 B.C.) Tiattlun 
(On Heaven). Also worth our attention is Confucius’s term of Tian ( ), which may 
either refer to heavenly principles as is in Ch. 3.13, or refer to the gods. I believe that 
Tian in the dialogue of Ch. 17.19 means the god or gods, because here Tian is a 
personified speaker, situated between humans and nature.
18. Confucius once talked to a subject of the state of Wei, “When you have offended 
against Heaven, there is nowhere you can turn to in your prayers” ( Ch. 3.13). Here, 
Confucius emphasizes the participation of gods or Heaven in the judgement of moral 
behavior in human society. Elsewhere Confucius also insists that gods would refuse to 
take care of those who fail to behave in accordance with the rites (e.g., Ch. 6.28 ).
19. In Zilu’s question, the word “death” ( )  actually refers to afterlife.
20. It is hard for us to find in The Analects a systematic representation of Confucius’s 
epistemology concerning theological issues. Here, also worth mentioning is that the 
ironical contrasts in Confucius’s dialogues may be interpreted as a matter of textual 
stratification, as well as of rhetorical strategy.
21. “Democracy” in the West traditionally emphasizes government by the people in the 
form of free election. But in modem use, “democracy” often denotes a claim for equal 
rights and an attitude against arbitrary differences of ranks or privilege ( OED, 1989). It is 
in the light of this idea of modem democracy that we are enabled to discern a democratic 
spirit in Confucius’s dialogue.
22. This idea is further developed in Confucius’s theory of naming. See my analysis in 
Chapter One.
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23. This is the term used by Lu Xun in his short story, “Kuangren riji” (Diary o f 
Madman).
24. Before Confucius, “gentleman” ( -J* ) generally referred to aristocrats and high 
officials. See Shangshu yin-i (An Interpretation of the Documents of Antiquity).
25. Six chi is equal to about one hundred and thirty eight centimeters.
26. H.G. Creel has raised such an original idea to describe Confucius’s contribution to the 
higher education of early China. See his Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao 
Zedong. 27-29.
27. Paul de Man has observed such a reconciling power in literary works, which helps to 
constitute the modes of a work. See his “Semiology and Rhetoric.”
28. In the Apology, Socrates made such a confession three times, and he made the same 
confession in Gorgias (509a4-6), Charmides (165b4-c2), Euthyphro (5a7-c5, 15e5-16a4), 
Laches (186b8-c5, 186d8-e3, 200e2-5); Lysis (212a4-7, 223b4-8); Hippias M ajor 
(286c8-e2, 304d4-e5); Meno (71 a 1-7, 80dl-4); and Republic I  {337e4-5).
29. Vlastos insists on the complexity of Socratic irony, and he maintains that in Socrates’s 
saying concerning knowledge and wisdom what is said is and isn’t what is meant. See his 
Socratic Studies. 65.
30. Such a defense of his piety in Plato’s Socratic dialogue is responded to by 
Xenophon’s defense of Socrates when he writes that Socrates “...never did anything 
impious against the gods, neither by word and deeds of one who deserves to be 
recognized as a most pious man” (Memorabilia, 1.1.20).
31. See Vlastos’s Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. 280-97. See also Connors’ 
“The Other 399: Religion and the Trial of Socrates.”
32. See Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death. 99.
33. Johnanne Climacus defines such knowledge vividly when he writes, “(God) is in the 
creation, and present everywhere in it, but directly he is not there; and only when the 
individual turns to his inner-self, and hence only in the inwardness of self-activity, does he 
have his attention aroused, and is enabled to see God.” See his Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript. 218.
34. Representative of these scholars are A.E. Taylor (1933) 103, Guthrie (1971) 61-64, 
and Stone (1988) 117-39. But, I can hardly agree with Brickhouse and Smith who
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classify Vlastos into this group of scholars because of my observation that Vlastos insists 
on the Platonic Socrates’s preference for the Greek democratic constitution. See 
Brickhouse (1994). 157.
35. For example, Wood and Wood state that Socrates was active “in a conspiracy against 
the democratic constitution of Athens.” See their Class Ideology and Ancient Political 
Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context. 97. However, later studies by 
scholars like Vlastos argued for the Platonic Socrates’s preference for the Athenian 
democratic constitution with the textual evidence in his early dialogues. See Vlastos’s 
“The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy.”
36. Zero category in generative transformational linguistics often refers to “zero article” 
when a noun or a noun phrase is used without an article, and I have borrowed this concept 
to distinguish Confucius’s ironical representation of his rhetoric of knowledge.
37. See Bakhtin’s “Epic and Novel” in The Dialogic Imagination. 24.
38. D. C. Muecke attempts to distinguish verbal and situational ironies by the formulae 
that “He is being ironic...” and “it is ironic that....” See his The Compass o f Irony. 42.
39. In Chapter Three, I have presented a description of the dialogic relation between 
Heaven and Confucius as a tragic hero.
40. See my analysis of his dialogue with Zilu on death and afterlife. Also, refer to 
Harbsmeiers’s essay.
41. The May Fourth Movement (1919-1921) was a new cultural trend by Chinese youth, 
which aimed at a criticism of Confucianism and making a break with China’s “feudalism.”
42. One of the representative modem neo-Confucianists, Mou Zhongsan, has provided a 
historical and philosophical approach to Chinese culture, which leads him to the 
conclusion that Confucianism, in the form of “a moral being” and “an artistic being”, has 
achieved its “subjective freedom” in the light of the Hegelian theory. However, this 
freedom can hardly bring Chinese society into a modem democratic politics, because 
Confucianism is never “a political being” that aims at the political and legal restriction over 
the Chinese rulers, the emperors. See his Lishi zhexue. (Historical Philosophy). 189-93.
43. See Tu Wei-ming’s description of the modem Chinese intellectual quest for the 
interaction between Confucian humanism and democratic liberalism in his book Way, 
Learning and Politics. 161 -78.
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44. Representative is Kuang Yarnin’s Marxist analysis o f Confucius’s democratic spirit. 
See his Kongzi pinzhucm. (Criticism of Confucius). 316-20.
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Conclusion
In the preceding four chapters, I have made an exploration o f Confucius’s and 
Socrates’s dialogical rhetoric from the perspectives of a voice of credibility, proto- 
scientific attitude, tragic consciousness and irony. The present study rejects the 
conventional polarized stances that either exclude the Confucian and Socratic dialogues 
from the domain of rhetorical criticism or confine an otherwise fruitful study of their 
dialogues to a set of traditional rhetorical/cultural norms.1 As Wayne C. Booth observes, 
“The worst enemy of good reading as of good criticism is the application of abstract rules 
that violate the life of particular works” (227). We need some approach or method to 
reflect a particular rhetorical practice of these two ancient giants whose philosophical 
endeavor has made its influence felt in the past two millennia and a half. Their anxiety 
over a new theoretical representation leads to my discovery in Mihail Bakhtin’s dialogism 
of a powerful method that illuminates the shared aspects of Confucius’s and Socrates’s 
rhetoric, that is, their dialogical form and dialogic imagination. It is a dialogic reading that 
enables us to discern double voices or sometimes a multiplicity of voices that compete for 
would-be solutions for particular philosophical problems but never reduce such a 
rhetorical situation to the “chaos” of divergent moral or political claims. Moreover, 
dialogism which encourages plurality as opposed to polemics helps to locate a “rhetorical
219
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unconsciousness” in Confucius’s and Socrates’s moral dialogues, because these dialogues 
often convey an ‘‘anti-rhetorical” attitude, and their philosophical implications turn out to 
be so manifest that their rhetorical norms are much overshadowed. Even so, we are still 
enticed to make, in the light of Bakhtin’s critique, a tentative definition of Confucius’s and 
Socrates’s “dialogical rhetoric,” a verbal exchange in an informal conversational style that 
focuses on scientific and philosophical issues, values divergent voices in a process of on­
going interaction, and is characterized by a use of irony and a high sense o f emotion, 
tragic or comic.
The essential and foremost element of such a rhetorical practice is its proto- 
scientific attitude and philosophical concern. Pervasive through Confucius’s dialogue and 
speech is an open, though not comprehensive, system of ethical theory that attempts to 
represent the true nature of an ideal social construction and human relations—Way ( \& ), 
to highlight a set of moral principles with Ren ( ,  benevolence) as its core and Li ( $  , 
rites) as its guidance. Simultaneously, Confucius’s pragmatic attitude also results in his 
contribution to popular science and technical communication for ancient Chinese society. 
In Socrates’s case, his dialogue, as a scientific method, is always centered on a moral 
philosophy to seek the final truth of eudaimonism (happiness) and the functions of ethical 
issues essential to the improvement of a human soul. His philosophical exploration usually 
proceeds through an elenctic investigation, a process of refutation. Socrates’s dialogue, 
like that of Confucius, also throws new light on Greek science and technical 
communication. Illuminating to the modern rhetorical theory is also Confucius’s deep
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
221
insight into a dialogic interpretation of the relation between De , morality) and Ycm 
( ,  word), or between a moral truth and a true rhetoric (Socrates). Though Confucius 
differs from Socrates and takes harmony as the objective of his rhetorical activities, 
Socrates’s recourse to argumentation is by no means counteractive to the concept of 
harmony, for his elenctic refutation is based on a positive evaluation of consensus between 
interlocutors of a dialogue. Moreover, the Confiician rhetorical practice, as my analysis 
indicates in Chapter Three, never totally excludes the method of argumentation even if he 
repeatedly presents a negative attitude to Ming ( (4c , empty talk and glibness of tongue) 
and Zheng ( ,  contending with each other). What Confucius rejects seems to be high- 
sounding words and empty talk which undermine the De (•(£., morality) of a speaker and 
destroys the credibility of an utterance. So, the over-emphasis on Confucius’s negative 
opinion of argumentation2 may lead to a misrepresentation of his dialogical rhetoric which 
sometimes does sound antagonistic in the defense of his moral principles. Through a 
comparative study of Socrates’s and Confucius’s dialogues, I tend to believe that 
argumentation, no matter how it is presented and to what extent it reaches, proves to be 
instrumental in rhetorical activities of both the East and the West.
Another rhetorical vision my dissertation attempts to highlight is Confucius’s and 
Socrates’s dialogized tragic consciousness which is reflected in their pessimistic 
understanding of a real world philosophical exploration, in their dilemma of being forced 
to address an unfavorable rhetorical situation, and also in a perpetual tragic response 
evoked by their miserable end of life among their followers and readers, ancient and
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modem. Both Confucius and Socrates felt frustrated in life, for their divine missions are 
often misrepresented and their moral claims are often ridiculed. Worse still, they had to 
struggle hard to get their own voices heard in a rhetorical context where even their life 
was threatened with a death penalty (in Socrates’s case) or a murder (in Confucius’s case), 
because the power of their orality posed a challenge to the voice of either the authority or 
the majority.
Certainly, Confucius and Socrates are not conventional types of tragic heroes of 
ancient mythology or drama. Their dedication to the exploration of human knowledge and 
to a continuous rhetorical activity displays now and then an optimistic attitude to an 
otherwise disappointing social reality-social disorder, injustice, and personal frustration. 
What makes their dialogues lasting works of rhetoric is a subtle interaction between two 
opposite emotional tendencies. When Confucius’s speech conjures up a carefree journey 
in the boundless ocean (Ch. 5.7) and when Socrates’s defense for his choice of staying in 
the prison brings out an eternity of spiritual happiness after his mortal extinction {Apology, 
Crito), the listeners or readers feel a great relief from a suffocating tension resulting from 
a brutal destiny ranged against these two philosophers. Tragedy and comedy are thus 
melted or fused into a peaceful intellectual conversation, though actual conversation does 
not always produce such an imaginative power. Presumably, what characterizes 
Confucius’s and Socrates’s tragic consciousness is also its power of persuasion which 
evokes a tragic response of the listeners/readers to a passion for knowledge inquiry and 
self-examination/personal cultivation. In Bakhtin’s terms, such tragic consciousness is
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always “addressive” to its readers not only with a sense of historical reality about the 
speaker’s personal experience but also with a humanistic concern for intellectual 
enlightenment of the other—the reader or the listener. To trace a tragic tendency in their 
dialogues should not, however, obscure the distinction between the connotations of 
Socrates’s and Confucius’s emotional structure. Socrates’s tragic understanding of the 
Athenian social reality tends to prevent him from undertaking rhetorical confrontation in 
the political arena3 while Confucius’s dialogue suggests that only a political participation 
leads to the realization of Way (Ch. 18.6). Besides, in regard to the issue of death, 
Socrates insists that he would rather die than to stop his elenctic investigation, while 
Confucius claims that a “gentleman” is ready to lose his life only in a practical cause of 
“benevolence” (Ch. 15.9), which implies that a gentleman values his life and is not 
prepared to die for certain philosophical or rhetorical activities.4 The difference between 
our tragic heroes obviously helps to shape differing attitudes toward political participation 
and life-and-death issues in the West and the East.
Like many previous works of scholarship on rhetoric, this dissertation also touches 
upon the topic of irony, though my focus is on how a use of irony, as a rhetorical strategy, 
helps to configure the concepts of knowledge, piety and democratic spirit in Confucius’s 
and Socrates’s dialogues, and demonstrates the reconciling effects of their dynamic 
relations with audience and situation, and also with our contemporary acceptance. Both 
Socrates and Confucius start their exploration from a recognition of human ignorance or 
“not knowing” ( ) ,  but their dialogues c-llen make audience or readers convinced
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that they possess genuine knowledge, for they know how to seek knowledge and they 
have a method. The difference lies in the fact that Socrates’s interaction with his 
interlocutors is directed to questioning and finding error with any statement that claims to 
the knowledge or final truth, while Confucius’s rhetorical activity generally relies on a 
continuous contact with anything, oral or written, that reflects tradition or legacy, and 
with anyone, educated or rustic, who possesses knowledge and is ready to join him in a 
discussion. Though Confucius’s tone in discussing his personal wisdom is much softened, 
both of the philosophers attempt to suggest that every statement may be questioned by 
their interlocutors/discussants or people of the following generations (Ch. 9.23), thus 
pointing to the ironic nature of philosophical inquiry of proceeding forward without being 
finalized.5
In terms of Confucius’s and Socrates’s attitude toward piety, we may discern an 
even more profound sense of irony. Their self-professed piety in accordance with a divine 
mission and their skepticism of any human endeavor to prove the existence of the 
supernatural put themselves in a vulnerable position. The true meaning of irony is their 
transformation of conventional religious belief into a moral philosophy, which enables 
Confucius to concentrate on a dialogic interpretation of moral education of the common 
people and enhances Socrates’s dialogic reading of the divinity as a virtuous force that 
sheds light on his spiritual journey. Since piety was a much less touchy issue in early 
China than in early Greece, Confucius neve: had to defend openly his piety as Socrates 
was forced to, and his religiousness still continues its dialogue with both a neo-Confucian
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interpretation of early Chinese science and a Marxist acceptance of a “plain materialistic” 
viewpoint in Confucius. Comparatively, Socrates’s piety, apart from its revolutionary 
spirit, is less warmly accepted in the Western world where religion, as both a way of life 
and a means of moral education, is still passionately defended as was the case with the 
Athenian god-believers.
In view of Socrates’s and Confucius’s dialogue concerning democracy, irony exists 
between a traditional misrepresentation of their attitude and a rediscovery of their 
democratic spirit, which presents a dialogized mode of modem acceptance. Democratic 
or oligarchic, Confucius’s and Socrates’s verbal activities simply deny any definite or 
monologized reading, for both of the thinkers contribute, in one way or another, to the 
configuration of the doctrine of democracy, though their political claims are often 
sympathetic with the oligarchic systems of their own time, which, once again, confirms a 
general belief that any great work can be supremely and intrinsically ironic, consequently 
encouraging a dialogic reading.
As has been repeatedly highlighted in my explication, both Socrates and Confucius 
regard dialogue as a way of philosophical life, because they envision a genuine rhetorical 
practice that relies on interaction between examiner and examinee, and questioner and 
questionee, thus making a great contribution to rhetorical culture. In his heated attack on 
Sophistic rhetoric in the Gorgias, Socrates scored sophistic handbooks for the absence of 
intellectual activity of active participants. Consistent with this rhetorical stance, he again 
focused his attack in his transitional dialogue, Phaedrus, on the negative use of rhetoric
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that denies the dialogical exchange of ideas and emotions. Similarly, Confucius’ rhetorical 
vision not only takes dialogue as a method of knowledge-making and learning (Ch. 7.22), 
but also negates the verbal activity that is characterized by high sounding words and empty 
talk (Ch. 11.25).
In regard to the twentieth-century acceptance of classical rhetoric, the strength of 
their dialogical rhetoric is generally reflected in two aspects: one is the understanding that 
it is the process of dialogue that makes human knowledge communicable (Ch. 7.1, 11.43). 
Socrates, as a central figure of his dialogue, makes possible the earliest philosophizing of 
human knowledge while Confucius, as a major contributor to the conversations and 
speeches in The Analects, enables us to follow the process of his philosophical exploration 
as a most influential Eastern thinker; the other is the understanding of Word or Yan ( ,
word) as individual voices that have to be defined in their relations to others, or in 
Bakhtin’s words, the individual voices address and are simultaneously defined by not only 
the voices of others but also by the voices of themselves in a rhetorical context of 
“heteroglossia.” To emphasize these two aspects of Confucius’s and Socrates’s rhetorical 
contribution is to indicate the vitality of their dialogical rhetoric in today’s liberal 
education and also in the increasing expansion o f electronic information. In the classroom 
of composition or speech communication, rhetorical activities are encouraged to engage 
both teacher and learner in a joint effort in composing process, which is appropriately 
represented as “contending with words” in Socrates’s expression (Harkin and Schilb, 5). 
And in the contemporary theory of communication, such a “contending” process is
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extended, in accordance with the Confucian rhetorical vision, to display an interaction 
between individual voices and also among human voices, time and space.6 We are 
convinced that the evolution of the twentieth-century orality and literacy is calling for the 
recapture of the oral process and written convention embedded in the Confucian and 
Socratic dialogues because of the fact that although dialogue, as a major rhetorical form, 
was dying in Plato’s Athens and the similar rhetorical activity became less popular after 
the Warring States period (475-221 B.C.) of early China, the interiorization of computer 
science and global electronic communication in our lives has tied classical rhetoric with 
our contemporary period. The changes in the means of communication have gradually 
compressed our globe into an ever-diminishing village, and meanwhile, revolutionized our 
concept of verbal exchange with dialogue embedded in written form. Furthermore, the 
coming generation of communication marked by visual-aid talks and phonetic 
identification transformation systems (spoken messages will be automatically transformed 
into written ones in different languages) will greatly reduce our dependence on writing 
skills in the near future, and face-to-face dialogue will presumably become once again the 
major form of our verbal activities. What is more important, such a dialogue will be 
actualized regardless of cultural differences and linguistic barriers. It might not be a 
premature inference that an interest will be further revived in oral culture and our study of 
Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogical rhetoric will gain more weight in terms of its 
theoretical as well as its practical value.
After drawing a picture of future forms of human communication, I attempt to call 
attention to the issue of how Confucius and Socrates contribute to a cross-cultural
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dialogue between China and the West. As is stressed in my introduction, a comparative 
study of the Confucian and Socratic dialogues may function as bridge between the Eastern 
and Western civilizations. To establish such bridge is not only necessary but also possible. 
My argument is based on the following considerations. To begin with, both Confucius’s 
and Socrates’s dialogical rhetoric derives from their humanistic concern for the human 
condition. Put in a philosophical tone, it deals with the problematic and the questionable, 
and their rhetorical vision exhibits questions or moral issues and puts forth arguments for 
or against the chosen solutions. Socrates’s rhetorical practice is almost exclusively 
directed to questions concerning human confusion with ethical knowledge. Taking the 
Gorgias and Phaedrus for example, Plato’s Socrates is found saying that in the true art 
and science of rhetoric the purpose o f joining in a face-to-face discussion is to raise a 
voice to promote either justice or truthfulness among one’s discussants. Similarly, that is 
the reason that Confucius’s dialogue and speech are always morality-ridden and 
pragmatism-oriented. In fact, his utterance is often directed to the phenomena of social 
disorder or moral degradation. A dialogue between these two ancient philosophers once 
again alerts modem readers to almost similar problems and questions in our rhetorical 
context at the turning of the twentieth century, though these issues are closely related to 
very sophisticated material civilizations and are often branded with the distinct cultural 
values of the East or the West. In a deeper sense, it becomes much harder for us to argue 
for a chosen solution. For instance, the issues about the relationship between individual 
and society, between the human condition and environmental ecology have presented a
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great challenge to our time and required us to resort to the wisdom of ancient 
philosophers like Confucius and Socrates, and to adapt their dialogic interpretations to 
meet our needs.
Second, Confucius’s and Socrates’s rhetoric, as is explored in Chapter Two, has 
developed a high sense of tolerance to different voices and viewpoints and encouraged a 
harmonious rhetorical situation for a common philosophical exploration. To Socrates, this 
tolerance often comes from a human virtue of temperance. A temperate person, according 
to his examination with Critias in the Charmides (167a), is one who knows himself and is 
able to examine what others know and what they do not. Certainly, this knowledge 
should take itself as its object. This understanding is also consistent with human 
knowledge expounded in the Apology (20d). Here, temperance signifies again the honesty 
to admit one’s own limits and sincerity in exploring the limits of others, therefore 
preparing oneself for a life-long investigation with others to seek knowledge, particularly 
the knowledge of the soul. Confucius’s tolerance in his dialogical rhetoric displays the 
spirit of “not imposing on others what you yourself do not desire” (Ch. 12.2). His 
tolerance raises a moral principle for dialogical interaction between self and other, which is 
based on the recognition of what one does not desire. It seems that Confucius’s and 
Socrates’s attitude to such a moral issue in communication are complementary rather than 
contradictory. While Confucius’s dialogue often starts from one’s own moral standard so 
as to use it to guide human relations, Socrates’s exploration generally begins with the self­
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knowledge of one’s ignorance so as to help others to realize the similar weakness in 
themselves. Confucius emphasizes that due respect for each other in word and behavior is 
the key to a cooperative search for knowledge, whereas Socrates seems to claim that 
common recognition of human limits is the key to a constructive dialogue. As far as 
cross-cultural communication is concerned, both of their attitudes contribute to a 
meaningful exchange of ideas. For how could a dialogue be guaranteed as an ongoing 
contact without due respect for the interests and value standards of all the participants, 
and how could a joint philosophical/moral exploration achieve anything without the shared 
virtues of courage and temperance to face the truth, which could bring shame or 
frustration for one participant or another? When appealing to dialogue between the East 
and the West, we cannot ignore the fact that a true dialogue is often a rhetorical and 
linguistic activity in form but a cultural conflict in meaning.7 Such a dialogue calls for 
tolerance of cultural and moral differences between the participants before a common goal 
is raised for the benefit of all those involved. Since no rhetorical, linguistic or cultural 
tradition can claim its hegemony over others, no participant in a verbal exchange is 
encouraged to practice a kind of “rhetorical imperialism.”8 In this sense, the dialogic 
imagination of Confucius and Socrates points to the right way of a cross-cultural 
conversation which aims at an ongoing interaction and a mutual enlightenment in favor o f 
all the rhetors/discussants. Such a democratic spirit is also highly constructive in the 
human effort to reduce tension in East-West contact and is repeatedly justified to be the 
most efficient communication practice.9
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Finally, the Confucian and Socratic dialogues have become new sources for 
rhetorical exploration with the emerging awareness o f second orality.10 The recent rapid 
development of electronic communication technologies have much revived academic 
interest in classical oral rhetoric.11 As is emphasized before, electronic revolution is 
greatly changing the face o f today’s communication, and the conversational technique will 
possibly once again come into the center of the twenty-first century’s rhetorical culture. 
This relatively fragile territory of communication may be further cultivated for a better 
understanding of the conversational arts originating from the ancient rhetoricians like 
Confucius and Socrates.
What then are the essential elements that have animated their dialogical practice 
for more than twenty centuries? It is their voiced message in an artificial text- 
composition, or a combination of orality and literacy. And also its “miracle” in initiating 
the power of word and particularizing its potential in real situations where people are 
engaged with either a scientific inquiry or merely daily communication. In other words, 
Confucius and Socrates demonstrate a new mode of communication—dialogical rhetoric.
It is both dialogue and rhetoric. Being dialogue, it takes into view the dynamic relations 
between participants/discussants, and between human agents and divergent topics. Being 
rhetoric, it not only resorts to rhetorical conventions like credibility or Xin ( ,  sincerity), 
emotional appeals of tragic consciousness and a use of irony, but also values a scientific 
attitude of seeking truth or Way ). Following the lead of Bakhtin’s dialogism, we are 
able to discern the interdependence of the d ialogical practice and rhetorical norms in their
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invention, because such a complementary relation is animated in the contextualization of a 
continuous interactive process of their rhetorical conduct. Due to this dialogic openness, 
Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogue has provided modem communication with a practical 
choice to go on their scientific search or everyday exchange of ideas with the help of the 
sophisticated electronic media. Thus, our ancient philosophers remain responsive to our 
time, and to our questions and discussions. Simultaneously, the dialogue also continues 
between Confucius and Socrates themselves, for the norms of their rhetorical culture need 
to be articulated, defined or moderated by each other in a global communication that aims 
at an accountability for both the general norms and particular applications of their 
dialogical rhetoric.
Notes
1. See the analysis in my “Introduction.”
2. In his recent research, Carl Becker has made a detailed analysis of ancient East Asian 
rhetoric and addressed the question why the Chinese and Japanese lack a tradition of 
argumentation from social, linguistic and philosophical perspectives. See his “Reasons for 
the Lack of Argumentation and Debate in the Far East.”
3. For instance, when explaining why he never ventures to address the Athenians in the 
public sphere and advise on the state administration, Socrates gives the reason as “If I 
had tried long ago to engage in politics, I should long ago have lost my life, without 
doing good either to you or to myself’ {Apology, 3 2d). Vlastos also maintains that 
this self-confession indicates that Socrates pleads guilty for his failure in advising the 
Athenians so as to serve his city. This argument does not sound convincing, for 
Socrates later defends his silence in the public sphere with the reason that it is the 
Athenian democracy that suffocates the different voices {Apology, 32a). See Vlastos’s 
Socratic Studies. 128-29.
4. It is obviously part o f the Western tradition to advocate sacrifice for the freedom of
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speech. By contrast, the sacrifice of one’s life for a political cause gains more weight 
in the Eastern civilizations.
5. See also Mueckes’s discussion on the ironic nature of scientific knowledge in The 
Compass o f Irony. 152-58.
6. In his paper, Chen Guo-ming discusses five Confucian concepts that help to develop a 
harmoniously interdependent relationship in the Chinese communication process: Bian 
(change), Shi (time), Wei (environment), Ji (the trace of movement) and Zhong Dao 
(appropriateness). See his “A Chinese Perspective of Communication Competence.”
7. Samuel Huntington convincingly argues for his hypothesis that the conflict of the 
future world will be among the eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, 
Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African ones. I can hardly agree, however, 
to his West-centered rhetoric that may do more harm than good to an otherwise 
constructive dialogue between the West and the East, or “the West and the Rest,” and that 
is also in discord with his argument that each of the different civilizations “will have to 
learn to co-exist with the others.” See his “The Clash of Civilizations.”
8. I have borrowed the term “imperialism” from “linguistic imperialism” which refers to 
the dominance of a language that is asserted and maintained by establishment and 
continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between this language 
and other languages. See Robert Phillipson’s Linguistic Imperialism. 47.
9. Only a few recent examples may illustrate the vitality of such a democratic spirit in 
Confucius’s and Socrates’s dialogues: the fruitful conversation between ASEAN (the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and WEU (Western European Union) in 
1996, the solution to the trade conflict resulted from a consultation between the U.S.A. 
and Japan in 1996, and the gradual improvement of Sino-American relations through a 
constructive strategic dialogue (including a planned presidential hot-line) ever since 1995. 
When highlighting the function of dialogical rhetoric, I certainly do not intend to exclude 
the economic, political or military factors that motivate dialogue between the East and the 
West.
10. In a collection of essays published in 1977, Ong studied the evolution of the word in 
relation to a wide range of subjects and raises the term “second orality” in order to 
indicate his belief that the basic orality of language is permanent. See his Interfaces
o f the Word: Studies in the Evolution o f Consciousness and Culture.
11. For detailed discussion, see Richard Lanham’s The Electronic Word: Democracy, 
Technology, and the Arts.
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